Feyerabend's Against Method: Feyerabend's Against Method 11

‘On the other hand, there are some telescopic phenomena which are plainly Copernican. Galileo introduces these phenomena as independent evidence for Copernicus while the situation is rather that one refuted view – Copernicanism – has a certain similarity to phenomena emerging from another refuted view – the idea that telescopic phenomena are faithful images of the sky. Galileo prevails because of his style and clever techniques of persuasion, because he writes in Italian rather than Latin, and because he appeals to people who are temperamentally opposed to the old ideas and standards of learning connected with them’

the question here is really whether anything is verified or refuted at this stage of the game – or for that matter – really at any stage of the game?

the simple fact of the matter is yes Galileo was proposing a cosmological view that was in conflict with the status quo

this does not mean that his view was ‘refuted’ –

the argument of the Aristotelians – and the grounds on which it was based – is of course what Galileo was challenging

to simply say that the argument of the Aristotelians or its observation statements refuted Galileo is to miss the point

this argument was rather just what Galileo was arguing against

to assert that the status quo ipso facto ‘refutes’ any alternative view is to fall back into un-reflective ignorance

it is clear that Feyerabend – in proposing this view is either playing the devil’s advocate – rather too well –

or which is more likely – that this approach is just a straw man argument – indeed a pretence – to effect a conclusion (Galileo’s ‘clever techniques of persuasion’) – for which there is in fact – no evidence

Feyerabend goes on to say –

‘But – and with this I come to what I think is the central feature of Galileo’s procedure – there are telescopic phenomena which agree more closely with Copernicus than do the results of naked-eye observation’

the idea here is that the evidence is fitted to the theory – and used to support the theory – and then presented as a refutation of the opposing theory

let us assume for the argument’s sake that this in broad design is Galileo’s method

my question is – so what?

if he has found phenomena that the naked eye theory of the Aristotelians cannot account for – then prime facie he has an argument against them

now of course they can argue that the phenomena are not genuine – and as it were counter Galileo on theoretical grounds –

this line of attack though does place the theoretical issue of true vision front and centre

Galileo is at an advantage here

the Aristotelians can only assert their theory of vision as true – and the Copernican-Galilean view as false

that is they have nowhere to go – once they are challenged

they can knuckle down – and hold their ground – claiming some form of common sense

Galileo on the other hand can show that their theory of vision hides a relativism

i.e. even with terrestrial vision there is no absolute in the visual field – and illusions abound

and on the basis of this Galileo can then argue that the deliverances of the telescope – are in this relativistic respect – no different

but further that telescopic observations are an advance on naked eye observation – just because of the fact of range of scope and magnification –

and you could say these notions – range of scope and magnification – have as much common sense status as so called veridical observation

all this is to point to the fact that the Aristotelians have no theoretical advantage –

and Galileo does have a phenomenal advantage –

i.e. the phenomena the Aristotelians can’t see or account for – such as the change in brightness of Mars as it approaches and recede from the earth

‘The reader will realize that a more detailed study of historical phenomena such as these, creates considerable difficulties for the view that the transition from pre-Copernican cosmology to that of the 17th century consisted in the replacement of refuted theories by more general conjectures which explained the refuted instances, made new predictions, and were corroborated by the observations carried out to test these predictions. And he will perhaps see the merits of a different view which asserts that, while the pre-Copernican view was in trouble (was confronted by even more drastic refuting instances and implausibilities); but that being in harmony with still further inadequate theories it gained strength, and was retained, the refutations being made ineffective by ad hoc hypotheses and clever techniques of persuasion. This would seem to be a more adequate description of the developments at the time of Galileo than is offered by almost all alternative accounts.’

a proposition – a ‘theory’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

if you take this view – then from a logical point of view – no theory is verified or falsified – in any final sense –

it is always open to question

a verified proposition – or theory – is one that is accepted – for whatever reason –

and the ground of any acceptance – as with the proposition – the theory itself – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

a falsified proposition – or theory – is one that is not accepted – is rejected – for whatever reason

and the ground of any rejection – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

that is the logic of the matter

as to what happened and why – yes that is an historical issue – and any proposal here –

is likewise open to question – to doubt – is uncertain

Feyeraband as a methodologist of science – and of the Copernican / Galilean revolution – puts up a proposal – to account for the move to the Galilean perspective

is it a more adequate description of the developments of the time – than i.e. the conjecture / refutation view of Karl Popper?

my point would be that any methodological proposal – has a place at the table –

and that any methodological proposal – as with any empirical / historical proposal – is open to question

genuine understanding of any issue – is not a matter of finding the truth – in any final sense – it is rather the exploration of possible perspectives

the hard fact is that the matter is never settled

and we have to understand the role of philosophical prejudice – in these matters

philosophers come to the matter to be explained – with metaphysical – logical – epistemological – ontological perspectives –

where the focus is a particular subject – i.e. the history of a scientific episode – these perspectives may be unstated – even as they are the driving force of any analysis and interpretation

if these perspectives are un-questioned – they are prejudices

logically speaking the methodologist is in the same position as the scientist or the historian – he operates with proposals – propositions – theories that at any point are open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

there is no final word – empirically – theoretically – methodologically

the best we can hope for is multiplicity – variety – imagination – and argument –

on-going argument

Feyerabend began with this statement –

‘Galileo prevails because of his style and clever techniques of persuasion, because he writes in Italian rather than Latin, and because he appeals to people who are temperamentally opposed to the old ideas and standards of learning connected with them.’

Feyerabend does not present any evidence for this claim

none at all

what we get from Feyerabend is an assertion – and an assertion that is purely rhetorical –

that is an assertion meant to persuade – in the absence of argument – in the absence of evidence

let us assume for the argument’s sake that because Galileo wrote in Italian and not Latin so more of his countrymen could be aware of his ideas –

it doesn’t follow from this that therefore his theories would prevail

it is conceivable that quite the opposite could have resulted

and the same point applies to the suggestion that Galileo appealed to those who are temperamentally opposed to the old ideas –

‘the temperamentally opposed’ might well have rejected his ideas along with the old ideas –

the problem here is that the Italian and temperament proposals – are just speculations –

interesting – but baseless as presented here by Feyerabend –

and really given that this idea that Galileo was a clever propagandist – is a central plank of Feyerabend’s argument concerning Galileo –

you would expect something more substantial than just throwaway lines

I say that Galileo prevailed because of the perceived strength of his argument

and if that is so – then it is irrelevant whether the argument was presented in Latin – Italian – or Swahili –

and I would also put that a good argument – that is a skilful use of logic – will appeal to those with an open mind – regardless of their temperament

that’s my proposal

‘Such irrational methods of support are need because of the ‘uneven development (Marx Lenin) of different parts of science. Copernicanism and other essential ingredients of modern science survived only because reason was frequently overruled in their past.’

Feyerabend begins here with –

‘A prevalent tendency in methodological discussions is to approach problems of knowledge sub specie aeternitatis, as it were. Statements are compared to each other without regard to their history and without considering that they might belong to different historical strata. For example, one asks: given background knowledge, initial conditions, basic principles, accepted observations – what conclusions can we draw about a newly suggested hypothesis? The answers vary considerably. Some say that it is possible to determine degrees of confirmation and that the hypothesis can be evaluated with their help. Others reject any logic of confirmation and judge hypotheses by their content, and by the falsifications that have actually occurred. But almost everyone takes it for granted that precise observations, clear principles and well-confirmed theories are already decisive; that they can and must be used here and now to either eliminate the suggested hypothesis, or to make it acceptable, or perhaps even prove it!’

sub specie aeternitatis – from the point of view of eternity

there is no such point of view

a statement – a proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain –

regardless of its history

its history by the way is someone’s proposal – someone’s theory – regarding where it came from

where it came from – might be of interest –

but logically speaking – it is not relevant

‘For example, one asks: given background knowledge, initial conditions, basic principles, accepted observations – what conclusions can we draw about a newly suggested hypothesis? The answers vary considerably.’

the answers vary considerably – because logically speaking the newly suggested hypothesis – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘But almost everyone takes it for granted that precise observations, clear principles and well-confirmed theories are already decisive; that they can and must be used here and now to either eliminate the suggested hypothesis, or to make it acceptable, or perhaps even prove it!’ –

‘almost everyone’?

where is the evidence for this?

what we have from Feyerabend here is a straw man argument –

I don’t know what everyone or almost everyone believes –

but I can say that any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

if people believe in ‘precise observations’ – ‘clear principles’ – and that ‘well-confirmed theories are already decisive ‘ –

then they are deluding themselves –

this is not to say – such delusions – are not central to scientific practice –

they may well be

‘Such a procedure makes sense only if we can assume that the elements of our knowledge – the theories, the observations, the principles of our arguments – are timeless entities which share the same degree of perfection, are all equally accessible, and are related to each other in a way that is independent of the events that produced them. This is, of course, an extremely common assumption. It is taken for granted by every logician; it underlies the familiar distinction between a context of discovery and a context of justification; and it is often expressed by saying that science deals with propositions and not with statements or sentences. However the procedure overlooks that science is a complex and heterogeneous historical process which contains vague and incoherent anticipations of future ideologies side by side with highly sophisticated theoretical systems ancient and petrified forms of thought. Some of its elements are available in the form of neatlty written statements, while others are submerged and become known only, by contrast, by comparison with new and unusual views. (This is the way in which the inverted tower argument helped Galileo to discover natural interpretations hostile to Copernicus. And this is also the way in which Einstein discovered certain deep-lying assumptions of classical mechanics, such as the assumption of the existence of infinitely fast signals. For general considerations, cf. the last paragraph of chapter 5) Many of the conflicts and contradictions which occur in science are due to this heterogeneity of the material, to this ‘unevenness’ of the historical development, as a Marxist would say, and they have no immediate theoretical significance. They have much in common with the problems which arise when a power station is needed right next to a Gothic cathedral. Occasionally, such features are taken into account; for example, when it is asserted that physical laws (statements) and biological laws (statements) belong to different conceptual domains and cannot be directly compared. But in most cases, and especially in the case observation vs. theory, our methodologies project all the various elements of science and the different historical strata they occupy on to one and the same plane, and proceed at once to render comparative judgments. This is like arranging a fight between an infant and a grown man, and announcing triumphantly, what is obvious anyway, that the man is going to win (the history of kinetic theory and the more recent history of hidden variable theories in quantum mechanics is full of insane criticisms of this kind and so is the history of psychoanalysis and of Marxism). In our examination of new hypotheses we must obviously take the historical situation into account. Let us see how this is going to affect our judgment!’

the elements of our knowledge – are not timeless entities –

any assumption to that effect – is simply rhetorical

any so called ‘context of discovery’ – is of course open to question

any so called ‘context of justification’ – likewise – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

a proposition – any proposition – is a proposal –

and as such open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

‘However the procedure overlooks that science is a complex and heterogeneous historical process which contains vague and incoherent anticipations of future ideologies side by side with highly sophisticated theoretical systems ancient and petrified forms of thought.’

if there are ‘vague and incoherent anticipations of future ideologies’ – it is because they have been proposed –

if these ‘vague and incoherent anticipations of future ideologies’ – are not proposed – they are not there –

and if they are there – they are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

and the same logic applies to ‘highly sophisticated theoretical systems ancient and petrified forms of thought.’

there is no hidden past or present – there is just what is proposed

and logically speaking what is proposed – is open to question

this hidden knowledge argument of Feyerabend is best placed in the middle ages –

or in those mythologies that deny the reality of the empirical world – or see it – as some kind of sham or illusion

Feyerabend is not a modern thinker – if he had his way – he would take epistemology and science back beyond the dark ages

he is an obscurantist – and as far as I can tell enjoys being so –

if you are not fair dinkum – then of course you can play the hide and seek game –

and to be honest I have no problem with this –

just one game among the many games – people play

‘Some of its elements are available in the form of neatlty written statements, while others are submerged and become known only, by contrast, by comparison with new and unusual views. (This is the way in which the inverted tower argument helped Galileo to discover natural interpretations hostile to Copernicus. And this is also the way in which Einstein discovered certain deep-lying assumptions of classical mechanics, such as the assumption of the existence of infinitely fast signals.’

Galileo proposed – interpretations that put to question Copernicus’ view

Einstein proposed – the existence of infinitely fast signals –

these arguments weren’t available – weren’t there – before they were proposed

what we deal with in reality is what is proposed –

reality – just is what is put – what is proposed

‘Many of the conflicts and contradictions which occur in science are due to this heterogeneity of the material, to this ‘unevenness’ of the historical development, as a Marxist would say, and they have no immediate theoretical significance. They have much in common with the problems which arise when a power station is needed right next to a Gothic cathedral. Occasionally, such features are taken into account; for example, when it is asserted that physical laws (statements) and biological laws (statements) belong to different conceptual domains and cannot be directly compared. But in most cases, and especially in the case observation vs. theory, our methodologies project all the various elements of science and the different historical strata they occupy on to one and the same plane, and proceed at once to render comparative judgments. This is like arranging a fight between an infant and a grown man, and announcing triumphantly, what is obvious anyway, that the man is going to win.’

look proposals are put – propositions are put – different propositions are put –

and yes you can spend time outlining the historical differences –

the real issue is critical engagement – engagement in propositional uncertainty

decisions get made – uncertain decisions – decisions – open to question – open to doubt –

and we proceed

that is – we proceed with – and in – uncertainty –

and what we do is explore the uncertainty – we have proposed

the common ground of all propositional action is the unknown –

the unknown is silent –

and so we have no known common ground

what we do in our decision procedure is look for a way forward

and any way forward – any way decided upon – does not register a ding in eternity –

it is nothing more than a proposal – a contingent proposal –

which has no certainty to it –

and which in the passage of time – might well be tossed

as to the decision procedure –

we have invented various propositional games – games which pretend a common ground – games such as verification and falsification

these games are easily dismissed – if we question their logic –

any ‘verified’ proposition – is open to question –

the same is true of falsification –

unless you stop the logical process of question and doubt – there is no verification – no falsification –

and any decision to stop – must be illogical

nevertheless these games and variants of them are played

and from a logical point of view – they can only be regarded as pretentious – and their only value is rhetorical

what percentage of scientific practise is logical – and what percentage is rhetorical – is indeed an interesting question

what is clear is that science does not work in a purely logical fashion – and that it does not work in a purely rhetorical manner –

science – as with the rest of our propositional life – is a mixture of logic and rhetoric –

if you like – the rational and the irrational

the rational purists will find this view intolerable –

and the irrationalist purists likewise will kick up –

the point I make is that the human being uses both rational and irrational strategies to get through this life

and in any complex propositional enterprise – you will find both the rational and the irrational – living together – uneasily perhaps – uncertainly – yes

referring to the Copernican theory –

Feyerabend continues –

‘It is obvious that such a new world view will take a long time appearing, and that we may never succeed to formulate it in its entirety. It is extremely unlikely that the idea of the motion of the earth will at once be followed by the arrival, in full formal splendour, of all the sciences that are now said to constitute the body of ‘classical physics’. Or, to be a little more realistic, such a sequence of events is not only extremely unlikely, it is impossible in principle, given the nature of man and the complexities of the world he inhabits. Yet it is only after these sciences have arrived that a test can be said to make sense.’

an odd statement –

‘it is impossible in principle, given the nature of man and the complexities of the world he inhabits’

I would put that the nature of man is uncertain – and that the complexities of the world he inhabits – are uncertain –

and it is in this uncertainty – that different – and hence new views arise – and that new views – even new disciplines – get developed

Feyerabend here is taking a sweeping view of the development of modern science –

such a view fails the test of now

and the test of now – is that which is proposed – that which is questioned – that which is a matter of doubt

we don’t know the future – we don’t know how a theory will be – in the future –

all we can reasonably talk about – is what we have now –

and how we are going to proceed with the proposals – the theories that are before us –

speculating about what is needed for a theory to be triumphant – is just pretence –

it is pretending a god’s eye view – a perspective that no one actually has – and a perspective Feyerabend claims to argue against –

it is just fanciful rhetoric –

and if this ‘perspective’ is based on an historical argument –

i.e. what has been the case in the past – will be case in the future –

then it is a perspective based on very bad logic

‘This need to wait and to ignore large masses of critical observations and measurements, is hardly ever discussed in our methodologies. Disregarding the possibility that a new physics or a new astronomy might have to be judged by a new theory of knowledge and might require entirely new tests, scientists at once confront it with the status quo and announce triumphantly that ‘it is not in agreement with facts and received principles’. They are of course right, and even trivially so, but not in the sense intended by them. For at an early stage of development the contradiction only indicates that the old and new are different and out of phase. It does not show which is the better one. A judgment of this kind presupposes that the competitors confront each other on equal terms. How shall we proceed in order to bring about such a fair comparison?’

science is not a game of leap frog –

it is not about generating new theories or cosmologies for the sake of it

it is not about how to make one theory obsolescent and another triumphant – only to then render the triumphant theory – obsolescent – with the new theory etc. etc.

science is the investigation of propositional uncertainty – theoretical propositions – observational propositions –

uncertainty is the focus –

and yes out of this uncertainty come new perspectives on existing theories – and indeed new theories that challenge existing perspectives

those who hold to the status quo without question – are not scientists – they are bigots –

yes – old and new are different – and you can drop ‘old’ and ‘new – and just stick with ‘different’ –

‘it does not show which is the better one’ – quite right –

reason is – there is no ‘better one’ – there are only different ones

why does one scientific system gain supremacy over another?

well – who can say? –

but my bet is that – in the end – one view comes to be regarded as more useful than another –

that is just my speculation –

the logical reality is that – the question of why one view gains cultural supremacy – is an open question –

one for which there will be no definitive or final answer –

the question is live – and will remain live

‘A judgment of this kind presupposes that the competitors confront each other on equal terms.’

well – I don’t think it does –

that is I don’t think it presupposes that that they confront each other on equal terms –

there are no equal terms – if you are talking about fundamentally different theories – different conceptions

Feyerabend asks –

‘How shall we proceed in order to bring about such a fair comparison?”

‘The first step is clear: we must retain the new cosmology until it has been supplemented by the necessary auxiliary sciences. We must retain it in the face of plain and unambiguous facts. We may, of course, try to explain our action by saying that critical observations are either not relevant or that they are illusory, but we cannot support such an explanation by a single objective reason. Whatever explanation we give is nothing but a verbal gesture, a gentle invitation to participate in the development of the new philosophy. Nor can we reasonably remove the received theory of perception which says that the observations are relevant, gives reasons for this assertion, and is confirmed by independent evidence. Thus the new view is quite arbitrarily separated from those data that supported its predecessor and is more ‘metaphysical’: a new period in the history of science commences with a backward movement that returns us to an earlier stage where theories were more vague and had smaller empirical content. This backward movement is not just an accident, it has a definite function; it is essential if we want to overtake the status quo, for it gives us the time and freedom that are needed for developing the main view in detail, and for finding the necessary auxiliary sciences.’

the ‘necessary auxiliary sciences’ – will be elements of a theory –

and the theory – with the auxiliary sciences – will be – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

the ‘necessary auxiliary sciences’ – will increase the uncertainty of the theory –

and this increase of uncertainty – is an increase of empirical content

there is no ‘must’ here – there is just what happens –

if a new theory is ‘retained’ – it will be retained presumably because someone thinks it has real promise

if – as it happens – it doesn’t light any fires – it will for all intents and purposes –

most likely – be dropped –

that is to say it will not be proceeded with by scientists working in the relevant field –

yes you can invite others to participate in the development of a new philosophy –

interesting intellectual game –

but if that is all it is – I think you will find – the players drop off –

look – this idea that the new view is arbitrarily separated from those data that supported its ‘predecessor’ –

means either – it’s not in the game – or in fact it is not ‘separated from the data’ –

if you think it is separated from it – then all that means is that you haven’t been able to show that it can be an interpretation of the data –

that it offers a new and different view of the data

if it doesn’t do this then it is not likely to be of any use to anyone in the relevant critical context

it strikes me that Feyerabend is arguing for the new – for the sake of the new –

and in so doing has lost his bearings –

he’s floating around somewhere – but no port in sight

he seems to want to avoid any contact with the data – which is to say with the science – that is actually going on

and it has got a little queer – because he wants to justify this methodology – with a ‘backward movement’ – a retreat

a retreat to a pre-scientific perspective – a ‘more metaphysical’ time and place –

where ‘theories were more vague and had smaller empirical content’ –

not to my mind – a step in the right direction

the whole point of this ‘backward movement’ – we are told is to ‘overtake the status quo’

well I don’t think the status quo need be too worried

and in any case – it strikes me that Feyerabend here in arguing for the overtaking of the status quo – is closer to a capitalist notion of corporation takeover than he is to his professed anarchism

the point being – if a new scientific theory ‘takes over’ the status quo theory – it becomes the status quo – ripe for takeover from another theoretical start-up –

what do they call it?

dog eat dog.

‘This backward movement is indeed essential – but how can we persuade people to follow our lead? How can we lure them away from a well-defined, sophisticated and empirically successful system and make them transfer their allegiance to an unfinished and absurd hypothesis? To a hypothesis, moreover, that is contradicted by one observation after another if we only take the trouble to compare it with what is plainly shown to be the case by our senses? How can we convince them that the success of the status quo is only apparent and is bound to be shown as such in 500 years or more, when there is not a single argument on our side (and remember that the illustrations I used two paragraphs earlier derive their force from the success of classical physics and were not available to the Copernicans). It is clear that allegiance to the new ideas will have to be brought about by means other than arguments. It will have to be brought about by irrational means such as propaganda, emotion, ad hoc hypotheses, and appeal to prejudices of all kinds. We need these ‘irrational means’ in order to uphold what is nothing but a blind faith until we have found the auxiliary sciences, the facts, the arguments that turn the faith into sound ‘knowledge’.’

‘This backward movement is essential’?

no – its not essential – it is retrogressive – it’s a way of going backwards

‘It’s clear that allegiance to the new ideas will have to be brought about by means other than arguments’

no – this is not clear – not clear at all

what Feyerabend is saying here is – if you have a proposal – an hypothesis – a theory – a world view –

but you have no argument for it – and you still believe in it – still hold to it

you will try to persuade – without argument – you will use irrational means – i.e. – emotion

an ad hoc hypothesis – by the way is an argument – it is not irrational

and yes being a champion of ignorance – you will double down on your prejudices

as for blind faith – just hot air

‘until we have found the auxiliary sciences’ –

that is until we have found the arguments that give the proposal something resembling substance –

waiting for the miracle to come –

it’s the methodology of the shyster – sign up now – and you will receive the goods in the mail – when in fact there are no goods at all

turning faith into knowledge –

turning faith into knowledge – is ditching faith altogether – and recognising that what we propose – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

and it is understanding that the exploration of uncertainty – is the road of argument

I am seriously unimpressed with this ‘argument’ from Feyerabend –

if Feyerabend had his way – we’d be back in the dark ages – or beyond –

with no question – no doubt – and ‘secure’ in the arms of prejudice and propaganda

Feyerabend states at the head of this chapter –

‘Copernicanism and other essential ingredients of modern science survived only because reason was frequently overruled’

we have no real account of what ‘reason’ is – from Feyerabend

he assumes we all know just what he means here –

and from what I can gather – ‘reason’ – as Feyerabend uses the term – is some reining intellectual orthodoxy – even the status quo – that is in someway or another enforced by the powers that be

so – it is some form of an authoritarian intellectual hegemony

ok – the point is – this is not reason – this is prejudice – entrenched prejudice –

and Feyerabend’s central mistake is just that he confuses reason with prejudice

reason is the critical capacity

it is the propositional action of question – of doubt – and of regarding any proposal put as uncertain

there is no authority – but the authority of authorship –

and logically speaking – the authorship of a proposal – of a proposition of any form – is irrelevant

authority – or claims to authority – are logically irrelevant –

such claims are the province of prejudice and rhetoric

if Feyerabend was saying that Copernicanism and other essential ingredients of modern science survived because prejudice and claims to authority were put to question – put to doubt –

then at least – he would have had a point as far as I can see – and at least he would have got reason and reasoning right

as to the why the Copernican theory et el survived –

it is an open question –

there will be various proposals put in explanation of the success of these theories

and these proposals – these explanations – will be open to question – open to doubt –

will be – uncertain

Galileo’s method works in other fields as well. For example, it can be used to eliminate arguments against materialism and put an end to the philosophical mind / body problem. (The corresponding scientific problems remain untouched, however.)

Feyerabend says the following –

‘Galileo made progress by changing familiar connections between words and words (he introduced new concepts), words and impressions (he introduced new natural interpretations), by using new and unfamiliar principles (such as the law of inertia and his principle of universal relativity), and by altering the sensory core of his observation statements. His motive was the wish to accommodate the Copernican point of view. Copernicanism clashes with some obvious facts. It is inconsistent with plausible, and apparently well-established, principles, and it does not fit in with the ‘grammar’ of a commonly spoken idiom. It does not fit in with the ‘form of life’ that contains these facts, principles, and grammatical rules. But neither the rules, nor the principles, nor even the facts are sacrosanct. The fault may lie with them and not with idea that the earth moves. We may therefore change them, create new facts and new grammatical rules, and see what happens once these rules are available and have become familiar. Such an attempt may take considerable time, and in a sense the Galilean venture is not finished even today. But we can already see that the changes were wise ones to make and that it would have been foolish to stick with the Aristotelian form of life to the exclusion of everything else.’

‘But neither the rules, nor the principles, nor even the facts are sacrosanct. The fault may lie with them and not with idea that the earth moves. We may therefore change them, create new facts and new grammatical rules, and see what happens once these rules are available and have become familiar.’

Feyerabend is on the right track here – nothing is sacrosanct

from a logical point of view any proposal – any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – is to be regarded as – uncertain

proposals – theoretical and experimental – are put – and yes – we see what happens

‘But we can already see that the changes were wise ones to make and that it would have been foolish to stick with the Aristotelian form of life to the exclusion of everything else.’

what we can see is that yes – changes were made –

and that from the point of view of the new perspective – the Aristotelian ‘form of life’ was regarded as ‘inadequate’ –

that is how it has paned out –

was it ‘wise’ to make these changes?

well from the point of view of those who endorse the changes – yes

and there is probably no-one today who would argue for Aristotelianism –

but regardless of the fashion of the time –

logically all we have is not – wise and unwise perspectives – but rather different proposals – simply different –

and proposals that regardless of who does or does not endorse them – are open to question – open to doubt – are uncertain

‘With the mind/body problem, the situation is exactly the same. We have again observations, concepts, general principles, and grammatical rules which, taken together, constitute a ‘form of life’ that apparently supports some view, such as dualism, and excludes others, such as materialism. (I say ‘apparently’ for the situation is much less clear here than it was in the astronomical case.) And we may again proceed in the Galilean manner, look for new interpretations, new facts, new grammatical rules, new principles which can accommodate materialism and then compare the total systems – materialism and the new facts, rules, natural interpretations, and principles on the one side; dualism and the old ‘forms of life’ on the other. Thus there is no need to try, like Smart, to show that Materialism is compatible with the ideology of common sense. Nor is the suggested procedure as ‘desperate’ (Armstrong) as it must appear to those who are unfamiliar with the conceptual change. The procedure was commonplace in antiquity and it occurs wherever imaginative researches strike out in new directions (Einstein and Bohr are recent examples.)’

Feyerabend misses the logical point – the issue is not between ‘old’ and ‘new’ –

what we have is different proposals

and if you are going to argue that the way forward is to find new facts – new rules – new natural interpretations – for one view –

then presumably you are committed to doing the same for the other view

it’s pretty clear here that Feyerabend advocates ‘free thinking’ – for his own preference –

but does not extend the courtesy to points of view and perspectives – that he doesn’t favour

so it is just the same old game – with a rhetorical flourish – suggestive of the opposite to what it is

pure rhetoric – from Feyerabend

Smart proposes that materialism is compatible with common sense – that’s all –

and his notion of common sense – is purely physicalist – good luck with that

and Armstrong – in arguing that the mental should be defined in causal terms and identified with purely physical processes in the brain (brain states) – is – like Smart simply asserting physicalism

Smart and Armstrong – as with Feyerabend – are pushing their own barrows –

that it seems is the philosophical game

in my view the object is not to ‘eliminate’ (falsify) points of view – but to facilitate proliferation of different theories – different views

Feyerabend seems to get this – when talking about physics – but forgets it when looking at his own enterprise – a case of amnesia rather than anamnesis?

he regresses – to a fundamentalist mind-set – where the object is to eliminate the opposition

the rational approach I would suggest is to put our resources into developing all points of view in the mind-body problem

I put that the history of the mind / body problem makes it clear that different theories have been used at different times by different groups for their purposes

i.e. Cartesian dualism suits idealists – and idealism suits certain purposes – certain interests – i.e. religious

the mind-brain identity thesis – renders the mind consistent with a physicalist metaphysics – and thus with modern physical science

the fact that historically there has never been just one view of the nature of the mind-body relation indicates quite clearly that no one view will serve all the purposes a theory of mind is needed for

what we have is different usages – different conceptual schemes – different outlooks on the world – on the nature of reality

the argument for a single view of anything is I would suggest the argument of a small mind – whatever that small mind is proposed to be

‘The results obtained so far suggest abolishing the distinction between a context of discovery and a context of justification and disregarding the related distinction between observational terms and theoretical terms. Neither distinction plays a role in scientific practice. Attempts to enforce them would have disastrous consequences.’

Feyerabend proceeds –

‘Let us now use the material of the preceding sections to throw light on the following features of contemporary empiricism: (1) the distinction between a context of discovery and a context of justification; (2) the distinction between observational terms and theoretical terms; (3) the problem of incommensurability. The last problem will lead us back to the problem of rationality and order vs. anarchism, which is the main topic of this essay.

One of the objections which may be raised against my attempt to draw methodological conclusions from historical examples is that it confounds two contexts which are essentially distinct, viz. a context of discovery, and a context of justification. Discovery may be irrational and need not follow any recognised method. Justification, on the other hand, or – to use the Holy Word of a different school – criticism, starts only after the discoveries have been made, and it proceeds in an orderly way. ‘It is one thing’, writes Herbert Feigl, ‘to retrace the historical origins, the psychological genesis and development, the socio-political-economic conditions for the acceptance or rejection of scientific theories; and it is quite another thing to provide a logical reconstruction of the conceptual structure and of the testing of scientific theories.’ These are indeed two different things, especially as they are done by two different disciplines (history of science, philosophy of science), which are quite jealous of their independence. But the question is not what distinctions a fertile mind can dream up when confronted with a complex process, or how some homogeneous material may be subdivided by accidents of history; the question is to what extent the distinction drawn reflects a real difference and whether science can advance without a strong interaction between separated domains. (A river may be subdivided by national boundaries, but this does not make it a discontinuous entity.) Now there is, of course, a very noticeable difference between rules of testing as ‘reconstructed’ by philosophers of science and the procedures which scientists use in actual research. The difference is apparent to the most superficial examination. On the one hand a most superficial examination shows that a determined application of the methods of criticism and proof which are said to belong to the context of justification, would wipe out science as we know it – and would never have permitted it to arise. Conversely, the fact that science exists proves that these methods were frequently over ruled. They were overruled by precisely those procedures which are now said to belong to the context of discovery. To express it differently: in the history of science, standards of justification often forbid moves that are caused by psychological, socio-economic- political and other ‘external’ conditions and science survives only because thesemoves are allowed to prevail. Thus the attempt ‘to retrace the historical origins, the psychological genesis and development, the socio-political-economic conditions for the acceptance or rejection of scientific theories’, far from being an enterprise entirely

different from the consideration of tests, actually leads to a criticism of these considerations – provided the two domains, historical research and discussion of test procedures, are not kept apart by fiat.’

any proposition – be that a proposition of discovery or a proposition of justification – is a proposal

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

that is the logic of propositional action – be it termed ‘scientific’ – ‘philosophical’ – or whatever

irrational action – is propositional action that is not held open to question – open to doubt

that is – propositional action that is regarded as certain

the claim of certainty – is the hallmark of irrationality

discovery – is irrational – if it is regarded as a process that leads to certainty

discovery as the investigation of uncertainty – of uncertain propositions – is rational

justification – if it is a process that is said to lead to certainty – is irrational

justification – as the decision to proceed with uncertainty – in uncertainty – is rational

criticism does not start only after discovery –

criticism is the engine of propositional discovery –

it is through propositional criticism that discoveries are made – and are proposed

and as to the ‘justification of the proposition’ – the decision to hold to a proposition – to proceed with a proposition –

that decision – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘justification’ – logically speaking – can only be the investigation of propositional uncertainty

the investigation of propositional uncertainty is criticism – is a critical activity

‘retracing the historical origins’ etc. – of a proposition – of theory – if it is done rationally

is a critical activity –

just as – ‘the logical reconstruction of the conceptual structure of scientific theories ’ – and the testing of scientific theories – if it is rational – is a critical activity

discovery and justification –

there are not ‘two different things’ –

rational activity – in any propositional context – is critical – and – from a logical point of view – never stops being critical

so there are no ‘separated domains’ – in rational activity –

what you actually have with this context of discovery / context of justification issue – if you have anything at all – is simply a division of labour – a division of work practices –

i.e. when one is in the discovery mode – justification may not be a central focus –

and when one’s focus is ‘justification’ – the discovery phase will have less significance

whether or not there is in actuality – in practise – anything like a real distinction here – could only be determined by a comprehensive empirical study of scientific work practices

to my mind – this distinction between a context of discovery and a context of justification is really a nothing issue

the thinking scientist I suspect understands that – at every turn – at any point in his work – there are questions – doubts – uncertainties –

discovery can well be seen as a question of justification – if you like –

and justification – a question of discovery –

there is nothing here

‘the rules of testing as ‘reconstructed’ by philosophers’ – if they are dealt with rationally are open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

the same is to be said of any procedure a scientist uses

a determined application of the methods of criticism – does not – would not – in fact ‘wipe out science as we know it’ –

a critical attitude simply gives a rational perspective – a rational understanding of science

science – has and will – does – proceed – whether or not it is prosecuted in a rational or irrational manner

it is the scientist who decides what science is

philosophers focus on the question of rationality –

if a standard of justification adopted by a scientific community ‘forbids moves that are caused by psychological, socio-economic-political and other ‘external’ conditions’ –

so be it – there you have it –

if the attempt ‘to retrace the historical origins, the psychological genesis

and development, the socio-political-economic conditions for the acceptance or

rejection of scientific theories’ – is a critical activity – then the activity is rational

if such an attempt is not critical – it is not rational

‘A similar argument applies to the ritual distinction between methodological prescriptions and historical descriptions, Methodology, it is said, deals with what should be done and cannot be criticized by reference to what is. But we must of course make sure that our prescriptions have a point of attack in the historical material, and we must also make sure that their determined application leads to desirable results. We make sure by considering (historical, sociological, physical, psychological, etc.) tendencies and laws which tell us what is possible and what is not possible under the given circumstances and thus separate feasible prescriptions from those which are going to lead into dead ends. Again, progress can be made only if the distinction between the ought and the is is regarded as a temporary device rather than a fundamental boundary line.’

how scientists proceed – is how they proceed –

there is no ‘ought’ here

either you operate in a manner that is recognized by those who practice science – or you don’t do science

how science is practised – how it is done – is open to question –

and historical studies show us that the practice of science – is uncertain –

nevertheless it is scientists who decide what science is and how it is practised

as to ‘desirable results’ –

this notion is I think facile and immature –

you propose and develop theories and test them – you see what the results are

and the results – whether you like it – or not – are the results

if that’s not satisfaction enough for you – find another job

what is possible and what is not possible – is determined in the testing

dead ends – require new theories – or new tests – or both

‘progress’ – is whatever results from the work

as for the use of historical material – historical insights – yes they must have a point relevant to whatever is being investigated –

historical examples though – are not science – they are history

these notions of ‘prescriptions’ and ‘progress’ – are rhetorical –

good for the advertising and selling of science –

but irrelevant to the actual practice of science

Feyerabend doesn’t get that science is about what is – not about what was – or what will be – or should be –

whatever he is on about – it is not science

‘A distinction which once may have had a point but which has now definitely lost it is the distinction between observational terms and theoretical terms. It is now generally admitted that this distinction is not as sharp as it was thought to be only a few decades ago. It is also admitted, in complete agreement with Neurath’s original views, that both theories and observations can be abandoned; theories may be removed because of conflicting with observations, observations may be removed for theoretical reasons. Finally, we have discovered that learning does not go from observation to theory but always involves both elements. Experience arises together with theoretical assumptions

not before them, and an experience without theory is just as incomprehensible as is (allegedly) a theory without experience; eliminate part of the theoretical knowledge of a sensing subject and you have a person who is completely disoriented and incapable of carrying out the simplest action. Eliminate further knowledge and his sensory world (‘his observation language’) will start disintegrating, colours and other simple sensations will disappear until he is in a stage even more primitive than a small child. A small child on the other hand does not posses a stable perceptual world which he uses for making sense of the theories before him. Quite the contrary – he passes through various perceptual stages which are only loosely connected with each other (earlier stages disappear when new stages take over – see chapter 17) and which embody all the theoretical knowledge available at the time. Moreover, the whole process starts only because the child reacts correctly towards signals, interprets them correctly, because he posses means of interpretation even before he has experienced his first sensation.’

observational terms – and theoretical terms –

what we have is proposals – and propositional categories

the categorizing – ‘observational’ – ‘theoretical’ – is organizational –

we organize our propositions – our propositional actions – into categories – to create propositional order and function

we categorize – and we create these categories – because such an ordering has proved useful

if we take a purely logical view here – we simply have proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

however propositional function – propositional utility – requires propositional organization

an observation is a propositional action

theory creation is a propositional action

experience is propositional action

our reality is propositional – and we categorize and organize our propositional actions into forms that enable function and use

‘an experience without theory’?

any ‘experience’ – is a propositional action – any ‘theory’ is a propositional action

a small child does not posses propositional stability – or propositional utility

we are born into a propositional world – we are taught a propositional reality

there is no ‘correct’ interpretation – there is only functional or non-functional propositional action

a sensation – is a propositional action – a propositional interpretation – an interpretation of what is given

and what is given is what is proposed – however – wherever – and in whatever form it takes

in the absence of proposal – what we face is the unknown –

our reality – is our propositional response to the unknown

‘Finally, the discussion in Chapters 6-13 shows that Popper’s version of Mill’s pluralism is not in agreement with scientific practice and would destroy science as we know it. Given science, reason cannot be universal and unreason excluded. This feature of science calls for an anarchistic epistemology. The realization that science is not sacrosanct, and that the debate between science and myth has ceased without having been won by either side, further strengthens the case for anarchism.’

here Feyerabend prepares the way for his argument for incommensurable theories in science

to this end he looks at the critical standards it is claimed by some constitute the content of rational argument

specifically he wants to look at the standards of the Popperian school

‘These standards are standards of criticism; rational discussion consists in the attempt to criticize and not in the attempt to prove or make probable. Every step that protects a view from criticism, that makes it safe or ‘well founded’, is a step away from rationality. Every step that makes it more vulnerable is welcome. In addition, it is recommended to abandon ideas which have been found wanting and it is forbidden to retain them in the face of strong and successful criticism unless one can present suitable counter arguments. Develop your ideas so that they can be criticized; attack them relentlessly; do not protect them, but exhibit their weak spots; eliminate them as soon as their weak spots become manifest – these are some of the rules put forward by our critical rationalists.

These rules become more definite and more detailed when we turn to the philosophy of science and, especially, to the philosophy of the natural sciences.

Within natural sciences, criticism is connected with experiment and observation. The content of a theory consists in the sum total of those basic statements which contradict it; it is the class of potential falsifiers. Increased content means increased vulnerability, hence theories of large content are to be preferred to theories of small content. Increase of content is welcome, decrease of content is to be avoided. A theory that contradicts an accepted basic statement is to be given up. Ad hoc hypotheses are forbidden – and so on and so forth’

‘to prove or to make probable’ –

if by ‘proof’ – you mean a logical end – to question – to doubt – to uncertainty –

there is no proof

and if by ‘probable’ – you mean a logical end to question – to doubt – to uncertainty –

there are no probable statements – hypotheses or theories –

proof and probability – are not logical concepts – they are rhetorical devices –

devices designed to boost any decision – to proceed

to render any such decision – acceptable and advisable

‘Every step that protects a view from criticism, that makes it safe or ‘well founded’ is a step away from rationality’ –

no view is logically speaking – beyond question or beyond doubt –

if by ‘well-founded’ – is meant – beyond criticism – then the well-founded view is a prejudice

uncertainty doesn’t stop us from action – uncertainty is the ground of action

we act – for whatever reason – and any reason we have – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

philosophers of science who have failed to accept – or understand this – have tended to act like moralists – fundamentalists even – preachers from the pulpit spouting moral imperatives –

this I think is true of the logical positivists – of Popper – and of Feyerabend –

though Feyerabend camouflages his fundamentalism – in the rhetoric of ‘anything goes’

and I would say it is not true of Kuhn and Lakatos –

they are – by and large – descriptivists – not prescriptivists

however the logical reality is that any description is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

science is what scientists do –

how the scientist proceeds – why the scientist proceeds as he does – and how he regards his procedure

is the practice of science –

and yes the practice of science is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

methodologists – of any persuasion – can put forward their theories and their insights

and I feel sure that any such proposals will be of interest to the reflective scientist –

but it is not for the methodologist to legislate or pontificate

such rhetoric will be seen by the working scientist for what it is – pretentious

the role of the methodologist is to question – to doubt – and to explore the uncertainty –

that is scientific practice –

and if necessary to educate the scientist to do the same

‘Now at this point, one may raise two questions.

1. Is it desirable to live in accordance with the rules of critical rationalism?

2. Is it possible to have both science as we know it and these rules?

As far as I am concerned the first question is far more important than the second. True, science and other increasingly depressing and narrow minded institutions play an important part in our culture, and they occupy the centre of interest for many philosophers (most philosophers are opportunists). Thus the ideas of the Popperian school were obtained by generalizing solutions for methodological and epistemological problems. Critical rationalism arose from the attempt to solve Hume’s problem and to understand the Einsteinian revolution, and it was then extended to politics and even to the conduct of one’s private life. (Habermas and others therefore seem justified in calling Popper a positivist.) Such a procedure may satisfy a school philosopher, who looks at life through the spectacles of his own technical problems and recognizes hatred, love, happiness, only to the extent that they occur in these problems. But if we consider the interests of man and, above all, the question of his freedom (freedom from hunger, despair, from the tyranny of constipated systems of thought and not academic ‘freedom of the will’) then we are proceeding in the worst possible fashion.

For is it not possible that science as we know it today, as a ‘search for the truth’ in the style of traditional philosophy, will create a monster? Is it not possible that it will harm man, turn him into a miserable, unfriendly, self-righteous mechanism without charm and humour? ‘Is it not possible’, asks Kierkegaard. ‘that my activity as an objective [or critico-rational] observer of nature will weaken my strength as a human being?’ I suspect the answer to all these questions must be affirmative and I believe that a reform of the sciences that makes them more anarchistic and more subjective (in Kierkegaard’s sense) is urgently needed.’

ok – I understand the view that ‘science and other depressing and narrow minded institutions play an important part in our culture’ –

I have been in that mood myself – but it is just one view –

and philosophers as opportunists? –

not my experience – but I can see that they could well be painted in that way

I find the ideas of the Popperian school – most interesting proposals –

and if they provide insights for the working scientist – they will be useful in his work

as to the ‘interests of man’ – that is an open question –

and feel free to throw anything you like into the mix –

but not a good idea to take yourself too seriously here –

‘the interests of man’ – is a work in progress –

as to what constitutes a ‘monster’ – there will be different theories

is it possible that science will turn man ‘into a miserable, unfriendly, self-righteous mechanism without charm and humour?’

miserable – unfriendly – self righteous – without charm and humour –

it depends where you are – and who you know –

it seems to me that such characteristics – if they are displayed – are best understood as circumstantial

human beings and their propositional practices – are too variable to be so definitively described –

and as for what will happen – well it is – unknown

best not to let your fears – dictate your theory of knowledge – or indeed your view of the world –

keep an open mind – whatever mood you’re in

as to ‘reforming the sciences’ – get off your high horse –

leave its shape and form – to the scientists

science is what it is – and will continue to be – whatever it is –

and whatever it is – is open to question – is open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘But these are not the problems I want to discuss now. In the present essay I shall restrict myself to the second question and I shall ask: is it possible to have a science as we know it and the rules of critical rationalism as described? And to this question the answer seems to be a firm and resounding No.

To start with we have seen, though rather briefly, that the actual development of institutions, idea, practices, and so on, often does not start from a problem but rather from some irrelevant activity, such as playing, which, as a side effect, leads to developments which can latter be interpreted as solutions to unrealised problems. Are such developments to be excluded? And, if we do exclude them, will this not considerably reduce the number of our adaptive reactions and the quality of our leaning process?’

‘is it possible to have a science as we know it and the rules of critical rationalism as described? And to this question the answer seems to be a firm and resounding No.’

I don’t know if Popper’s ideas are reflected in the actual practise of science –

and I have to say the same with regard to Feyerabend’s proposals –

both Popper and Feyerabend have interesting and useful things to say about scientific practise –

whether they are adopted by practicing scientists – is an empirical matter –

I don’t see any empirical studies on the matter from Popper or Feyerabend –

and yes – philo-historical analyses are worth having –

however they are just proposals – in the same boat as any other proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

and yes – the actual development of science – may or may not start with a problem

again – just how scientific work begins – is open to question

I have to note that we have the makings of a shell game from Feyerabend –

when is an irrelevant activity – no longer irrelevant? –

watch carefully

and when does not having a problem turn into a problem?

and furthermore there are no ‘unrealised problems’ lurking in a philosophical underworld

there is only what is put – what is proposed –.

that is the reality we face – and that is the reality we deal with –

a propositional reality – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Secondly, we have seen …that a strict principle falsification, or ‘naïve falsification’ as Lakatos calls it, would wipe out science as we know it and would never have permitted it to start.’

yes – a strict principle of any kind – would I think wipe out science as we know it

we don’t operate with strict principles –

yes we have some priests – some politicians and some philosophers – and some nut cases – barking out strict principles –

but from what I can see this mob is in the business of convincing themselves rather than anyone else –

in any case it is just harsh rhetoric – and most people see through it pretty quickly

just on falsification – from a logical point of view –

any so called falsification – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

in practice I think falsification is best seen as a propositional move –

a move in one direction – rather than the other

‘The demand for increased content is not satisfied either. Theories which effect the overthrow of a comprehensive and well-entrenched point of view, and take over after its demise, are initially restricted to a fairly narrow domain of facts, to a series of paradigmatic phenomena which lend them support, and they are only slowly extended to other areas……Later on of course the theory is extended to other domains; but the mode of extension is only rarely determined by the elements that constitute the content of its predecessors. The slowly emerging conceptual apparatus of the theory soon starts defining its own problems, and earlier problems, facts and observations are either forgotten or pushed aside as irrelevant. ….. A comprehensive theory, after all, is supposed to contain an ontology that determines what exists and thus delimits the domain of possible facts and possible questions. The development of new science agrees with these considerations. New views soon strike out in new directions and frown upon the older problems…which so much exercised the minds of earlier thinkers. And they do pay attention to preceding theories, they try to accommodate their factual core in the manner already described, with the help of ad hoc hypotheses, ad hoc approximations, redefinition of terms, or by simply asserting, without any more detailed study of the matter, that the core ‘follows from’ the new basic principles. They are ‘grafted on to older programmes with which they [are] blatantly inconsistent’.

The result of these procedures is an interesting epistemological illusion: the imagined content of the earlier theories (which is the intersection of the remembered consequences of these theories with the newly recognized domain of problems and facts) shrinks and may decrease to such an extent that it becomes smaller than the imagined content of the new ideologies (which are the actual consequences of these ideologies plus all those ‘facts’, laws, principles which are tied to them by ad hoc approximations or by the say-so of some influential physicist or philosopher of science – and which properly belong to the predecessor).

‘Theories which effect the overthrow of a comprehensive and well-entrenched point of view, and take over after its demise, are initially restricted to a fairly narrow domain of facts, to a series of paradigmatic phenomena which lend them support, and they are only slowly extended to other areas……’

a new theory – if viewed exclusively in terms of the old theory – will be restricted to a narrow domain of facts – the domain of the old theory –

but here we are talking about how the new theory is being viewed – and how it is being utilized and applied –

it depends on how you look at the new theory –

if you see the new theory in terms of what might be regarded as its full expression – it’s relation to the older theory – crucial as that may be in a particular context – may well be its least important dimension

‘Later on of course the theory is extended to other domains; but the mode of extension is only rarely determined by the elements that constitute the content of its predecessors. The slowly emerging conceptual apparatus of the theory soon starts defining its own problems, facts and observations are either forgotten or pushed aside as irrelevant. ….. A comprehensive theory, after all, is supposed to contain an ontology that determines what exists and thus delimits the domain of possible facts and possible questions.

the extension to other domains need not be later – it may already have been proposed –

it’s a question of context –

just how important the content of its predecessor is to its mode of extension – is something we can only speculate on –

it will depend on just what importance it is given by those involved at the time

‘a slowly emerging conceptual apparatus’? –

look – any theory new or old is – a logically speaking in a constant state of uncertainty –

the conceptual apparatus will be a propositional work in progress – whose central characteristic will be uncertainty

and yes – the facts and observations of the older theory will be put to question – to doubt – and will – if the procedure is logical – be regarded as uncertain –

and yes – they may be forgotten – they may be pushed aside

decisions get made –

any decision – is open to question –

as to the ‘comprehensive ontology’ – again – propositions will be put – or if you like assumed or presupposed –

but in any dynamic propositional action – the ontology of a theory – will be – as with all other propositional dimensions of the theory – uncertain

‘New views soon strike out in new directions and frown upon the older problems…which so much exercised the minds of earlier thinkers. And they do pay attention to preceding theories, they try to accommodate their factual core in the manner already described, with the help of ad hoc hypotheses, ad hoc approximations, redefinition of terms, or by simply asserting, without any more detailed study of the matter, that the core ‘follows from’ the new basic principles. They are ‘grafted on to older programmes with which they [are] blatantly inconsistent.’

‘blatant inconsistency’ –

logically speaking inconsistency is the fabric of propositional endeavour and action –

inconsistency is a marker for propositional uncertainty

theoretical action – theoretical development – is an exploration of propositional uncertainty

the ‘epistemological illusion’ – the ‘imagined’ content of earlier theories –

look – how a theory – its content is regarded – at any time – is open to question – is open to doubt – is uncertain –

one could say the whole point of a new theory is that it reinterprets –

and yes – there will be different – conflicting views on this –

that is the propositional reality

as Feyerabend’s illustrations above show – there is no certainty as to the relation between the new and the old theory

really it is a contingent matter –

it is just a question of how the situation is viewed by those involved at the time –

any proposed relation is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

on the ground – the reality is that perspectives are adopted – and proceeded with –

until for whatever reason – the propositional state of affairs is reviewed and re-interpreted

‘To sum up: wherever we look, whatever examples we consider, we see that the principles of critical rationalism (take falsification seriously: increase content; avoid all ad hoc hypotheses; ‘be honest’ – whatever that means; and so on) and a fortiori the principles of logical empiricism (be precise; base your theories on measurement; avoid vague and unstable ideas; and so on) give an inadequate account of the past development of science and are liable to hinder science in the future. They give an inadequate account of science because science in much more ‘sloppy’ and ‘irrational’ than its methodological image. And, they are liable to hinder it, because the attempt to make science more ‘rational’ and more precise is bound to wipe it out, as we have seen. The difference between science and methodology which is such an obvious fact of history, therefore, indicates a weakness of the latter, and perhaps of the ‘laws of reason’ as well. For what appears as ‘sloppiness’, ‘chaos’ or ‘opportunism’ when compared with such laws has a most important function in the development of those very theories which we today regard as essential parts of our knowledge of nature. These ‘deviations’, these ‘errors’, are pre-conditions of progress. They permit knowledge to survive in the complex and difficult world which we inhabit, they permit us to remain free and happy agents.

Without ‘chaos’, no knowledge. Without a frequent dismissal of reason, no progress. Ideas which today form the basis of science exist only because there were such things as prejudice, conceit, passion; because these things opposed reason; and because they were permitted to have their way. We have to conclude then, that even within science reason cannot and should not to allowed to be comprehensive and that it must be overruled, or eliminated, in favour of other agencies. There is not a single rule that remains valid under all circumstances and not a single agency to which appeal can always be made.’

there is no methodological account of science – be that critical rationalism – or Feyerabend’s so called ‘methodological anarchism’ – or whatever – that is beyond question – beyond doubt

what we get – at the best – from these and other methodological proposals – is insights –

suggested ways of proceeding – suggested methods of evaluation –

science is what it is –

which amounts to saying – it is how it is described – by whoever proposes a description

it is always a question of how you see –

some interpret in terms of some form of rational theory –

Feyerabend sees it as – sloppy – chaotic – opportunistic

in the absence of description – of any description at all – science is – unknown

it is made known in terms of descriptive proposals –

any such proposal is – open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

‘without ‘chaos’, no knowledge’?

forget chaos – what we are dealing with is propositional uncertainty –

knowledge is our response to the unknown –

and our responses are uncertain –

logically speaking – there is no such thing as ‘progress’ – what we have is movement in propositional space

what gets written up as ‘progress’ – is an exercise in rhetoric

Feyerabend’s ‘argument’ regarding reason – is I would suggest rather chaotic and sloppy itself –

yes – you can run with ‘anything goes ‘ – and go nowhere

reason is critical analysis –

a rational argument – is any argument that is up for question – up for doubt – is regarded as uncertain

‘There is not a single rule that remains valid under all circumstances and not a single agency to which appeal can always be made.’

yes – what we have from Feyerabend here is not an argument for his so called ‘anarchism’ – rather an argument for epistemological scepticism

and this is the central problem with ‘Against Method’ –

where it has value – it is not what it claims to be –

‘Against method’ – is at its best where it can be seen to endorse and advocate a methodological scepticism

Feyerabend is in many respects a traditionalist – he sees scepticism as a useful tool – a means to an end – and the end for Feyerabend is to defeat his philosophical enemies –

he plays the same tired old game

the radical step – is to see that any methodological proposal – an indeed – any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt and is – uncertain

it is to see that uncertainty is the ground and engine of propositional activity – of propositional life

‘Now we must remember that this conclusion has been drawn on condition that science as we know it today remains unchanged and that the procedures it uses must be permitted to determine its future development as well. Given science, reason cannot be universal and unreason cannot be excluded. This peculiar feature of the development of science strongly supports an anarchistic epistemology. But science is not sacrosanct. The restrictions it imposes (and there are many such restrictions though it is not easy to spell them out) are not necessary to have general coherent and successful views about the world. There are myths, there are dogmas of theology, there is metaphysics, and there are many other ways of constructing a world view. It is clear that a fruitful exchange between science and such ‘non-scientific’ world-views will be in even greater need of anarchism than is science itself. Thus anarchism is not only possible, it is necessary both for the internal progress of science and for the development of our culture as a whole. And Reason, at last joins all those other abstract monsters such as Obligation, Duty, Morality, Truth and their more concrete predecessors, the Gods, which were once used to intimidate man and restrict his free and happy development: it withers away ….’

‘Given science, reason cannot be universal and unreason cannot be excluded’ –

the problem with unreason – as in propositional action that is not open to question – open to doubt – that is regarded as certain – is that you get nowhere with it – in the sense that you don’t get beyond it

here I have in mind prejudice in whatever form it takes –

you don’t get beyond it – you don’t move from it – until you question it – until you take the supposed certainty out of it

passion is interesting – it can be an exploration of uncertainty – or an obstinate stand against doubt –

that is to say it can be rational or irrational –

I would put that no-one operates rationally under all circumstances –

and I don’t think that people are essentially – irrational

I think our lives are an uncertain mix of rational and irrational behaviour

the issue is understanding the difference

‘But science is not sacrosanct. The restrictions it imposes (and there are many such restrictions though it is not easy to spell them out) are not necessary to have general coherent and successful views about the world.’

yes – that I would have thought is obvious

‘It is clear that a fruitful exchange between science and such ‘non-scientific’ world views will be in even greater need of anarchism than is science itself.’

scientific and non-scientific world views – are proposals – open to question – to doubt – and uncertain

fruitful exchange between different world views – or should we say – between the proponents of different world views – is always possible if those involved are open to question – open to doubt – and can deal with uncertainty

anarchism as such has nothing to do with it –

where you have bigot against bigot – there will be no fruitful exchange

Feyerabend’s anarchism – as the methodology of overthrow – will suit the thugs

‘And Reason, at last joins all those other abstract monsters such as Obligation, Duty, Morality, Truth and their more concrete predecessors, the Gods, which were once used to intimidate man and restrict his free and happy development: it withers away’

these so called ‘abstract monsters’ – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

Feyerabend here displays his own prejudices – and thus his ignorance

‘Even the ingenious attempts of Lakatos to construct a methodology that (a) does not issue orders and yet (b) puts restrictions upon our knowledge-increasing activities does not escape this conclusion. for Lakatos’ philosophy appears liberal only because it is an anarchism in disguise. And his standards which are abstracted from modern science cannot be regarded as neutral arbiters in the issue between modern science and Aristotelian science, myth, magic, religion, etc.’

Feyerabend begins –

‘My quarrel with Lakatos concerns the standards he recommends, his evaluation of modern science (in comparison with say myth or Aristotelian science), his contention that he has proceeded ‘rationally’, as well as the particular historical data he uses in his discussion of methodologies. I start with his account of the first term on the list.

When a new theory or idea enters the scene it is usually somewhat inarticulate, it contains contradictions, the relation to facts is unclear, ambiguities abound. The theory is full of faults. However it can be developed, and it may improve. The natural unit of methodological appraisal is therefore not a single theory, but a succession of theories, or a research programme, and we do not judge the state in which a research programme finds itself at a particular moment, we judge its history, preferably in comparison with the history of other programmes.’

yes – the new theory – of for that matter any theory – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

is the natural unit of methodological appraisal – a single theory – a succession of theories – a research programme?

the logical unit of methodological appraisal – is the proposal

how the proposal is described – will depend on who does the describing – and most likely what description is in fashion –

we do judge the state in which a proposal – a ‘research programme’ – finds itself in –

at a particular moment

we are only directly connected to the particular moment –

if it is proposed that an historical perspective is relevant – such a proposal will be relevant – to the particular moment

Feyerabend here is putting that the history of a theory – of a succession of theories – of a research programme – is by fiat – his fiat – always relevant

we don’t need – any more authoritarian directives here –

if scientists investigate their proposals without reference to a history – so be it

if they use historical proposals – so be it –

whatever approach they take – their proposals – their descriptions – from a logical point of view – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘According to Lakatos the judgments are of the following kind: a research programme is said to be progressing as long as its theoretical growth anticipates its empirical growth, that is as long as it keeps predicting novel facts with some success…..’; it is stagnating if its theoretical growth lags behind its empirical growth, that is as long it gives only post hoc explanations of either chance discoveries or of facts anticipated by, and discovered in a rival programme. A stagnating programme may degenerate further until it contains nothing but ‘solemn reassertions’ of the original position coupled with a repetition, in its own terms, of (the success of) rival programmes. Judgments of this kind are central to the methodology Lakatos wishes to defend. They describe the situation in which a scientist finds himself. They do not yet advise him how to proceed.’

progression – theoretical growth anticipates empirical growth?

what is to be regarded as theoretical growth – what is to be regarded as empirical growth?

and does the proposed ‘theoretical growth’ anticipate the proposed empirical growth?

the logical reality is that any proposal of theoretical growth – any proposal of empirical growth – and any proposal of the relation between theoretical growth and empirical growth – will be open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and dealing with proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain – is just what science is – when science is proceeded with in a logical fashion

Lakatos’ methodological proposal – is in this respect – no different to any other methodological proposal

perhaps it will suit the temperament of some scientists –

and if so – yes – they will find it useful as a description of their work –

perhaps not –

it is philosophical wrapping paper –

it is one design among many

‘it is stagnating if its theoretical growth lags behind its empirical growth, that is as long it gives only post hoc explanations of either chance discoveries or of facts anticipated by, and discovered in a rival programme. A stagnating programme may degenerate further until it contains nothing but ‘solemn reassertions’ of the original position coupled with a repetition, in its own terms, of (the success of) rival programmes.’

I could see that a theory could well be regarded as stagnating if it is held that theoretical growth is lagging behind its empirical growth

on the other hand – it may well be that the theoretical growth – though at a point in time – lags behind the empirical growth – there is reason to believe that the theoretical growth will – in the passage of time – lead to better empirical growth

solemn reassertions of the original position – like claims of anticipated growth – are rhetorical

‘They describe the situation in which a scientist finds himself. They do not yet advise him how to proceed.’ –

yes a description – one among many –

and as for advise on how to proceed – everyone’s got advice

‘Considering a research programme in an advanced state of degeneration one will feel the urge to abandon it, and to replace it by a more progressive rival. This is an entirely legitimate move. But it is also legitimate to do the opposite and retain the programme. For any attempt to demand its removal on the basis of a rule can be criticized by arguments almost identical with the arguments that led to the ‘securing of a breathing space’ in the first place; if it is unwise to reject faulty theories the moment they are born because they might grow and improve, then it is also unwise to reject research programmes on a downward trend because they might recover and might attain unforseen splendour (the butterfly emerges when the caterpillar has reached its lowest stage of degeneration). Hence, one cannot rationally criticize a scientist who sticks to a degenerating programme and there is no rational way of showing that his actions are unreasonable.’

‘This is an entirely legitimate move.’ –

what makes it ‘legitimate’?

who decides what is and is not ‘legitimate’

where are the laws – determining what is or is not legitimate?

there are none –

yes – there are protocols and conventions – that guide scientific practice –

but these are open to question – open to doubt – they are uncertain

the point is – sticking with a degenerating programme – or not sticking with it – is neither legitimate or illegitimate –

scientists do what they do – how they do it –

they get peer support – the get funding – or they don’t

it seems that it is only philosophers that are stuck on this question of legitimacy

the real issue for philosophers of science is finding useful descriptions of science

it is not about legislating for science – or determining whether what occurs is legitimate or not

if a scientist or scientists decide to proceed with a theory or a research programme – that’s all there is to it

if on the other hand the scientist or scientists decide not to proceed with a theory or research programme – so be it

now these decisions are open to question – open to doubt

that is the logic of the matter –

and such decisions may produce what comes to be regarded as good science –

or they may end up being what is regarded – by whoever does the regarding – as a colossal waste of time energy and resources –

that too is science – and – that too is life

‘Hence, one cannot rationally criticize a scientist who sticks to a degenerating programme and there is no rational way of showing that his actions are unreasonable.’

any critical evaluation – any criticism – just is rational –

and if you get spooked by criticism – you need to toughen up

sure someone may say – ‘his actions are unreasonable’ –

if the scientist in question knows what he is on about – presumably he will argue his case

and unless his critics can surprise him with an observation – or an insight – that turns him around –

then he will most likely – proceed –

what’s ‘reasonable’ is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

that is the rationality of the matter

‘Lakatos agrees with this. He emphasises that one ‘may rationally stick to degenerative programme until it is overtaken by a rival and even after ‘programmes may get out of degenerating toughs. It is true that his rhetoric often carries him much further, showing that he has not yet become accustomed to his own liberal proposals. But when the issue arises in explicit form, then the answer is clear: the methodology of research programmes provides standards that aid the scientist in evaluating the historical situation in which he makes his decisions: it does not contain rules that tell him what to do.’

‘Lakatos agrees with this. He emphasises ‘one may rationally stick to degenerative programme until it is overtaken by a rival and even after’’

so what is the point of ‘rationality’ here for Lakatos?

it seems he might just as well have said – ‘one may work on a degenerative programme until it is overtaken by a rival and even after – or not’ –

i.e. just do your work

which is effectively to say – nothing – from a methodological point of view –

and if that is all Lakatos was effectively saying – I can see Feyerabend’s attraction to his point of view

as Feyerabend’s ‘anything goes’ – is on one reading – to say nothing

in my view – one may work on – whatever one works on – for whatever reason one has

and if you regard your ‘programme’ as open to question – open to doubt – as uncertain –

you have a rational – as in logical – perspective

if you don’t regard your work critically – you don’t have a rational / logical perspective

science – as with any other propositional activity – can be rational and logical – or not –

successful scientific work may come from a rational / logical perspective – or it may come from a prejudiced perspective –

the work – is the work – however it is appraised – the results are the results – however they come –

this not to say that there won’t be argument about how to proceed –

and it is not to say that argument won’t be efficacious in terms of outcomes –

this may well be the case – but just as equally it may not be

there seems to be this notion in philosophy of science – that unless science conforms to ‘rational practise’ – it’s not science –

Popper was big on this – and it’s rubbish –

science is science – however it is regarded from the point of view of someone’s theory of rationality

‘the methodology of research programmes provides standards that aid the scientist in evaluating the historical situation in which he makes his decisions: it does not contain rules that tell him what to do.’

perhaps –

but the point is that Lakatos is not saying that his standards are a piece with all other standards –

that is to say – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

and presumably he holds that his standards – his recommendations – have a solid basis –

a solid basis in history

a solid basis in history – or whatever – is still the problem of a solid basis

logically speaking there is no solid basis

any standard – any recommendation – in short any proposal – is open to question – and is therefore uncertain – not solid –

either that or Lakatos’ standards – his recommendations – are no more than his proposals – methodological proposals –

proposals the scientist can take up or leave –

Feyerabend has hitched his wagon to Lakatos –

and I think the reason is that Feyerabend has realised that with his ‘anything foes’ – he’s got nothing – nothing of substance

so if he can convince us that Lakatos with his historical standards and recommendations –

is in fact on the ‘anything goes’ track –

then he (Feyerabend) – actually has some content to his methodology – while preserving the freewheeling rhetoric of ‘anything goes’ –

it’s hard to see though – why logically speaking – there is a preference for Lakatos’ standards – as against any other standards – if all they are is proposals –

and indeed – if ‘anything goes’

perhaps Feyerabend – just has a preference for Lakatos’ proposals

and that is fair enough – but in that case – methodology – comes off as simply one preference against another –

and really all that will separate one preference from another – in practise – is persuasion – rhetoric –

my argument is simply that – if you are to behave rationally – if you want to operate logically – you regard any proposal – any standard – any argument – as open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and this is the argument for rational / logical scepticism –

for methodological scepticism

‘The methodology of research programmes thus differs radically from inductivism, falsification and from other even more paternalistic philosophies. Inductivism demands that theories that lack empirical support be removed. Falsification demands that theories that lack excess empirical content over their predecessors be removed. Everyone demands that inconsistent theories or theories with low empirical content, be removed. The methodology of research programmes neither does contain such demands nor can it contain them, as we have seen. Its rationale – ‘to provide a breathing space’ – and the arguments that established the need for more liberal standards make it impossible to specify conditions in which a research programme must be abandoned, or when it becomes irrational to continue supporting it. Any choice of the scientist is rational, because it is compatible with the standards. “Reason’ no longer influences the actions of the scientist. (But it provides terminology for describing the results of these actions.)’

yes – the methodology of research programmes is not overtly prescriptive –

but its ‘recommendations’ – make it prescriptive-lite

I think it is a more subtle and sophisticated form of prescriptivism – in the guise of descriptivism

it strikes me as an urbane prescriptivism

if you take out the prescriptivism of inductivism and falsification –

what you have is propositional models for scientific practice

and the methodology of research programmes – is just another one of these – a model for scientific practice –

these models – and any other models offered – provide useful insights into science –

and also useful methods of procedure

a methodological proposal – is just that – a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

the scientist can use it – or not – and whether he does or not – will be determined by circumstance –

the prescriptivist approach in philosophy of science is naïve – infantile – and frankly –

irrelevant –

scientists don’t need prescriptions –

methodological proposals may be of use

the big plus that Feyerabend sees for the methodology of research programmes is that it provides a ‘breathing space’

if you drop prescriptivism from science – forget about what someone claims should be done – and focus of what can be done

then the great ‘breathing space’ argument – sinks to the level of common sense –

no big leap forward

‘‘Reason’ no longer influences the actions of the scientist.’

if by reason you mean ‘prescriptions’ that may be true

but what needs to be understood – and I don’t think either Lakatos or Feyerabend do understand this – is that reason is not a prescription

‘prescriptions’ as in ‘directions’ – characteristically are – to whatever degree –

authoritarian pronouncements

prescriptivism in any shape or form – is the opposite of reason

reasoning is the action of propositional question – and doubt –

reason is the recognition of propositional uncertainty –

as for the claim that reason doesn’t influence the actions of the scientist –

to say this – is to say that question – doubt – uncertainty – doesn’t influence the actions of the scientist –

if you think this you are either deluded – living in a fantasy world – or just plain ignorant

no propositional activity – be it described as ‘science’ or whatever – is without question – or beyond doubt –

our propositional reality is uncertain

referring to his intellectual relationship to Lakatos – Feyerabend says –

‘… there is no ‘rationally’ describable difference between Lakatos and myself, always taking Lakatos’ standards as a measure of reason. However there is certainly a great difference in rhetorics: and we also differ in or attitude toward the ‘freedom of research’ that emerge from our ‘standards’. I now take a closer look at these differences.

The hallmark of political anarchism is its opposition to the established order of things: to the state, its institutions, the ideologies that support and glorify these institutions. The established order must be destroyed so that human spontaneity may come to the fore and exercise its right of freely initiating action, of freely choosing what it thinks is best. Occasionally one wishes to overcome not just some social circumstances but the entire physical world which is seen as being corrupt, unreal, transient, and of no importance. This religious or escatological anarchism denies not only social laws, but moral, physical and perceptual laws as well and it envisages a mode of existence that is no longer tied to the body, its reactions and its needs. Violence, whether political or spiritual, plays an important role in almost all forms of anarchism. Violence is necessary to overcome the impediments erected in a well-organized society, or by one’s own modes of behaviour (perception, thought, etc.), and it is beneficial for the individual, for it releases one’s energies and makes one realise the power at one’s disposal. Free associations where everyone does what best suits their talents replace the petrified institutions of the day, no function must be allowed to become fixed – ‘the commander of yesterday can become a subordinate tomorrow.’ [Bakunin]. Teaching is to be based on curiosity and not on command, the ‘teacher’ is called upon to further this curiosity and not to rely on any fixed method. Spontaneity reigns supreme, in thought (perception) as well as in action.’

‘opposition to the established order of things’ –

‘the established order must be destroyed so that human spontaneity can come to the fore’

this suggests that nothing that is done within the established order of things enables human spontaneity to come to the fore

now most I think would find this an odd statement – for it flies in the face of experience – of the very human actions and achievements that have their basis in spontaneity

however if we take Feyerabend’s statement on face value – then the question is – if spontaneity cannot ‘come to the fore’ in the established order of things – if it is not a feature of the established order of things – the order that we experience and operate in –

how can we know of spontaneity – how can we speak of it at all?

just a note – we have no definition of spontaneity from Feyerabend – and certainly no argument about the nature of spontaneity

what we get from Feyerabend here – is just an assertion –

which for all intents and purposes – has no content

his spontaneity – is empty – hollow – and without meaning

his ‘spontaneity’ – is rhetorical

‘the established order must be destroyed’ –

you destroy and existing order of things – only to replace it with a new order of things –

and then once again you have an established order of things

the idea that we can operate without any established order – without anything being established – is ridiculous

Feyerabend goes on to speak of religious or escatological anarchism –

the idea being that social – moral – physical and perceptual laws are denied

denial makes no sense

on the other hand – questioning – raising doubts – and proposing – different – physical and perceptual laws – is logical and rational

‘an existence no longer tied to the body, its reactions and needs’ –

this is a stupid and delusional notion –

‘Violence is necessary to overcome the impediments erected in a well-organized society, or by one’s own modes of behaviour (perception, thought, etc.), and it is beneficial for the individual, for it releases one’s energies and makes one realise the power at one’s disposal’

it is plainly not the case that violence is necessary to overcome the impediments erected in a well organised society –

impediments can be overcome in any number of ways –

we might think our way over or around an impediment

we might change our physical position – our place in the world – to overcome our impediments

we have – do and will – use science to overcome our impediments –

and yes – there will be impediments we can’t overcome –

violence might do the job in certain circumstances –

but like any other means we use – there are no guarantees – violence may well fail –

in any case it is quite clearly not necessary

and yet again we have no account – no definition – no argument – from Feyerabend regarding the nature of violence

just a bald rhetorical assertion

Feyerabend’s view of political anarchism is the standard view –

it is s a theory of anarchism that doesn’t stand up to scrutiny –

and cannot be regarded as serious political philosophy –

I think Feyerabend’s view – the standard view – has got anarchism wrong

political anarchism – as I see it – is not about overthrowing the established order of things

this is just rhetoric

the anarchist argument – is the argument against institutional authority

we can and do have ‘established orders’ within our experience that are not authoritarian –

most of our interpersonal relations are – and can be – of this kind –

we see this also on a local – social and political level – with the establishment of co-operatives of various kinds

the matter is more difficult on a national and international level –

however social democratic health and welfare programmes are steps in the right direction

just as the united nations – for all its faults and failures – is an attempt to overcome international authoritarianism –

and there are other international organisations that promote co-operation

I don’t know if we can completely eliminate authoritarian structures

nevertheless this is the anarchist idea – and it is a worthy one

it is an argument that makes sense in the real world – and make sense of the real world

overthrowing everything and using violence to do so – with the idea of unleashing spontaneity – is barbarism – not anarchism

and is I think an ideology designed to exploit those who are disadvantaged and oppressed

the real objective should be to lift up the downtrodden – and to give them material and psychological security –

so that they have a chance of finding some fulfilment and happiness in this world –

it’s about changing and improving their world – not tearing it down

while I think there is a sensible argument for political anarchism –

I don’t think that anarchism – or for that matter any other political philosophy – has a monopoly on truth

the world we operate in – is uncertain –

if we are to respond intelligently to our circumstances – we need to maintain an open mind – and be prepared to consider all options when dealing with our social and political

realities

any proposal of political philosophy that we put up – needs to be seen for just what it is –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

political philosophy – if it is done well – is the exploration of this uncertainty

and it is the development of new and different ideas – new ways of seeing and new ways of doing

we should avoid fundamentalism – of any kind –

that includes totalitarianism in all it forms – liberal democratic fundamentalism – communist and socialist fundamentalism – anarchist fundamentalism and religious fundamentalism

fundamentalism has no basis in logic – it is grounded in prejudice –

it is the mark of ignorance –

it is what needs to be overcome – not promulgated or indulged in

if Feyerabend was genuinely ‘against method’ –

he would be arguing just this point

‘Epistemological anarchism differs both from scepticism and from political (religious) anarchism. While the sceptic either regards every view as equally good or equally bad, or desists from making such judgements altogether, the epistemological anarchist has no compunction to defend the most trite, or the most outrageous statement. While the political or the religious anarchist wants to remove a certain form of life, the epistemological anarchist may want to defend it, for he has no everlasting loyalty to, and no everlasting aversion against, any institution or any ideology. Like the Dadaist, whom he resembles much more than he resembles the political anarchist, he ‘not only has no programme [he is] against all programmes’, [Hans Richter] though he will on occasion be the most vociferous defender of the status quo, or of his opponents: ‘to be a true Dadaist, one must also be anti-Dadaist’ [Hans Richter]. His aims remain stable, or change as a result of argument, or of boredom, or of a conversion experience, or to impress a mistress, and so on. Given some aim, he may try to approach it with the help of organised groups, or alone; he may use reason, emotion, ridicule, an ‘attitude of serious concern’, and whatever other means have been invented by humans to get the better of their fellow men. His favourite pastime is to confuse rationalists by inventing compelling reasons for unreasonable doctrines. There is no view, however ‘absurd’ or ‘immoral’, he refuses to consider or act upon, and no method is regarded as indispensable. The one thing he opposes positively and absolutely are universal standards, universal laws, universal ideas such as ‘Truth’, ‘Reason’, ‘Justice’ ‘Love’ and the behaviour they bring along, though he does not deny that it is often good policy to act as if such laws (such standards, such ideas) existed, and as if he believed them. He may approach the religious anarchist in his opposition to science and the material world, he may outdo any Nobel Prize winner in his vigorous defence of scientific purity. He has no objection to regarding the fabric of the world as described by science and revealed by his senses as a chimera that either conceals a deeper and, perhaps spiritual reality, or as a mere web of dreams that reveals, and conceals nothing. He takes great interest in procedures, phenomena and experiences such as those reported by Carlos Casteneda, which indicate that perceptions can be arranged in highly unusual ways and the that the choice of a particular arrangement as ‘corresponding to reality’, while not arbitrary (it almost always depends on traditions), is certainly not more ‘rational’ or more ‘objective’ than the choice of another arrangement: Rabbi Akiba, who in ecstatic trance rises from one celestial sphere to the next and still higher and who finally comes face to face with God in all his Splendour, makes genuine observations once we decide to accept his way of life as a measure of reality, and his mind is as independent of his body as the chosen observations tell him. Applying this point of view to a specific subject such as science, the epistemological anarchist finds that its accepted development (e.g. form the Closed World to the ‘Infinite Universe’) occurred only because the practitioners unwittingly used his philosophy within the confines of their trade – they succeeded because they did not permit themselves to be bound by ‘laws of reason’, ‘standards of rationality’, or ‘immutable laws of nature’. Underneath all this outrage lies his conviction that man will cease to be a slave and gain a dignity that is more than an exercise in cautious conformism only when he becomes capable of stepping outside the most fundamental categories and convictions, including those which allegedly make him human. ‘The realization that reason and anti-reason, sense and nonsense, design and chance, consciousness and unconsciousness [and, I would add, humanitarianism and anti-humanitarianism] belong together as a necessary part of the whole – this was the central message of Dada,’ writes Hans Richter. The epistemological anarchist agrees, though he would not express himself in such a constipated manner. There is no room, in the present essay, to pursue all the implications of this radical view which is reasonable in the sense that every move that it recommends can be defended with the help of the most beautiful arguments (after all, reason is the slave of passions).’

this is a fair representation of the standard view of scepticism

my view of scepticism is different –

what I argue is that the sceptic regards any view – as a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – as uncertain

I don’t say there is no knowledge – rather that all knowledge is propositional – and as such – uncertain

‘good’ and ‘bad’ – these notions – are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

moral questions – are an exploration of propositional uncertainty –

our moral landscape just is the various meta and normative ethical theories that are proposed –

these theories – these ethical proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – they are uncertain

our moral decisions will reflect – or can be interpreted in terms of different ethical standpoints at different times

we are enriched if we are exposed to the great variety of ethical systems –

and we are impoverished if our exposure to different ethical perspectives is limited –

our morality is always open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

ethical authoritarianism – is – as with any other form of propositional authoritarianism – pretentious and irrational

it is the ground of prejudice and ignorance

as for judgments –

judgments are propositional – and so – open to question – open to doubt

of course we make judgments – but as I see it – these judgments – are uncertain –

and yes – we act on our judgments – but our actions – as with our judgments – are proposals – open to question

‘the epistemological anarchist has no compunction to defend the most trite, or the most outrageous statement’

if the idea is to defend – rather than critically evaluate – this ‘epistemological anarchist’ is no different from your standard justificationalist –

perhaps he thinks that by defending ‘the most trite, or the most outrageous statement’ – he is being less boring – than his fellow justifications – who defend the serious and most conservative statement

yes – the epistemological anarchist – may well provide some entertainment and comic relief – in the philosophy department

and perhaps if the idea catches on every philosophy department will have a fool – a court jester – to take the edge off.

‘While the political or the religious anarchist wants to remove a certain form of life, the epistemological anarchist may want to defend it, for he has no everlasting loyalty to, and no everlasting aversion against, any institution or any ideology.

not having any commitment – but pretending to – is just fraud

Feyerabend argues for pretence and deception

and as to the ideas of the Dadaist movement – or the thoughts of Carlos Casteneda – or the trances of Rabbi Akiba –

what we have from a logical point of view is proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

that’s the real game –

the antics of Feyerabend’s so called ‘epistemological anarchist’ –

are just an irrelevant side show

Feyerabend goes on to show how his epistemological anarchist might act in specific situations ‘assuming he has temporarily decided to choose a certain aim and to accept a certain description of the ‘state of the world’ –

in the first example Feyerabend gives –

‘He may proceed more directly and defend the ideal of stability that underlies the Aristotelian point of view and that still appeals to sizable groups of the population. This is how, playing the game of some rationalists and using social laws as temporary levers, the anarchist may defeat the urge for progress of other rationalists.’

in the second case –

‘Assume on the other hand our anarchist detests the emotional, intellectual, the social bonds to which his contemporaries are subjected, that he regards them as a hindrance rather than the presupposition of a happy and fulfilling life…..In this case he will look for some principles that are opposed to some fundamental assumptions of the orthodox ideology and which can be used as intellectual levers for overthrowing this ideology.’

in the third example –

‘…….take an anarchist who is interested in the improvement of scientific astronomy only and who views increase in content as a necessary condition of such improvement …..Building his content-increase on new observations entirely, he must reject the old observations and he buries them without ever explaining why they should never be used…….This is how increase of content is manufactured by a combined use of enthusiasm, forgetfulness, and historical change.’

Feyerabend goes on –

‘The last two examples which are slightly bowdlerized versions of actual historical developments establish one point: given any aim, even the most narrowly ‘scientific’ one, the non-method of the anarchist has a greater chance of succeeding than any well defined set of standards, rules, prescriptions…..The first example makes it plausible that argument, judiciously used, could have prevented the rise of modern science.’

first up what is this ‘non-method’?

in the examples that Feyerabend gives his ‘anarchist’ chooses a certain aim and accepts a certain description of the state of the world – and then argues against other views – using various approaches – that is – methods

what I am getting at is – ok there is no one universal description of the method of science – but this does not mean there are not methods employed in science

Feyerabend undercuts his own so called argument for non-method – by illustrations of the ‘anarchist’ adopting clearly defined methods

in saying that methods are indeed used in science – all that is being said is that for science to be – scientists find ways to proceed – to do their work

Feyerabend’s examples above are perfect examples of this

now the claim that Feyerabend makes of this ‘non-method’ is that it ‘has a greater chance of succeeding than any well-defined set of standards, rules, prescriptions’ –

his claim that the methodologies adopted by his anarchists have a greater chance of succeeding is not established

he has not shown how the approaches he gives as examples of epistemological anarchism compare with other approaches –

he simply asserts that his non-method is more likely to be successful

in the actual practice of science – how would we know in advance – what methodology will succeed?

and for that matter – who is to say in advance – what success is?

one gets the impression that Feyerabend has already decided the issue – independently of what happens

which is bad enough

however coupled with the fact that his non-method argument is baloney

the overall picture is not good

as for his so called ‘anarchists’ –

all they are on face value is narrow minded practitioners – who it seems really don’t value anything – except cheap intellectual thrills

it is unlikely I think that anyone as vacuous as a ‘Feyerabendian anarchist’ would have enough grunt to bother with the deception that the master calls ‘non-method’ in any kind of a sustained manner –

surely even these fools must come face to face eventually with the question ‘why?’

and given that they will have no answer beyond ‘I felt like it’ – if that –

what’s the point?

Feyerabend finishes off this section with –

‘….one will be strongly inclined to believe that there are many different ways of approaching nature and society and many different ways of evaluating a particular approach, that we must make a choice, and that there are no objective conditions to guide us. So far, a brief and very incomplete sketch of the ideology of epistemological anarchism and some possible applications.’

at the best what you have here is an argument for scepticism

‘epistemological anarchism’ – is the idiot brother

Feyerabend gets back to Lakatos –

‘Imre Lakatos, on the other hand, wants science and, indeed the whole of intellectual life to conform to fixed standards, he wants it to be ‘rational’. This means two things: (a) The chosen standards must never be overruled by standards of a different kind; if knowledge or science is to be part of a larger context, then this must not affect its nature; science especially must retain its ‘integrity’. (b) the standards must have heuristic force as well, that is, the activity that is governed by them must be different from the intellectual freelancing of the anarchist.’

conforming to fixed standards –

you can put forward the proposal that as a matter of fact science – and the whole of intellectual life can be described in terms of certain standards – and argue your case –

all you have is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

and you will find other similar proposals – if you keep your eyes and ears open

if you get prescriptive – moralistic – i.e. – hold that your chosen standards must never be overruled by different standards – and that the activity that is governed by them must be different from other approaches –

then you are really just wasting your pompous breath –

science will be – what it will be –

and how it is described – will be open to question –

that is the logical reality

those who have a fixed view of the nature of science – operate with fixed standards –

are blind – and the blindness is self-inflicted

and furthermore – what gets me is they celebrate their logical blindness – and recommend it to others

such people may well have good hearts but they are logically backward

by all means have a theory – and develop it – and test it in the propositional marketplace

throw it into the mix –

but understand – really understand – that it is just one of any number of proposals that can – that are – and that will be – advanced –

and understand too – that what such proposals have in common – what all proposals have in common – is that they are open to question – open to doubt – that they are uncertain

as for Feyerabend –

if he is fair dinkum about ‘intellectual freelancing’ – then his argument is the argument of the sceptic

his so called ‘epistemological anarchist’ – is just a wayward – not very bright –

provocateur

who without Feyerabend’s bombastic rhetoric – could easily be set on a more intelligent path

Feyerabend has an outdated notion of scepticism –

he thinks the sceptic withholds judgment and does nothing

when if you take my view of scepticism – quite the opposite is the case –

the sceptic makes judgments – but understands that they are open to question

the sceptic acts – but understands that his actions – are open to question –

this sceptic is free – and he knows his freedom is the freedom of uncertainty

‘Moreover, these standards, which involve a comparison of content classes, are not always applicable. The content of classes of certain theories are incomparable in the same way that none of the usual logical relations (inclusion, exclusion, overlap) can be said to hold between them. This occurs when we compare myth and science. It also occurs in the most advanced, most general and therefore most mythological parts of science itself.’

Feyerabend begins –

‘I have much sympathy with the view, formulated clearly and elegantly by Whorff (and anticipated by Bacon), that languages and the reaction patterns they involve are not merely instruments for describing events (facts, states of affairs), but that they are also shapers of events (facts, states of affairs), that their ‘grammar’ contains a cosmology, a comprehensive view of the world, of society, of the situation of man which influences thought, behaviour, perception. According to Whorff the cosmology of language is expressed partly by the overt use of words, but it also rests on classifications ‘which ha[ve] no overt mark….but which operate [ ] through an invisible “central exchange” of linkage bonds in such a way as to determine other words which mark the class.’ Thus ‘[t]he gender nouns such as boy, girl, father, wife, uncle, woman, lady, including thousands of given names like George, Fred, Mary, Charlie, Isadore, Jane, John, Alice, Aloysius, Ester, Lester, bear no distinguishing mark of gender like the Latin –us or –a within each motor process, but nevertheless each of these thousands of words has an invariable linkage bond connecting it with absolute precision either to the word “he” or to the word “she” which, however, does not come into the overt behaviour picture until and unless special situations of discourse require it.’

‘languages and the reaction patterns they involve are not merely instruments for describing events (facts, states of affairs), but that they are also shapers of events (facts, states of affairs), that their ‘grammar’ contains a cosmology, a comprehensive view of the world, of society, of the situation of man which influences thought, behaviour, perception.’

languages are complex propositional systems

‘facts’ – ‘states of affairs’ – are proposals

grammars are propositional constructs

if a grammar ‘contains a cosmology’ – that is because – it has been proposed that the grammar contains a cosmology

‘According to Whorff the cosmology of language is expressed partly by the overt use of words, but it also rests on classifications ‘which ha[ve] no overt mark….but which operate [ ] through an invisible “central exchange” of linkage bonds in such a way as to determine other words which mark the class.’

as a matter of propositional fact – there are no ‘covert’ classifications – there is only what is proposed

if it is not proposed – it is not there

a proposal of covert classifications – is deliberate epistemological obscurantism –

there is no ‘invisible exchange’

‘but nevertheless each of these thousands of words has an invariable linkage bond connecting it with absolute precision either to the word “he” or to the word “she” which, however, does not come into the overt behaviour picture until and unless special situations of discourse require it.’

there is no ‘invariable linkage bond’ – or ‘absolute precision’ –

any relation of words – of proposals – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

accepted and habitual propositional behaviour – signifies propositional utility

Feyerabend goes on –

‘Covert classifications (which because of their subterranean nature are ‘sensed rather than comprehended – awareness of [them] has an intuitive quality’ – which ‘are quite apt to be more rational than overt ones’ and which may be very ‘subtle’ and not connected ‘with any grand dichotomy’) create ‘patterned resistances to widely divergent points of view’. If these resistances oppose not just the truth of the alternatives but the presumption that an alternative has been presented, then we have an instance of incommensurability.’

luckily for us – we have secret agent Paul Feyerabend on the job

Feyerabend needs this ‘covert reality argument’ – simply because without it – there would be no basis for his epistemological anarchism – for his incommensurability thesis

– but his rhetoric

the rhetoric has to have a basis – so he thinks – even if the basis is ‘covert’

and as with all epistemological foundationalists – he needs a foundation

his foundation is the unseen – the hidden –

he thinks he can get away with arguing – vehemently – against foundationalism – while having his secret – ‘covert’ – foundation –

I sympathise with him in one respect – the law and order – rule governed epistemology of twentieth century western philosophy – is a straight jacket –

and the history of this period is really the history of philosophers wriggling one way – or wriggling another

Feyerabend wanted out – and good on him – but going ‘underground’ – was not the answer –

the same building – just a different floor – the basement – as it turns out

we just don’t need this subterranean mysticism – our reality is what is put – what is proposed – in the light of day – as it were

if it is not proposed – it is not lurking in a hidden dimension – it quite simply – is not there –

our reality – or realities – are proposed – nothing is hidden

Feyerabend says –

‘covert classifications are sense rather than comprehended – awareness of them has an intuitive quality’

‘sensed’ rather than comprehended?

smelt – touched – heard – seen – tasted?

if so these ‘covert classifications’ – are not covert at all – they are phenomenal

‘an intuitive quality’ – means what?

Feyerabend is peddling obscurantism – and he should know better

‘apt to be more rational than overt ones’ –

and what is ‘more rational’?

there is no ‘more rational’ – a proposal is held rationally if it is held – open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

if it is not open to question – open to doubt – not regarded as uncertain – then it is not held rationally

‘If these resistances oppose not just the truth of the alternatives but the presumption that an alternative has been presented, then we have an instance of incommensurability.’

these ‘resistances’ of Feyerabend – are just phantasms –

we don’t need phantasms – all we need – in fact all we have – is proposals – propositions

where you have a propositional confrontation – that is where proposals are put against each other – you will have incommensurability

which is to say prime facie – they will not be comparable

incommensurability is the starting position of any propositional confrontation –

the next step in the propositional action is to propose a ground for comparison –

and following this – if any such proposal is successful – a decision procedure – for deciding what proposal – what theory – to proceed with

there is no covert propositional action

and any propositional action is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘I also believe that scientific theories, such as Aristotle’s theory of motion, the theory of relativity, the quantum theory, classical and modern cosmology are sufficiently general, sufficiently ‘deep’ and have developed in sufficiently complex ways to be considered along the same lines as natural languages. The discussions that prepare the transition to a new age in physics, or in astronomy, are hardly ever restricted to the overt features of the orthodox point of view. They often reveal hidden ideas, replace them by ideas of a different kind, and change overt as well as covert classifications. Galileo’s analysis of the tower argument led to a clearer formulation of the Aristotelian theory of space and it also revealed the difference between impetus (an absolute magnitude that inheres in the object) and momentum (which depends on the chosen reference system)…Attending to cases such as these we realize that scientific arguments may be subjected to ‘patterned resistances’ and we expect that incommensurability will also occur among theories.’

‘The discussions that prepare the transition to a new age in physics, or in astronomy, are hardly ever restricted to the overt features of the orthodox point of view.’

this is a very confused statement

discussions – are overt – ‘any features of the orthodox point of view’ – that are discussed

are overt – it cannot be any other way

‘They often reveal hidden ideas, replace them by ideas of a different kind, and change overt as well as covert classifications.’

if an idea is proposed in a discussion – it is hardly ‘hidden’

and if a classification – is proposed in a discussion – it is not – covert

‘Galileo’s analysis of the tower argument led to a clearer formulation of the Aristotelian theory of space and it also revealed the difference between impetus (an absolute magnitude that inheres in the object) and momentum (which depends on the chosen reference system.’

a ‘clearer formulation of the Aristotelian theory of space’– is a proposal

and a proposal that reveals the difference between impetus and momentum – is – as with any proposal – out in the open – and open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘Attending to cases such as these we realize that scientific arguments may be subjected to ‘patterned resistances’ and we expect that incommensurability will also occur among theories.’

if you divest ‘patterned resistances’ of it is ‘covert’ rhetoric –

what you have is the confrontation of different proposals

incommensurability – is this confrontation – it is where we start – it is ground zero

we propose a common ground – for the purpose – ultimately of proceeding –

and any such proposal of common ground – is of course – open to question

theories of verification and falsification – are proposals for decision making

and logically speaking these decision proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

commensurability is ‘manufactured’ – is a pragmatic action –

and of course – open to question

‘(As incommensurability depends on covert classifications and involves major conceptual changes it is hardly ever possible to give an explicit definition of it. Nor will the customary ‘reconstructions’ succeed in bringing it to the fore. The phenomenon must be shown, the reader must be led to it by being confronted with a great variety of instances, and he must then judge for himself. This will be the method adopted in the present chapter.)’

if incommensurability depends on covert classifications – hidden classifications –

then this concept of incommensurability – is irrelevant to actual scientific practice –

there is no covert dimension to propositional activity

a proposal is what is put –

if it is not proposed – it is not open to question – it is not open to doubt

if a proposal – a proposition is not revealed – it’s not there

what we have with Feyerabend’s ‘incommensurability’ – is some kind of medieval obscurantism –

‘nor will the customary reconstructions succeed in bringing it to the fore’ –

which is just to say even if this incommensurability (Feyerabend’s incommensurability) – is proposed – it is still covert – still hidden –

and that of course is ridiculous

he calls it a ‘phenomenon’ –

it is not a ‘phenomenon’ – if no one is able to see it – or identify it

and in any case – if incommensurability is anything – it is an argument –

an argument regarding the relation between theories –

i.e. that there are theories that cannot be compared given the usual criteria for comparison

which is to say incommensurability is a propositional construct –

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

however it seems that Feyerabend would prefer incommensurability to be a covert presence – a presence that haunts scientific practice

‘The phenomenon must be shown, the reader must be led to it by being confronted with a great variety of instances, and he must then judge for himself.’

yes – very mystical

it strikes me that Feyerabend’s incommensurability – is just a con-artist’s trick –

now you see it – now you don’t – ok judge for yourself –

bring in the ghost busters

there is no common – objective – ground for the comparison of theories – or the comparison of propositions – but the unknown

our proposals are our responses to the unknown –

the unknown – is silent

‘Interesting cases of incommensurability occur already in the domain of perception…... Given appropriate stimuli, but different systems of classification (different ‘mental sets’) our perceptual apparatus may produce objects which cannot be easily compared. A direct judgement is impossible. We may compare the two attitudes in our memory, but not while attending to the same picture. .. Not even memory can give us a full view of the alternatives.’

what we have here – with this ‘different systems of classification’ – is different proposals

and yes – we may compare the two proposals –

and what is revealed – is propositional uncertainty –

incommensurability = uncertainty

what needs to be understood from the get go here –

is that incommensurability – is not a phenomenon

it is not a reality that exists independent of propositional reality

there is no such thing as a phenomenon – independent of propositional reality

in the absence of proposal – what we have – what we face – is the unknown

our propositional action – is what creates our reality – our realities –

and our propositional activity is the modification and change of the propositional realities that are proposed – that we work with and in

Feyerabend continues –

‘Every picture with just a modicum of perspective exhibits this phenomenon: we may decide to pay attention to the piece of paper on which the lines are drawn – but then there is no three-dimensional pattern: on the other hand we may decide to investigate the properties of this pattern, but then the surface of the paper disappears, or is integrated into what can only be called an illusion. There is no way of catching the transition from one to another. In all these case the perceived image depends on the ‘mental sets’ that can be changed at will without the help of drugs, hypotheses, reconditioning. But mental sets may become frozen by illness, as a result of one’s upbringing in a certain culture, or

because of physiological determinants not in our control. (Not every change of language is accompanied by perceptual changes.) Our attitude towards other races, or towards people of a different cultural background often depends on ‘frozen’ sets of the second kind: having learned to ‘read’ faces in a standard way we make standard judgements and are led astray.’

‘Every picture with just a modicum of perspective exhibits this phenomenon: …’

it is not the ‘picture’ that exhibits a ’modicum of perspective’ –

the picture is a proposal – to which proposals are put – different proposals – described as ‘perspectives’

‘There is no way of catching the transition from one to another.’ –

what we have here is different proposals – there is nothing ‘to catch’ – a proposal is put – another proposal is put – one is not the other – there is no transition – there is just different proposals – at different times –

different ways of seeing

‘mental sets’ – again a description of proposals – operating proposals –

a ‘perceptual change’ – so called – is a propositional change

any standard judgment – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

any proposal – not regarded as uncertain – is ‘frozen’ –

and yes – some proposals – for some people – remain frozen –

there is at any time in human history – in human lives – frozen realities

we get led astray by claims of certainty –

the claim of certainty – is irrational – is the ground of prejudice –

and I suspect that no one is completely free of prejudice –

that is propositions that are not put to question

‘An interesting example of physiologically determined sets leading to incommensurability is provided by the development of human perception. As has been suggested by Piaget and his school, a child’s perception proceeds through various stages before it reaches its relatively stable adult form. In one stage, objects seem to behave very much like after-images and are treated as such. The child follows the object with his eyes until it disappears; he does not make the slightest attempt to recover it, even if this should require but a minimal physical (or intellectual) effort, an effort, moreover that is already in the child’s reach. There is not even a tendency to search – and this is quite appropriate ‘conceptually’ speaking. For it would be nonsensical to ‘look for’ an after-image. It’s ‘concept’ does not provide for such an operation.

The arrival of the concept, and of the perceptual image, of material objects, changes the situation dramatically. There occurs a drastic reorientation of behavioural patterns and, so one may conjecture, of thought. After-images, or things somewhat like them, still exist; but they are now difficult to find and must be discovered by special methods (the earlier visual world therefore literally disappears). Such methods proceed from a new conceptual scheme (after-images occur in humans, they are not part of the physical world) and cannot lead back to the exact phenomena of the previous stage. (These phenomena should therefore be called by a different name, such as ‘pseudo-after-images’ – a very interesting analogue to the transition from, say Newtonian mechanics to special relativity.) Neither after-images nor pseudo-after-images have a special position in the new world. For example, they are not treated as evidence on which the new notion of material object is supposed to rest. Nor can they be used to explain this notion: after-images arise together with it, they depend on it, and are absent from the minds of those who do not yet recognize material objects; and pseudo-after-images disappear as soon as such recognition takes place. The perceptual field never contains after-images together with pseudo-after-images. It is to be admitted that every stage possesses a kind of observational ‘basis’ to which special attention is paid and from which a multitude of suggestions are received. However, this basis (a) changes from stage to stage, and (b) it is part of the conceptual apparatus of a given stage, nor its one and only source of interpretation as some empiricists would like to make us believe.

Considering developments such as these, we may suspect that the family of concepts centring upon the ‘material object’ and the family of concepts centring upon ‘pseudo-after-image’ are incommensurable in precisely the sense that is at issue here; these families cannot be used simultaneously and neither logical nor perceptual connections can be established between them.’

the object of perception – in the absence of proposal – is unknown –

Piaget’s theory of perceptual development – is a proposal that makes known –

and as with any proposal – it is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

what we have with ‘the family of concepts centring upon the ‘material object’’ and the family of concepts centring upon the ‘pseudo-after image’ – is two proposals – two different proposals – regarding the object of perception – here described as ‘the material object’ –

this is not a problem – if you understand that the object of perception – its description –

is not propositionally fixed –

how we describe the object of perception – is logically open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

and any proposal that functions for us – in whatever circumstance – is valid

‘these families [of concepts] cannot be used simultaneously’ –

this is just to say different proposals cannot be used simultaneously –

a statement of the logical obvious –

‘neither logical nor perceptual connections can be established between them’ –

in so far as we have two different proposals in response to the question of the object of perception –

then we do have a logical relation – or a proposal that can be put to that effect

as to the question of perceptual connections –

perceptual connections are propositional connections

in terms of Piaget’s theory – a theory of perceptual development and change – obviously you cannot ‘experience’ two propositional states at the same time –

though you can propose a relation between two proposals –

and this is just what Piaget has done –

and could you not argue – that in terms of his theory – his theory of conceptual change and development –

that these different proposals regarding the perception of the material object – are indeed commensurable?

the point being that it is this theory of Piaget’s – that renders them commensurable

commensurable within the terms of the theory

Feyerabend has focused on two stages of Piaget’s theory of conceptual and perceptual development – taken them out of the context of Piaget’s proposal – and put that they are incommensurable theories

this is philosophical cherry picking –

and while I don’t think it is fair to Piaget –

it should also be pointed out that it is actually irrelevant as far as incommensurability goes

any proposal is incommensurable with any other proposal – unless some ground of comparison is proposed

Piaget’s theory is a good example of just how different forms of perception and conception – can be related –

that is the idea of his theory – to show such a relation – to propose such a relation –

and to propose a ground of comparison

Feyerabend goes on –

‘Now is it reasonable to expect that conceptual and perceptual changes of this kind occur only in childhood? Should we welcome the fact, if it is a fact, that an adult is stuck with a stable perceptual world and an accompanying stable conceptual system, which he can modify in many ways but whose general outlines have forever become immobilized? Or is it not more realistic to assume that fundamental changes, entailing incommensurability, are still possible and that they should be encouraged lest we remain forever excluded from what might be called a higher stage of knowledge and consciousness? Besides, the question of the mobility of the adult stage is at any rate an empirical question that must be attacked by research, and cannot be settled by methodological fiat. The attempt to break through the boundaries of a given conceptual system, and to escape the reach of Popperian spectacles, is an essential part of such research (and it should also be an essential part of any interesting life.)’

our propositional reality is uncertain –

just where the future will takes us – we don’t know –

we can only speculate

I say – use whatever spectacles you find useful –

and make new ones if that strikes you as necessary

keep your eyes open – and keep an open mind –

and you will have an interesting life

‘Such an attempt involves much more than a prolonged ‘critical discussion’ as some relics of the enlightenment would have us believe. One must be able to produce and to grasp new perceptual and conceptual relations, including relations which are not immediately apparent (covert relations – see above) and that cannot be achieved by critical discussion alone …The orthodox accounts, of course, are restricted to (physical) theories (or, rather, to emaciated caricatures of them), they neglect the covert relations that contribute to meaning, disregard perceptual changes and treat the rest in a rigidly standardized way so that any debate of unusual ideas is at once stopped by a series of routine responses. But now this whole array of responses is in doubt. Every concept that occurs in it is suspect, especially fundamental concepts such as ‘observation’, ‘test’, and of course, the concept ‘theory’ itself. And as regards the word ‘truth’ we can at this stage only say that it is certainly has people in a tizzy, but has not achieved much else. The best way to proceed in such circumstances is to use examples which are outside the range of the routine responses.’

‘One must be able to produce and to grasp new perceptual and conceptual, including relations which are not immediately apparent (covert relations – see above) and that cannot be achieved by critical discussion alone …’ –

this is a weak statement – a weak argument

there will be no production of – or grasping of new proposals – perceptual and conceptual – without critical evaluation –

without critical evaluation – no new proposals will be put – no new ways of seeing or understanding will be imagined

to say that a relation is not immediately apparent – is a statement after the fact of it being made apparent – after it being proposed –

anyone can say – that what was not immediately apparent – now is

‘covert relations’ – is a propositional deception –

a relation exists if and when it is proposed

meaning does not exist in some metaphysical nether world –

meaning is a question of usage –

meaning is exploring how a proposal or a theory is used – meaning is a propositional investigation

perceptual changes – are propositional changes

yes – unusual ideas can be stopped by routine responses –

however if you are proposing an unusual idea – you should expect routine road blocks –

and be ready – to go right through them

and yes – the whole array of responses – is in doubt –

any proposal put – at any point – is open to question –

any ‘concept’ – is a proposal – and logically speaking – open to question – open to doubt

observation – test – truth – these are concepts – proposals –

central epistemological concepts – that as with any concept / proposal – are – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

and this should be no news to anyone

‘The best way to proceed in such circumstances is to use examples which are outside the range of the routine responses.’

yes by all means do this –

and doing so is good critical practice –

an example – is a proposal – and as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt

you don’t somehow avoid propositional logic by using an example

Popper advocated criticism – critical evaluation –

but he did not understand that the concepts that were central to his methodology – falsification – corroboration – verisimilitude – growth of knowledge – etc. –

are open to question – open to doubt and uncertain

Popper was not prepared to see – or not able to see – that his methodology – was in the same boat as the methodologies he argued against

my point is logical –

and it is that any proposal – in any shape or form – is by its nature – open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

that is to say that our propositional reality – is uncertain

some run from this and seek a security in authority and prejudice

it does take courage to face the reality of uncertainty full on –

and courage to embrace it – and see it in a positive light

and as for those who don’t take up the challenge –

or those who make it their business to side step it at every turn –

let he who has not sinned …

‘It is for this reason that I have decided to examine means of representation different from languages or theories and so to develop my terminology in connection with them. More especially, I shall examine styles in painting and drawing. It will emerge that there are no ‘neutral’ objects which can be represented in any style, and which can be used as objective arbiters between radically different styles. The application to languages is obvious.’

any means of representation – is a proposal – and as such logically speaking no different from languages and theories

we propose our reality – in any number of ways – and one of the most significant propositional actions – is artistic proposal

no proposal – is neutral – in the sense that it is beyond question – or beyond doubt

there are no certainties –

and artistic endeavour – is a response to and launches from propositional uncertainty

art – if you speak of it in general terms – is an exploration of uncertainty –

and what we know too – is that artistic work – as well giving us different ways of perceiving and conceptualizing our reality –

is a source of real joy for human beings

as to ‘objectivity’ –

if you take the standard western philosophical view – of a reality independent of propositional action

you end up in the dog house of authoritarianism and prejudice – with all the other dogs

on the other hand – it can be seen for what it is – just a proposal –

a proposal for the giving of perspective –

we need proposals for organizing our perceptions – our conceptions – our theories and our language use –

and we need proposals to provide a propositional focus –

the real function of the objective proposal is to organize and provide focus –

if objectivity is understood in this way it is a useful proposal

I will now look at Feyerabend’s argument here –

he says –

‘there are no ‘neutral’ objects which can be represented in any style, and which can be used as objective arbiters between radically different styles.’ –

Feyerabend begins with an account of the ‘archaic style’ as defined by Emmanuel Loewy

Feyerabend quotes Loewy –

‘Side by side with the images which reality presents to the physical eye there exists an entirely different world of images which live or, better, come to life in our mind only and which, although suggested by reality, are totally transformed. Every primitive act of drawing … tries to reproduce these images and them alone with the regularity of a physical function.’

Feyerabend goes on to say –

‘The archaic style changes as a result of ‘numerous planned observations of nature which modify the pure mental images’, initiate the development towards realism and thus start the history of art. Natural, physiological reasons are given for the archaic style and for its change.

Now it is not clear why it should be more ‘natural’ to copy memory images than images of perception which are so much better defined and so much more permanent. We also find that realism precedes more schematic forms of representation. This is true of the old Stone Age of Egyptian Art, of Attic Geometric Art. In all these cases the ‘archaic style’ is a result of conscious effort (which may of course be aided, or hindered, by unconscious tendencies and physiological laws) rather than a natural reaction to the internal deposits of external stimuli. Instead of looking for the psychological causes of a ‘style’ we should therefore rather try to discover its elements, analyse their function, compare them with other phenomenon of the same culture (literary style, sentence construction, grammar, ideology) and thus arrive at an outline of an underlying world view including an account of the way in which this world view influences perception, thought, argument, and of the limits it imposes on the roaming about of the imagination. We shall see that such an analysis provides a better understanding of conceptual change than either the naturalistic account or trite phrases such as ‘critical discussion and comparison of … various frameworks is always possible’. Of course, some kind of comparison is always possible (for example one physical theory may sound more melodious when read to the accompaniment of a guitar than another physical theory). But lay down specific rules for the process of comparison, such as the rules of logic as applied to the relation of content classes, and you will find exceptions, undue restrictions, and you will be forced to talk your way out of trouble at every turn. It is much more interesting and instructive to examine what kinds of things can be said (represented) and what kinds of things cannot be said (represented) if the comparison has to take place within a certain specified historically well structured framework.’

looking for the psychological causes of a style – is a valid approach –

as valid I would say – as any other

in a certain context it may be just what is required –

however – like any approach – any methodology – it is just one approach among many

and as with any methodology – open to question

discovering the elements of style – comparing them with other phenomena of the same culture and thus arriving at an underlying world view – would indeed be an interesting study

on the face of it such a study is different from that of looking for the psychological cause of style –

but that is all – it is different

again in a particular context – this discovery of the elements of style – may be just what will prove instructive and useful

but if the focus is psychological – such a study – interesting as it may well be – would not be relevant

now Feyerabend contrasts his elements of style approach to that of the critical approach –

however – the fact remains that Feyerabend’s ‘elements of style approach’ has only come about as a result of his critical evaluation of other methods i.e. the psychological method of Loewy –

that is to say – Feyerabend’s own work on scientific method – didn’t come out of nowhere

his theories are a direct result of his critical appraisal of other methodologies –

and he knows this – if anyone does

yes – some kind of comparison is always possible –

which is to say one theory is placed against another

that is where we begin in the business of critical evaluation

you have to propose a ground of comparison – and then you get about the critical evaluation of the different proposals

and you then immerse yourself in the uncertainty of the propositional reality

and whatever comes out of such a process – is itself – open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

the ‘growth of knowledge’ – so called – is the exploration of propositional uncertainty

‘lay down specific rules for the process of comparison, such as the rules of logic as applied to the relation of content classes, and you will find exceptions, undue restrictions, and you will be forced to talk your way out of trouble at every turn.’

yes – that is the game – critical evaluation and arguing your case –

dealing with propositional uncertainty

‘To sum up: the archaic world is much less compact than the world that surround us, and is also experienced as being less compact. Archaic man lacks ‘physical’ unity, his body consists of a multitude of parts, limbs, surfaces, connections; and he lacks mental unity. his mind is composed of a variety of events, some of them not ‘mental’ in our sense, which either inhabit the body-puppet as additional constituents or are brought into it from the outside. Events are not shaped by the individual, they are complex arrangements of parts into which the body-puppet is inserted at the appropriate place. This is the world view that emerges as a result of an analysis of the formal features of ‘archaic’ art and Homeric poetry, taken in conjunction with an analysis of the concepts which the Homeric poet used for describing what he sees. These individuals live indeed in the same kind of world that is depicted by their artists.’

‘To sum up: the archaic world is much less compact than the world that surround us, and is also experienced as being less compact’ –

here we have a couple of straight out traditional naive ‘objective’ statements –

it would have been epistemologically more sophisticated – had the claim been that the archaic world is represented in archaic art and poetry

the archaic world – as with any world – or any description of the world – is a matter of interpretation

statements about what is the case – are fair enough – so long as you understand them for what they are – interpretative

and it is just pretentious to assert that the archaic world is experienced by those who lived in it – as –compact – or as whatever –

I mean who knows how it was experienced?

who can say how this world – our world is experienced?

the best we can do on this matter – is to put forward various proposals

‘Archaic man lacks physical unity, his body consists of multiple parts, limbs, surfaces, connections’

from the point of view of 21^st century medical sciences – the same could be said of modern man

‘some of them not ‘mental’ in our sense, which either inhabit the body-puppet as additional constituents or are brought into it from the outside’

‘in our sense’ – who’s he kidding here?

‘this body puppet’ – may just be a primitive expression for Cartesian dualism –

as for ‘brought in from the outside’ – here we could well be discussing a theory of sensation

‘Events are not shaped by the individual, they are complex arrangements of parts into which the body-puppet is inserted at the appropriate place’

determinists and modern social theorists could get with this

‘this is the world view …’ –

this is a world view proposed by Feyerabend as a result of his analysis –

and there is nothing wrong with that as such

the Homeric poet – was a poet –

that is one who creates with language a view of the world –

his description – is a description of how he conceives or imagines what he sees

‘These individuals live indeed in the same kind of world that is depicted by their artists.’

I ask – how is anyone to know this?

fair enough – that it is proposed – it is an interesting idea – but not one that is beyond question – beyond doubt –

perhaps ‘these individuals’ have entirely different world views to their artists?

and just how unusual would that be?

we all live in ‘the same kind of world’ – for what that’s worth

whether we are archaic men – or modern men –

‘our world’ – just is – the great variety of propositional realities that we create –

propositional realities – that are open to question – open to doubt – that are uncertain

‘To repeat and conclude: the modes of representation used during the early archaic period

in Greece are not just reflections of incompetence or of special artistic interests, they give a faithful account of what are felt, seen, thought to be fundamental features of the world of archaic man. This world is an open world. Its elements are not formed or held together by an ‘underlying substance’, they are not appearances from which this substance may be inferred with difficulty. They occasionally coalesce to form assemblages. The relation of a single element to the assemblage to which it belongs is like the relation of a part to an aggregate of parts and not like the relation of a part to an overpowering whole. The particular aggregate called ‘man’ is visited, and occasionally inhabited by ‘mental events’. Such events may reside in him, they may also enter from the outside. Like every other object man is an exchange station of influences rather than a unique source of action, an ‘I’ (Descartes’ ‘cogito’ has no point of attack in this world, and his argument cannot even start). There is a great similarity between this view and Mach’s cosmology except that the elements of the archaic world are recognizable physical and mental shapes and events while the elements used by Mach are more abstract, they are as yet unknown aims of research, not its object. In sum, representational units of the archaic world view admit of a realistic interpretation, they express a coherent ontology, and Whorff’s observations apply.’

of course the modes of representation used during the early archaic period in Greece are not reflections of incompetence –

there is no issue of competence – in representation –

a representation – however it is regarded or assessed – is a proposal –

open to question

‘competence’ or ‘incompetence’ – are rhetorical notions –

not logical concepts

and it might well be argued that a mode of representation – is a reflection of a special artistic interest

that is for us – an anthropological question

who is to say what is a ‘faithful’ account of what is seen – felt – and thought – at any time?

‘faithful’ is a rhetorical term – a term used to persuade

for Feyerabend to be so sure of himself here – is I think just plain pretentious –

by all means put up the ‘faithful’ claim as a possibility – (among others) and indeed argue your case –

but the hard reality is – you don’t know

and that should temper your enthusiasm

the rational approach is to look for as many interpretations as possible –

that is – work to filling out the logical picture of the representation

and yes – you won’t end up with a knock down – take no prisoner’s conclusion

but that is the logical reality

‘This world is an open world. Its elements are not formed or held together by an ‘underlying substance’, they are not appearances from which this substance may be inferred with difficulty.’

here is a proposal regarding the world of Greece in the archaic period – a proposal –

that is all

interesting as it is – it is will be just one of any number of proposals to account for and explain the Greek world of the archaic period

Feyerabend elaborates his proposal – and concludes with –

‘In sum, representational units of the archaic world view admit of a realistic interpretation, they express a coherent ontology, and Whorff’s observations apply.’

a realistic interpretation?

that will depend on your idea of realism

a coherent ontology? –

was that ever in question?

and as for Whorff’s observations – why not throw them in too?

Feyerabend has done some first class anthropological thinking –

he has proposed an analysis of Greece in the Archaic period –

all to the good –

however in terms of the question of the historical / anthropological method –

what we get here is just a different methodology – a different approach – a different analysis

it is one among many possible proposals –.

my argument is that any methodological proposal – is valid – is worthy of consideration

I see no problem with considering different approaches

it is likely to be to the advantage of the working historian – to have a number of methodological options at his disposal –

and Feyerabend’s methodology – would be among these

what historians do and how they proceed is up to them –

I make the logical point that whatever methodology is adopted –

it is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

Feyerabend proceeds –

‘At this point I interrupt my argument in order to make some comments which connect the preceding observations with problems in the philosophy of science.

It may be objected that the foreshortenings and other indications of perspective are such frivolous features of our perceptual world that they cannot have been absent from the perceptual world of the Ancients. The archaic manner of presentation is therefore incomplete, and its realistic interpretation incorrect.’

in response to this Feyerabend says –

‘Reply: Foreshortenings are not an obvious feature of our perceptual world unless special attention is drawn to them (in an age of photography and film this is rather frequently the case)…….Aspects, foreshortenings, if they enter our consciousness at all……. are noticed in special situations only. In ancient Greece such special situations arose in the theatre…..Besides why should the conceptual world of the Greeks coincide with ours?’

‘its realistic interpretation’ – is just that – an interpretation –

Feyerabend puts his argument for this interpretation – and his argument is questioned

there is nothing new here

‘why should the conceptual world of the Greeks coincide with ours?’

‘ours’ is what?

the many and diverse points of views and perspectives – that actually exist – that can exist – as responses to the unknown –

was the ancient Greek propositional reality any different?

that is to say – uncertain responses to the unknown?

‘The reader should take notice of the method that has been used for establishing the peculiarities of the archaic cosmology. In principle the method is identical with the method of an anthropologist who examines the world-view of an association of tribes. The differences which are quite noticeable, are then due to the scarcity of the evidence and to the particular circumstances of its origin (written sources; works of art; no personal contact).’

Feyerabend replies –

‘Having completed his study the anthropologist carries within him both the native society and his own background, and he may now start comparing the two. The comparison decides whether the native way of thinking can be reproduced in European terms (provided there is a unique set of European terms’) or whether it has a ‘logic’ of its own, not found in Western language. In the course of the comparison the anthropologist may rephrase certain native ideas in English. This does not mean that English as spoken independently of the comparison is commensurable with the native idiom. It means that language can be bent in many directions and that understanding does not depend on any set of rules.’

evidence is always incomplete – inadequate

this criterion of the adequacy of evidence – does not distinguish one proposal from another

what the anthropologist ‘carries with him’ is – proposals –

whether ‘relapsing into his native English’ – or using ‘native idiom’ – the anthropologist’s proposals will be open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

the anthropologist is in the thick of propositional uncertainty

the best he can hope for is a perspective – an argument – that others give their assent to –.

or that they find interesting and worthy of their attention

commensurability and incommensurability – are propositional games

and whether you play the commensurability game or the incommensurability game –

uncertainty remains

‘The examination of key ideas passes through various stages, none of which leads to complete clarification. Here the researcher must exercise firm control over his urge for instant clarity and logical perfection. He must never try to make a concept clearer than is suggested by the material (except as a temporary aid for further research). It is this material and not his logical concepts that decides about the content of concepts.’

Feyerabend responds –

‘Each item of information is a building block of understanding, which means that it is to be clarified by the discovery of further blocks from the language and ideology of the tribe rather than by premature definitions…….Lack of clarity of any particular anthropological statement indicates the scarcity of the material rather than the vagueness of the logical intuitions of the anthropologist.’

the logic of the matter is that the concepts – content – the proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

each ‘block’ is – a block of uncertainty – open to question –

clarity is a rhetorical delusion

scarcity of material may be embarrassing – but logically – it is irrelevant

with a greater range of material – or more adequate material –

we increase the domain of uncertainty

‘Exactly the same remarks apply to my attempt to explore incommensurability. Within the sciences incommensurability is closely connected with meaning. A study of incommensurability in the sciences will therefore produce statements that contain meaning-terms – but these terms will be only incompletely understood …And the remark that such statements should be made after a clear theory of meaning is as sensible as the remark that statements about Nuer time, which are the material that leads to an understanding of Nuer time, should be written down only after such an understanding has been achieved. My argument presupposes, of course that the anthropological method is the correct method for studying the structure of science (and for that matter, of any other form of life).’

yes – these statements can only be ‘incompletely understood’

for any statement is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

this doesn’t mean that we don’t use ‘incompletely understood statements’ – or that we don’t operate with uncertain proposals

any theory of meaning – as with the statements it is designed to explain – is logically speaking incomplete – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

what we have at any point in time in science is a range of methodological proposals –

and the decisions of the practising scientist –

whatever methodologies – whatever perspectives – are put into play – will be a matter of circumstance

however whatever approach is used –

it will be open to question – open to doubt – it will be uncertain –

the anthropological method – is just one methodological option – and Feyerabend should know this –

there is no ‘correct’ method

‘Logicians are liable to object. They point out that an examination of meanings and the relation between terms is the task of logic, not of anthropology.’

to this Feyerabend says –

‘Now by ‘logic’ one may mean at least two different things. Logic may mean the study of, or the results of the study of, the structures inherent in a certain type of discourse. And it may mean a particular logical system, or set of systems.

A study of the first kind belongs to anthropology.’

logic is the study of propositions

propositions are proposals

proposal are open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

this is the case however propositions are classified – i.e. as ‘logical’ – as ‘anthropological’ – or whatever

Feyerabend here considers the objection that can be put given the application of a particular logical system

and in this connection he has Professor Giedymin in his sights –

‘A logical study of science as Giedymin and his fellow logicians understand it, is a study of sets of formulae of this system, of their structure, the properties of their ultimate constituents (intension, extension, etc.), of their consequences and possible models. If this study does not repeat the features an anthropologist has found in, say, science then this either shows that science has some flaws, or that the anthropologist does not know any logic….. [On this view] science is axiomatics plus model theory plus correspondence rules plus observation language.’

to this Feyerabend says –

‘It does not make the slightest difference to the logician in this second sense that his formulae do not look like scientific statements, that they are not used like scientific statements and that science could not possibly run in the simple ways his brain is capable of understanding (and therefore regards as the only permissible ways). He does not notice the discrepancy or he regards it as due to imperfections that are to be removed from a satisfactory account. Not once does it occur to him that the imperfection may have an important function, and that scientific progress might be impossible once they are removed.

Such a procedure assumes (without noticing that there is an assumption involved) that an anthropological study which familiarizes us with the overt and hidden classifications of

science has been completed, and that it has decided in favour of the axiomatic (etc. etc.) approach. No such study has ever been carried out. And the bits and pieces of field work available today mainly as a result of the work of Hanson, Kuhn, Lakatos, and others, shows that the logician’s approach removes not just some inessential embroideries of science, but those very features which make scientific progress thereby possible.’

Giedymin outlines a model for science – and a model for assessing scientific practice

this is one of any number of such models that have and can be proposed

the problem here is that what you get with Giedymin’s view – is not a logical analysis – but rather an authoritarian pronouncement

by that I mean – we are meant to assume that his analysis has the authority of logic

there is no authority – but the authority of authorship – and authorship – logically speaking – is irrelevant

and any claim that there is ‘authority’ other than authorship – is pretentious

what we get from Giedymin – is stock standard philosophical pretension –

a proposition – a proposal – if considered logically – is put to the question – is put to doubt –

logical analysis is the exploration of propositional uncertainty

where a philosopher like Giedymin comes to an embarrassing halt – is when it is put to him that his model – his philosophical model – is logically speaking – no different to any other proposal –

it is open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

Feyerabend’s response to Giedymin is to say that his model – his perspective –

does not have an anthropological basis to it

Giedymin would agree with this – and not be at all concerned by it –

probably thinking that anthropology is for anthropologists – and philosophy for philosophers

I see no problem with an anthropological perspective on scientific method – or for that matter on any propositional activity

my point is that such a perspective – like the activity it is a response to – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

it is just one of a number of possible perspectives

Feyerabend says of Giedymin’s argument –

‘that his formulae do not look like scientific statements and that science could not possibly run in the simple ways his brain is capable of understanding’

perhaps Giedymin could make a similar response to Feyerabend’s view –

Feyerabend’s proposal is not as ‘clean’ or straightforward as Giedymin’s – it is different

it is more complex – it is messy –

and some I imagine would regard this as a step in the right direction

however there may well be scientists who looking at Feyerabend’s proposal – might say that his model does not capture the nature of scientific practise and behaviour – that interesting as it is – it’s on the wrong track –

would Feyerabend accept that his model – is just one of a number of possible valid views?

or does he just want to keep slugging it out with the other philosophical authoritarians?

‘For Giedymin….this term [‘meaning’] and its derivatives such as the term ‘incommensurability’ are unclear and sufficiently imprecise.’

for Feyerabend –

‘The question is what role they play in (actual, non-reconstructed) science. Clarification must come from a more detailed study of this role, and lacunae must be filled with the results of such a study. And as the filling takes time the key terms will be ‘unclear and sufficiently imprecise’ for years and perhaps decades.’

unclarity and imprecision – are not peculiar to ‘meaning’ and ‘incommensurability’

once you drop the so called objective view of knowledge – which is really just a sophisticated epistemological authoritarianism –

and recognize that propositions are in fact – proposals – and that proposals are open to question – and open to doubt –

you will understand that from a logical point of view – any term – any concept – any description – is uncertain

it is not a matter of ‘years and perhaps decades’ of unclarity and imprecision – as Feyerabend states –

the issue is not unclarity and imprecision –

it is rather an issue of logical integrity

the problem is not how to get rid of uncertainty – the problem is understanding that it is the ground of propositional life – that it is the source of our creativity

those looking for certainty will always find it – in their prejudices –

philosophers can be among the worst offenders

if the result of being intellectually sophisticated and clever is just another form of ignorant authoritarianism – then the point has been missed entirely

better to ditch the load altogether – and walk free – free of intellectual pretension –

doing so – has to make for a better life

Feyerabend distinguishes two senses of clarity –

‘Arguments, theories, terms, points of view and debates can therefore be clarified in at least two different ways: (a) in the manner already described, which leads back to the familiar ideas and treats the new as a special case of things already understood, and (b) by the incorporation into a language of the future, which means that one must learn to argue with unexplained terms and to use sentences for which no clear rules of usage are as yet available.’

Feyerabend’s view of (a) is –

‘so the course of an investigation is deflected into the narrow channels of things already understood and the possibility of fundamental conceptual discovery (or of fundamental conceptual change) is considerably reduced.’

he argues for (b) –

‘Now the building of new world view, and a corresponding new language, is a process that takes considerable time, in science as well as in meta-science. The terms of the new language become clear only when the process is fairly advanced, so that each single word is the centre of numerous lines connecting it with other words, sentences, bits of reasoning, gestures which sound absurd at first but which become perfectly reasonable once the connections are made.’

a critical investigation that ‘treats the new as a special case of things already understood’

puts those ‘things already understood’ – to question – to doubt – renders them – uncertain

learning to ‘argue with unexplained terms and to use sentences for which no rules of usage are as yet available’ – is to operate critically – putting the terms – the sentences – to question – to doubt – recognizing their uncertainty

rules come and go – they are uncertain

whether the channel is narrow or not – is logically irrelevant –

any propositional program or structure – whether familiar or new – is open to question –

open to doubt – is uncertain

time is not the issue –

thinking that establishing a propositional structure over time – makes it more logically secure –

is just the same old foundationalist argument with a temporal twist

it matters little whether your propositional endeavour is conservative or adventurous –

‘conservative’ or ‘adventurous’ – are purely rhetorical descriptions

‘There is still another dogma to be considered before turning to the main narration. It is the dogma that all subjects, however assembled, quite automatically obey the laws of logic, or ought to obey the laws of logic. If this is so then anthropological field work would seem to be superfluous. ‘What is true in logic is true in psychology…..in scientific method, and in the history of science,’ writes Popper.’

Feyerabend argues –

‘This dogmatic assertion is neither clear nor is it (in one of its main interpretations) true…There is Hegel, there is Brower, there are formalists. They offer not just different interpretations of one and the same bulk of logical ‘facts’, but different ‘facts’ altogether. And the assertion is not true as there exist legitimate scientific statements which violate simple logical rules. For example there are statements which play an important role in established scientific disciplines and which are observationally adequate only if they are self-contradictory: fixate a moving pattern that has just come to a standstill, and you will see it move in the opposite direction, but without changing its position. The only phenomenologically adequate description is ‘it moves, in space, but it does not change place’ – and this description is self-contradictory.

Secondly, let us assume that the expressions ‘psychology’ ‘anthropology’ ‘history of science’, ‘physics’ do not refer to facts and laws but to certain methods of assembling facts including certain ways of connecting observation with theory and hypothesis. That is, let us consider the activity ‘science’ and its various subdivisions. We may approach this activity in two ways. We may lay down ideal demands of knowledge and knowledge-acquisition, and we may try to construct a (social) machinery that obeys these demands. Almost all epistemologists and philosophers of science proceed this way…Such an enquiry on the other hand will have to explore the way scientists actually deal with their surroundings, it will have to examine the actual shape of their product, viz. ‘knowledge’, and the way in which this product changes as a result of decisions and actions in complex social and material conditions. In a word such an enquiry will have to be anthropological.’

‘What is true in logic is true in psychology…in scientific method, and in the history of science,’ writes Popper.’

this really is an empty statement –

it is just the attempt to establish – an authority –

it’s a rhetorical statement

and I think an attempt to intimidate – in the guise of reason –

and as Feyerabend shows there is no real consensus on just what logic is –

that’s the brute fact of it –

the matter is open to question

if you can get away from this inherent assumption of most of Western philosophy – that the task is to establish an authority –

if you can see that such an argument is simply a deception designed to make you obey –

obey in your thoughts – and in your actions –

someone else’s view of the world –

then you have a chance of seeing what the real state of play is

we deal in propositions – proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

and this applies as much to so called logical statements and systems – as it does to any other statements or propositional systems

there is no authority – there is only propositional uncertainty

epistemology is proposal –

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

‘…Such an enquiry, on the other hand, will have to explore the way scientists actually deal with their surroundings, it will have to examine the actual shape of their product, viz. ‘knowledge’, and the way in which this product changes as a result of decisions and actions in complex social and material conditions. In a word such an enquiry will have to be anthropological.’

yes – and by all means propose your model of scientific practice –

however – be aware that any such model – at best – will only provide an insight into science

what we should be doing as methodologists is critically examining existing methodological proposals

and proposing and developing different descriptions of scientific practise

just putting up one model and then arguing its merits ‘til the crows come home – is really pretty pathetic –

keep an open mind – look and see where – different methodologies – different descriptions – make sense – where they work – and where they don’t –

and keep at it

Feyerabend’s anthropological idea is a good one – from a brilliant thinker

but it is not the only one –

whatever is put – however simple – or however comprehensive and elaborate our proposals are –

they are open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

and we never leave propositional uncertainty –

Feyerabend now returns to consideration of the paratactic universe of the archaic Greeks – to the substance-appearance universe of their followers

he begins with this –

‘The archaic cosmology (which from now on I shall call cosmology A) contains things, events, their parts; it does not contain any appearances. Complete knowledge of an object is complete enumeration of its parts and peculiarities. Man cannot have complete knowledge. There are too many things, two many events, too many situations (Iliad, 2.488), and he can be close to only a few of them (Iliad, 2.485). But although man cannot have complete knowledge, he can have a sizeable amount of it. The wider his experience, the greater his number of adventures, of things seen, heard, read, the greater his knowledge.’

‘The archaic cosmology (which from now on I shall call cosmology A) contains things, events, their parts; it does not contain any appearances’ –

the epistemological reality is that what the ‘archaic cosmology’ contains – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

that Homer is interpreted as representing it in a certain way is a proposal

‘Complete knowledge of an object is complete enumeration of its parts and peculiarities. Man cannot have complete knowledge. There are too many things, two many events, too many situations (Iliad, 2.488), and he can be close to only a few of them.’

again – Feyerabend’s interpretation of Homer’s epistemology

‘But although man cannot have complete knowledge, he can have a sizeable amount of it. The wider his experience, the greater his number of adventures, of things seen, heard, read, the greater his knowledge.’

the real problem with Feyerabend’s interpretation – is that it cannot be assumed that the concepts that he uses – ‘things’ – ‘their parts’ and ‘experience’ – or the lack of it – ‘complete knowledge’ – ‘wide experience’ would connect with Homer –

did Homer think in these terms?

I think Feyerabend’s interpretation – and his use of modern western concepts – is ok – as far as it goes – but it must be represented – presented – for what it is –

an interpretation – and an interpretation that has its roots in the modern mind

as far as I can tell Feyerabend wants to say that his descriptions of the Homeric world and his analysis of so called ‘Homeric epistemology’ – in these modern western terms – is the correct account of the matter – end of story –

when from a logical point of view all he has done is put a proposal – open to question – open to doubt

a proposal that is – logically speaking – uncertain –

at best what we have from Feyerabend is a rhetorical argument

‘The new cosmology (cosmology B) that arises in the 7the to 5th century B.C. distinguishes between much-knowing, [Greek term], and true knowledge, and it warns against trusting ‘custom born of experience’, [Greek term]. Such a distinction and such a warning make sense only in a world whose structure is very different from the structure of A. In one version that played an important role in the development of Western civilization and which underlies such problems as the problem of the existence of theoretical entities and the problem of alienation the new events form what one may

call a True World, while the events of everyday life are now appearances that are but its dim and misleading reflection. The true world is simple and coherent, and it can be described in a uniform way. So can every act by which its elements can be comprehended: a few abstract notions replace the numerous concepts that were used in cosmology A for describing how man might be ‘inserted’ into his surroundings and for expressing the equally numerous types of information thus gained. From now on there is only one important type of information, and that is: knowledge.’

‘From now on there is only one important type of information, and that is: knowledge.’ –

certainly that is the standard view – the received wisdom – but is there anything here but rhetoric?

is there any evidence for this view?

Feyerabend does not present any evidence here –

there is no anthropology here – just assertion

Feyerabend – just doesn’t get that – the world is variously described and that any description – from a logical point of view is valid –

does he think that in the many cultures of the 7^th to the 5^th century – there was only one view of reality –

that even with the emergence of modern science – other interpretations of the world – simply ceased to exist?

it would seem so

if you accept Feyerabend’s A / B distinction – what we have is different propositions – different propositional structures – different propositional analyses that’s ok – different views of the world – at different times –

no great news

Feyerabend continues –

‘The conceptual totalitarianism that arises as a result of the slow arrival of B has interesting consequences, not all of them desirable.’

conceptual totalitarianism – is an authoritarian myth –

the claim is that there is one conceptual scheme –

and if so – it must hold sway – i.e. there are no others –

or if it is claimed that there are others – the claim is false –

or that such conceptual schemes are inadequate

the issue here is not conceptualism – rather authoritarianism –

any proposal put is open to question – open top doubt – is uncertain

the uncertainty of any conceptual scheme – puts pay to any claim of authority

that there may be a conceptual scheme that dominates a particular propositional context – at a particular time and place – is best understood in terms of fashion – propositional fashion

and you will always find that such a conceptual scheme is not the full story –

in any context – at any time or place you will find alternative conceptions –

and even within the most ‘fashionable’ conceptual scheme – you will find question – doubt – dissent

and as for the claim that the ‘slow arrival of B has consequences that are not ‘desirable’ –

not desirable from who’s point of view?

such an argument is not logical – it is not scientific – it is pretentious and rhetorical –

this conceptual totalitarianism that Feyerabend is putting up – and presumably arguing against – is a straw man argument – a red herring

and if Feyerabend had a non-authoritarian view himself –

he would see that this totalitarian argument is quite unnecessary to the prosecuting of his ‘anthropological view’

and here it needs to be noted that Feyerabend – has got anthropology wrong

the anthropologist – as with all empirical scientists understands that what he deals with – what he observes – is difference

and when we come to the theoretical level – exactly the same situation pertains –

we have different theories – different propositions

the anthropological world is a world of difference – of question – of doubt – of uncertainty

here is the logic of anthropology

Feyerabend seems to think – that all you have to do is come up with a new interpretation

a radically new interpretation – and that’s the end of the story

his view is unscientific – and naïve in the extreme

‘Situations which made sense when tied to a particular type of cognition now become isolated, unreasonable, apparently inconsistent with other situations: we have a ‘chaos of appearances.’ The ‘chaos’ is a direct consequence of the simplification of language that goes with the belief in the True World.’

situations don’t become ‘isolated, unreasonable, apparently inconsistent with other situations’

these ‘situations’ – when given different interpretation – are enhanced –

they are broadened and expanded – given a new life – by the different interpretation

it is only the narrow minded philosophical pugilist that would regard them as isolated and unreasonable

propositional difference – and variety – does not signify chaos –

it signifies propositional uncertainty – that is to say logical health

forget this notion of ‘simplification of language’ – that is just philosophical party political narrow mindedness

what you have is different propositional responses to these ‘situations’ –

‘situations’ – mind you – that in the absence of any propositional action / interpretations –

are ‘unknowns’

belief in the ‘True world’ – is of course ridiculous –

but I think it should be pointed out that it is just as ridiculous to think in terms of the ‘False world’ –

implicit in Feyerabend’s work here – is a belief in absolutes – True and False –

absolutes he pretends to argue against –

his own view – if you drop all the sophistication that he wraps it up in –

is logically speaking – no different to the views he argues against –

he argues quite forcefully for his conceptualization of scientific method –

alternative views are just put to be debunked and ridiculed –

it’s an intellectual hatchet job

Feyerabend goes on to ask –

‘How is the ‘irrationality’ of the transition period overcome?

his answer is the following –

‘It is overcome in the usual way (cf. item 8 above), i.e. by the determined production of nonsense until the material produced is rich enough to permit the rebels to reveal, and everyone else to recognize, new universal principles. (Such revealing need not consist in writing the principles down in the form of clear and precise statements.) Madness turns into sanity provided it is sufficiently rich and sufficiently regular to function as the basis of a new world view. And when that happens, then we have a new problem: how can the old view be compared with the new view?

‘the irrationality of the transition period’ – so called – is a critical period –

a period of question – doubt – uncertainty

logically speaking – such is essentially – no different to any other period of critical / scientific activity

so as far as I am concerned – what Feyerabend calls ‘irrationality’ – question – doubt – uncertainty – is logical

in my view the absence of question doubt and uncertainty – is what is ‘irrational’

how is a period of question – doubt – and uncertainty overcome?

with pretence – authoritarian pretence –

which I would suggest – is an ever present feature of propositional activity – or propositional life – of science –

it is not realistic to regard human beings as completely rational / logical – or completely ‘irrational’ / illogical

propositional life – is a mixture of both the rational and irrational –

human beings are rational and irrational –

and as far as I can see – both the rational and the irrational play essential and significant roles in human experience

the job of the philosopher is not to proselytize against the so called ‘irrational’ – and to champion the so called ‘rational’

the task of the philosopher is to distinguish – to show the difference – between logical and illogical propositional action

‘From what has been said it obvious that we cannot compare the contents of A and B.

A-facts and B-facts. A-facts and B-facts cannot be put side by side, not even in memory: presenting B-facts means suspending principles assumed in the construction of A-facts. All we can do is draw B-pictures of A-facts in B, or introduce B-statements of A-facts into B. We cannot use A-statements of A-facts in B. Nor is it possible to translate language A into B. This does not mean that we cannot discuss the two views – but the discussion cannot be in terms of any (formal) relations between the elements of A and the elements of B. It will have to be ‘irrational’ as was the talk of those intent on leaving A.’

we cannot compare the contents of A and B?

A and B are proposals – different proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

if all you have is A and B – that’s all you have – two proposals

if two proposals are compared – they are compared to – compared in relation to another – a third proposal –

there must be a third proposal against which the two subject proposals are put

i.e. does A lend support to C – does B lend support to C?

any decision here – will be open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

comparison is best seen as a propositional game – perhaps even as a propositional ritual

in any case – the logic of a comparative exercise or study – is the logic of the proposition

in a comparative game – the propositions involved – i.e. A – B – C and any relational proposal between A and C – or B and C – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

if you don’t want to – or don’t see the need to – or you don’t have a reason to – play this propositional game –

presumably you won’t

the fact is we do play this game in all propositional contexts – science is just one –

to say that this game is not played – defies the empirical facts of propositional life

to say that it shouldn’t be played – is to take yourself out of propositional reality

this game will be played whether we are dealing with propositional systems separated by centuries – or separated by minutes

we play the game with question – with doubt – with uncertainty – and we go wherever it takes us –

Feyerabend says that A-facts and B-facts cannot be put side by side –

well they can – and they are – Feyerabend needs only to look at his own work to see this.

for this is just exactly what he does – puts them side by side

if you have two propositions – two proposals – you don’t have – one

you have – you always have – different propositions – and they are put side by side –

that is the propositional reality

but just putting them side by side – is not comparing them

if they are to be compared – they are put in relation another proposition

‘presenting B-facts means suspending principles assumed in the construction of A-facts.’

no it doesn’t – it means putting different facts – putting different principles

it’s walking and chewing gum at the same time

‘All we can do is draw B-pictures of A-facts in B, or introduce B-statements of A-facts into B’

drawing B pictures of A-facts – yes – or introducing B-statements of A-facts – could well be an interesting propositional game –

however any such game – if it has a serious end in view – will require a critical activity – the critical activity of question – of doubt

‘We cannot use A-statements of A-facts in B.’ –

well – you can – but if you do – quite obviously you change the character of B –

‘Nor is it possible to translate language A into B’ –

if you translate the language of A into B – you propose a new language

‘This does not mean that we cannot discuss the two views – but the discussion cannot be in terms of any (formal) relations between the elements of A and the elements of B. It will have to be ‘irrational’ as was the talk of those intent on leaving A.’

any discussion of the two views will be an exploration of propositional uncertainty –

formal relations between the elements of A and the elements of B – is nothing more than some proposal put –

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

and whether it is a useful proposal or not will be decided upon – at the time – by those involved

critical talk – is uncertain – not irrational –

the idea that you can’t engage in a critical evaluation of different proposals – is what is irrational –

this seems to be Feyerabend’s preferred position

‘Now it seems to me that the relation between, say, classical mechanics (interpreted in terms of the view of Niels Bohr), or between Newtonian mechanics (interpreted realistically) and the general theory of relativity (also interpreted realistically) is in many respects similar to the relation between cosmology A and cosmology B. (There are of course also important differences: for example the modern transition has left the arts, ordinary language, and perception unchanged.) Thus every fact of Newton’s mechanics presumes that shapes, masses, periods are changed only by physical interactions and this presumption is suspended by the theory of relativity. Similarly the quantum theory constitutes facts in accordance with the uncertainty relations which are suspended by the classical approach.’

straight up – the relation between any two proposals – is of course similar to that of the relation between A and B

we have two different proposals – or – in the example Feyerabend gives – three – with quantum theory –

different proposals – different propositional constructions

does Feyerabend’s argument – come down to anything more than this?

I can’t see it –

why B was preferred to A – in the day – why relativity gained acceptance over Newtonian mechanics – is open to question –

and there will be any number of explanations advanced –

and these explanations – as with the theories themselves – will be – are – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

we cannot say definitively – why one proposal – one proposition – or propositional construction – wins the day – the matter is uncertain –

the best we can do here is advance as may proposals as are possible – as are useful

that is to say explore the critical state of affairs

and whatever explanation is adopted – useful or enlightening as it may be – will be – as with any other – open to question – to doubt – uncertain –

the reality just is that decisions get made – for whatever reason – and propositional action is taken

we all operate in various propositional structures and networks –

this is the empirical reality –

what structures and networks we have to hand – are those that are customary –

or those that are not –

the call – which way to go – is always open to question – open to doubt –

is always uncertain –

Feyerabend proceeds –

‘I shall conclude this chapter by repeating its results in the form of theses…

The first thesis is that there are frameworks of thought (action, perception) which are incommensurable.

I repeat that this is a historical (anthropological) thesis which must be supported by historical (anthropological) evidence….’

the claim is that there are theories – that are incommensurable – and that the basis for this claim has to be anthropological evidence

the idea is that a theory is incommensurable – if rendered so – by anthropology

the anthropology of a theory – may well be of interest – but it doesn’t follow that because a theory is given an anthropological dimension – it is incommensurable

the issue of comparison is not a question of the evidence for or against a theory

for two proposals to be compared – they will be placed in relation to a third proposal

i.e. – which of the two proposals lends support to the third proposal?

the two proposals per se – cannot be compared to each other – except to say the obvious – that they are different

we know this regardless of any anthropological research – we know this because it is a logical fact – quite independent of any scientific evidence

if two propositions are not different – there is only one proposition –

where you have two propositions – the propositions are not the same – they are different

the way Feyerabend has set up this issue – is disingenuous

Feyerabend’s A and B – are radically different conceptions of reality –

now of course you can ask the question – which conception of the natural world do you think has more going for it?

unless you are talking to poets – the answer most likely will be – B –

but this is really just an intellectual exercise –

is anyone seriously – realistically – going to compare A and B?

isn’t it rather that you recognise the difference – and the integrity of both proposals – and consider yourself enriched by this propositional diversity – and leave it at that?

it’s not that you can’t compare A and B – it’s just that there seems no good reason to do so –

so perhaps incommensurability is really just about whether you have a reason to compare propositions or not –

if not – it is because – it doesn’t happen

and yes Feyerabend can go on forever about what doesn’t happen – and why it doesn’t happen –

he can construct a theory to that end – and rummage around in anthropology all he likes searching for his ‘evidence’

but who is interested in what doesn’t happen – and why it doesn’t happen?

the focus of science is on what does happen –

and that too should be the focus of the philosopher –

I can’t help but think that Feyerabend wants to bring science as we know it – scientific method – to an end –

and in its place to have nothing but screwball ideas fighting it out – to no end at all

‘Secondly, we have seen that incommensurability has an analogue in the field of perception and that it is part of the history of perception. This is the content of my second thesis on incommensurability: the development of perception and thought in the individual passes through stages which are mutually incommensurable.’

this thesis – defeats itself –

stages of development of the individual are just that – stages

we have one theory here

to separate out ‘individual stages’ – and treat them as separate theories – is to destroy the theory as a theory of stages

and if you do that – then you do not have a theory of stages

you don’t have one theory at all – you have a number of disconnected theories

so yes – you can take the ‘stages’ out of context – treat them as un-related – and then claim – they are incommensurable – because – they are unrelated

if you don’t propose a propositional relation between propositions – then there is no relation

and if there is no relation – they are incommensurable

so this incommensurability of Feyerabend – has to do with extracting theories out of a propositional context

a theory that is not related to another theory – in a propositional context – cannot be compared

theories are neither commensurable – or incommensurable per se

commensurability is a propositional relation between theories

if you don’t propose such a relation – if you don’t compare theories – they won’t be –

commensurable

incommensurability has nothing to do with theory itself –

it is just the decision – not to compare – not to propose a relation between one theory and another

it’s a propositional – non-action

‘My third thesis is that scientists, and especially their views on basic matters, are often as different from each other as are the ideologies underlying different cultures. Even worse: there exist scientific theories which are mutually incommensurable though they apparently deal ‘with the same subject matter’. Not all competing theories have this property and those which have the property have it only as long as they are interpreted in a special way, for example, without reference to an ‘independent observation language’. The illusion that we are dealing with the same subject matter arises in these cases as a result of an unconscious confusion of two different types of interpretation. Using an ‘instrumentalistic interpretation of the theories which sees them as no more than instruments for the classification of certain ‘facts’ one gets the impression that there is some common subject matter. Using a ‘realistic’ interpretation that tries to understand the theory in its own terms such a subject matter seems to disappear although there is the definite feeling (unconscious instrumentalism) that it must exist. Let us now see how incommensurable theories may arise.’

of course scientists’ views on basic matters will be different –

people have different views – whatever they work at

‘even worse’ – worse than what? – not having different views?

different scientific theories – that because of context – because of circumstance – are not compared?.

given a different propositional set – a different propositional context – they may well be placed in relation to – a theory – an hypothesis – that its advocates think can gain by the involvement of one or other of these so called ‘incommensurable’ theories

theories are ‘incommensurable’ – only if they are not compared

this ‘same subject matter’ will be a proposal – a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and indeed – uncertain

and the idea is that the exploration of such a proposal – the exploration of its uncertainty

will lead to further propositional discoveries

and yes – theories get interpreted –

and they get interpreted into propositional contexts –

some might say they get mangled into them – whatever –

they get used in propositional contexts

as to an ‘independent observation language’ – there is only what is proposed – what is put

and that is open to question – open to doubt – it is uncertain –

uncertain – not independent – or independent

there is no ‘illusion’ that we are dealing with the same subject matter –

there is the proposal of ‘the same subject matter’ –

and I would put that it is best seen – not as an instrumentalist proposal – or realist proposal – but rather as a pragmatic proposal –

for without such a proposal – what can be done?

if all you have is different proposals that have no proposal of common reference – what do you have?

nothing goes

‘a common reality’ – is a pragmatic decision

as for all this ‘unconscious’ guff –

science is demeaned by any talk of a hidden reality –

and as a matter of fact – we are all demeaned – whatever it is we do – whenever we do it – by such obscurantism –

what we deal with – is what there is – and what there is – is what is proposed –

and ‘proposed’ means put – not hidden

‘Scientific investigation, says Popper, starts with a problem and proceeds by solving it.’

I don’t think so

scientific investigation begin with propositional uncertainty

logically speaking there is no ‘solving’ of propositional uncertainty – there is only the exploration of propositional uncertainty

a ‘problem’ is a proposed focus

‘This characterization does not consider that problems may be wrongly formulated, that one may inquire about properties of things and processes which latter views declare to be non-existent. Problems of this kind are not solved, they are dissolved and removed from the domain of legitimate inquiry.’

‘wrongly formulated?’

any problem-proposal will be open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

there is no ‘wrong’ formulation – any formulation is uncertain

‘which latter views declare to be non-existent’?

well the problem changes – one problem leads to another – we have different problems –

Popper’s critical rationalism can accommodate this –

and from my point of view such a scenario is simply critical activity

problems don’t get solved – and they don’t dissolve –

any formulation of a problem – is uncertain – and therefore logically speaking – can always be revisited

yes – we make pragmatic decisions to move on from one formulation to another –

however any formulation is open to question

‘The discovery that certain entities do not exist may prompt the scientist to re-describe the events, processes, observations which are thought to be manifestations of them and which were therefore described in terms assuming their existence (Or rather it may prompt him to introduce new concepts since the older words will remain in use for a considerable time.) This applies especially to those ‘discoveries’ which suspend universal principles. The discovery of an ’underlying substance’ and of a ‘spontaneous I’ is of this kind, as we have seen.’

‘the discovery that certain entities do not exist’ –

is – a re-description of the proposals that have been used –

i.e. ‘events’ – processes’ – ‘observations’ –

what exists independently of proposal – of description – is the unknown

our proposals – our descriptions – make known –

and this knowledge is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

so called ‘new concepts’ – are proposals –

and ‘the older words’ – are not beyond question – beyond doubt –

they can be re-interpreted

‘universal principles’ – at best are pragmatic guidelines – at worst authoritarian rhetoric

the ‘discovery’ of an ‘underlying substance’ or a ‘spontaneous I’ –

is to propose a substance – is to propose an I –

these proposals are open to question – open to doubt – are uncertain

‘An interesting development occurs when the faulty ontology is comprehensive, that is when its elements are thought to be present in every process in a certain domain. In this case, every description inside the domain must be changed and must be replaced by a different statement (or by no statement at all). Classical physics is a case in point. It has developed a comprehensive terminology for describing some very fundamental properties of physical objects, such as shapes, masses, volumes, time intervals and so on. The conceptual scheme connected with this terminology assumes, at least in one of its numerous interpretations, that the properties inhere in the objects and change only as a result of direct physical interference. This is one of the universal principles of classical physics. The theory of relativity implies, at least in the interpretation accepted by Einstein and Bohr, that inherent properties of the kind do not exist, that shapes, masses, time intervals are relations between physical objects and co-ordinate systems which may change, without any physical interference, when we replace one coordinate system with another. The theory of relativity also provides new principles for constituting mechanical facts. The new conceptual system that arises in this way does not deny the classical state of affairs, it does not even permit it to formulate statements expressing such a state of affairs. It does not, and cannot, share a single statement with its predecessor – assuming all the time that we do not use the theories as classificatory schemes for the ordering of neutral facts. If we interpret both theories in a realistic manner, then the ‘formal conditions for a suitable successor’, which were stated in chapter 15 (it has to repeat successful consequences of the older theory, deny its false consequences, and make additional predictions), cannot be satisfied and the positivistic scheme of progress with its ‘Popperian spectacles’, breaks down. Even Lakatos’ liberalized version cannot survive this result; for it too assumes that content-classes of different theories can be compared, i.e. that a relation of inclusion, exclusion or overlap can be established between them. It is no use trying to connect classical statements by an empirical hypothesis. An hypothesis of this kind would be as laughable as the statement ‘whenever there is possession by a demon there is a discharge in the brain’, which establishes connections between terms of a possession theory of epilepsy and more recent ‘scientific’ terms. For we clearly do not want to perpetuate the older devilish terminology, and take it seriously, just in order to guarantee compatibility of content-classes. But in the case of relativity vs. classical mechanics, an hypothesis of this kind cannot even be formulated .Using classical terms we assume a universal principle that is suspended by relativity which means it is suspended whenever we write down a sentence with the intention to express a relativistic state of affairs. Using classical terms in the same statement we both use and suspend certain universal principles which is another way of saying that such statement do not exist: the case of relativity vs. classical mechanics is an example of two incommensurable frameworks. Other examples are the quantum theory vs. classical mechanics, the impetus theory vs. Newton’s mechanics, materialism vs. mind-body dualism, and so on.’

there are no faulty ontologies – there are different ontologies

Feyerabend goes on to talk of the conceptual schemes of classical physics – ‘at least in one of its numerous interpretations’ and the theory of relativity ‘at least in the interpretation accepted by Einstein and Bohr’ –

so yes these theories are – open to interpretation – and obviously – open to interpretation relative to each other

and Feyerabend has adopted interpretations – and proceeds with his view of their relation

it is that on the Einstein / Bohr interpretation – the inherent properties – do not exist –

‘that shapes, masses, time intervals are relations between physical objects and co-ordinate systems which may change, without any physical interference, when we place one coordinate system with another.’

and yes – of course – if you adopt this interpretation you can get that result –

but what has been achieved?

the two systems are different – their conceptual schemes – are different – their world views – are different

we knew this before we started here

‘The new conceptual system that arises in this way does not deny the classical state of affairs, it does not even permit it to formulate statements expressing such a state of affairs.’

we have two different theories – with different terminologies –

and there is no co-relate in the new conceptual scheme for the terms of the old scheme –

or vice versa

Feyerabend’s overall point here is that such theories cannot be compared

his problem is that he doesn’t understand comparison

two different theories – will be different – because they do not share a common language

all a comparison between the two – will show is that there is this difference

if you are to compare two such theories – the comparison will be relative to a third proposal –

i.e. which of these two theories is relevant to – adds to – supports – etc. – this third proposal?

the issue may be well argued one way or the other – and it will be an argument about different concepts – different terminologies – different content classes – etc.

but there you have it – the argument – and this is all a comparison amounts to –

and even when a decision has been made – as to whether and how – either of the two theories is relevant to the third –

that decision will be open to question – open to doubt – it will be – uncertain

again the question is not whether comparisons can be made –

all you have to do is relate two different proposition to a third proposition – and argue the

case –

the real point is – not pretending – that anyone thinks – that two radically different views of nature – are anything but that – radically different

Feyerabend’s ‘method’ – is to float the notion that someone thinks that classical physics and relativity theory share common terminology – and then – shoot it down –

the net result is that there is nothing to disagree with – hey there never was –

the whole kit and caboodle is a fraud –

the real problem with such a ‘method’– is – nothing changes –

nothing is ventured – nothing is gained – but for – pretension – empty pretension

Feyerabend considers the Popperian approach – that a new theory has to repeat successful consequences – deny its false consequences – and make additional predictions

I think these methodological prescriptions – if they were followed – would result in a substantial weakening of the power of any new proposal – because they effectively attempt to minimize the difference –

it is as if from this point of view the die has been set – and any alternative theory – has to fit in – when it may be the case that the point of the new theory – is to offer an entirely different perspective

the Popperian approach places too great an emphasis on continuity –

continuity may be comforting – but discontinuity – is the logical reality –

pretending logical continuity – when there isn’t any – is just logical fraud

‘It is no use trying to connect classical statements by an empirical hypothesis. An hypothesis of this kind would be as laughable as the statement ‘whenever there is possession by a demon there is a discharge in the brain’ –

look you would call this a bridging proposition –

it’s neither one thing nor the other – however it has the advantage of showing that different perspectives do exist – that a connection can be proposed – that a relation can be proposed –

look any proposal is just that – a proposal – let’s not shoot it down – just because it doesn’t fit neatly into one or other straight-jackets –

Feyerabend says that Lakatos’ theory like Popper’s assumes that content classes of different theories can be compared –

logically speaking the content class of any theory is not a fixed description – it is open to question – to doubt – it is an uncertain description

that it is not held to be – by the proponents of the theory – is either logical blindness –

or a pragmatic decision – to move on – .

with content classes – we are not taking about fixed entities – fixed formulations

anyway –

my main point here is that if two theories are placed in a comparative relation relative to a third proposal – the content classes of the two theories will be redescribed – relative to the ‘comparative’ proposal or theory – if the ‘comparative action’ is to go forward

normally we don’t bother about ‘comparing’ radically different theories in any serious manner

we have a look at them – to see which – if any – will suit our purposes –

and sometimes we cherry pick from what is available – and work with a mishmash – a patchwork of concepts and languages

‘But in the case of relativity vs. classical mechanics, an hypothesis of this kind cannot even be formulated.’

yes – if you are going to take a hard line – an authoritarian line about what can and cannot be proposed – what can and cannot be considered –

you can always stitch it up so that no new relation is allowed to be proposed – and be satisfied – that your theory has not been tainted by another

any such formulation – like the demon and epilepsy example – will be a tapestry of different concepts and terminology –

nevertheless – if that is what happens – ok – just a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

who knows what such could lead to – and isn’t it healthy to throw different propositional constructs into the mix?

I thought that was what Feyerabend was arguing –

he seems to have reverted to common and garden philosophical sectarianism –

and a sectarianism that goes nowhere – changes nothing

‘Other examples are the quantum theory vs. classical mechanics, the impetus theory vs. Newton’s mechanics, materialism vs. mind-body dualism .’

yes different conceptions – different proposals –

the world – our world – the propositional world is just this – the reality of different proposals – the reality of difference

and our freedom lies just in the logical reality – of question – doubt – and uncertainty –

the enemies of difference – or a world of difference – are those who hold to any conception – to any proposal – as a certainty –

it is not that any proposal is certain – it is just that the claim is made or assumed – as a support to ignorance and prejudice

Feyerabend – pretends a genuine liberalism – but it is a sham –

the only genuine liberality – is scepticism – thorough-going and positive –

if you shirk this – as Feyerabend has – there is no gain – only pretence and hyperbole –

in the end though – if that’s where your at – that’s where your at –

there is no sin

‘Shapere (and others after him) have tried to show that incommensurable theories are not just rare, but are a philosophical impossibility. I now turn to a discussion of these arguments.

I have said that a scientific change may lead to a replacement of statements in a certain domain and that replacement will be comprehensive when we are dealing with comprehensive ideologies. It will effect not only theories but observational statements and (see Galileo above) natural interpretations. Now such an adaptation of observation to theory (and this is the gist of the first objection) often removes conflicting observation reports and saves a new cosmology in an ad hoc manner. Moreover, there arises the suspicion that observations which are interpreted in terms of a new theory can no longer be used to refute the theory. It is not difficult to reply to these points.

As regards the objection let me point out, in agreement with what has been said before (cf. Chapters 5 and 6) that an inconsistency between theory and observation may reveal a fault of the observational terminology (and even of our sensations), so that it’s quite natural to change this terminology, adapt it to the new theory and see what happens. Such a change gives rise (and should give rise) to new auxiliary subjects (hydro-dynamics, theory of solid objects, optics in the case of Galileo) which may more than compensate for the loss of empirical content. And as regards the suspicion, we must remember that the predictions of a theory depend on its postulates (and associated grammatical

rules) and also on initial conditions while the meaning of the ‘primitive’ notions depends on the postulates and (and associated grammatical rules) only. In those rare cases, however, where a theory entails assertions about possible initial conditions we can refute it with the help of self-inconsistent observation reports such as ‘object A does not move on a geodesic’, which if analysed in accordance with the Einstein-Infeld-Hoffman account, reads ‘singularity µ which moves on a geodesic does not move on a geodesic.’

an inconsistency between theory and observation –

is a sign of propositional uncertainty

who can say where any propositional investigation will lead?

perhaps to different theories – different observations –

perhaps you drop the theory altogether –

perhaps you turn a blind eye to the observations

you might decide to do some terminological tinkering

and render the situation – consistent –

you might give up – and start again –

you might look for another occupation –

who’s to say?

my point is that whatever approach is taken – and there are any number of them –

any approach is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

the methodology – if you can call it that – is the methodology of uncertainty

Feyerabend’s response is to say that in the face of inconsistency – change the observational terminology – adapt it to the new theory and see what happens –

ok – why not?

and he says such a change gives rise to new auxiliary subjects

well maybe it does – maybe it doesn’t – there is no necessity here

and in any case Feyerabend’s response is just one of the many possible responses to inconsistency

the Einstein-Infeld-Hoffman manoeuvre is simply a re-interpretation of the data –

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

and as with any proposal – if it fits the bill at the time – it may well be used –

it all depends on the circumstance – and that is a most uncertain state of affairs – at any time

this discussion of inconsistency is all very well – but it has nothing to do with whether one theory can or cannot – is or isn’t – be compared to another –

it has nothing to do with incommensurability

‘The second objection criticizes an interpretation of science that seems to be necessary for incommensurability to come about. I have already pointed out that the question ‘are two particular comprehensive theories, such as classical mechanics and the special theory of relativity, incommensurable?’ is not a complete question. Theories can be interpreted in different ways. They will be commensurable in some interpretations, incommensurable in others. Instrumentalism, for example, makes commensurable all those theories which are related to the same observation language and are interpreted on its basis. A realist on the other hand, wants to give a unified account, both of observable and unobservable matters, and he will use the most abstract terms of whatever theory he is contemplating for that purpose. He will use such terms in order either to give meaning to observation or else to replace their customary interpretation. (For example, he will use the ideas of the special theory of relativity in order to replace the customary classical interpretation of everyday statements about shapes, temporal sequences, and so on.) Against this, it is pointed out by almost all empiricists that theoretical terms receive their interpretation from being connected with a pre-existing language, or with another theory that has already been connected with such a language. Thus Carnap asserts, in a passage I have already quoted, that there is ‘no independent interpretation for LT [the language in terms of which a certain theory, or a certain world view, is formulated].The system T [the axioms of the theory and the rules of derivation] is in itself an uninterpreted postulate system. [Its] terms … obtain only an indirect and incomplete interpretation by the fact that some of them are connected by the [correspondence] rules C with observation terms …’ Now, if theoretical terms have no ‘independent interpretation’, then they cannot be used for correcting the interpretation of observation statements which is the one and only source of their meaning. It follows that realism, as described here, is an impossible doctrine and that incommensurability cannot arise as long as we keep within the confines of ‘sound’ (i.e. empiricist) scientific method.

The guiding idea behind this very popular objection is that new and abstract languages cannot be introduced in a direct way, but must first be connected with an already existing, and presumably stable, observation idiom.’.

as to an ‘independent interpretation’ –

you can work with an instrumentalist interpretation – or a realist interpretation – or whatever –

any interpretation – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

the idea of an ‘independent interpretation’ – is an authoritarian fantasy –

i.e. there is an authority – that can be appealed to in the matter of interpretation

the logical uncertainty of the proposition undercuts any notion of authority

and yes – Carnap was right – there is no independent interpretation –

and yes system T is an uninterpreted postulate system (until it is interpreted) –

and any interpretation is not just ‘indirect and incomplete’ – it is uncertain – open to question – open to doubt –

as is any ‘connection’ with observation statements

and further – ‘observation statements’ – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt

they are in the same boat as theories – in the same boat as any proposal – they are uncertain

‘new and abstract languages’ –

of course you can propose that they have their basis in a customary idiom –

but this proposal is just another – open to question

and the argument can be made that they are indeed unique – and do not owe their existence to what has come before –

again – a proposal – open to question

as to incommensurability –

incommensurability is propositional difference – logical difference

and unless different proposals are put into a comparative relation to a third – they remain incommensurable

and putting the two proposals in a comparative relation to a third – i.e. ‘which of these two proposals best supports the third?

this is a pragmatic action –

or you can see it is a propositional game – a propositional ritual –

however in such a game – in such a ritual – the logic of the situation is unaltered –

any action of commensurability – or any propositional action that results from the action of commensurability – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

and that – as I see it – is the propositional reality – and is in fact the empirical reality

when I say propositions and propositional systems are open to question – open to doubt – are uncertain –

what I am saying is that there is no necessity regarding how we interpret the world –

different cultures at different times will have different propositional systems –

different individuals at different times will use different and uncertain propositional systems –

my point is that from a logical point of view any proposal – any propositional system is uncertain

that scientists at the present – in modern western cultures – operate with the propositional categories – systems and practices that they do – i.e. theory / experiment / verification / falsification - etc.) –

is logically speaking no different to the propositional action of those in ancient cultures – or indeed – in different cultures at the present time – where the propositional practices and descriptions of these practices are radically different to those of modern western science

and further – how the world is interpreted – is proposed – by anyone at any time – is valid

when it comes to the question of the legitimacy of different methodologies and different theories within propositional cultures – we are not dealing with a logical issue –

any proposal is legitimate –

what we are dealing with is contingent issues –

if you propose a radically different methodology – or a radically different theory – the chances of it having a place at the table – are slim

that would be my observation

entrenched propositional practices are essentially conservative –

changing entrenched practices is difficult –

you need courage and resilience – and there is no guarantee that that you will have success –

it is a matter finally of persuasion – which amounts to rhetoric

‘It is also said that by admitting incommensurability into science we can no longer decide whether a new view explains what it is supposed to explain, or whether it does not wander off into different fields. For example, we would not know if a newly invented physical theory is still dealing with problems of space and time, or whether its author has not by mistake made a biological assertion. But there is no need to possess such knowledge. For once the fact of incommensurability has been admitted, the question which underlies the objection does not arise (conceptual progress often makes it impossible to ask certain questions and to explain certain things, thus we can no longer ask for the absolute velocity of an object, at least as long as we take relativity seriously). Is this a serious loss for science? Not at all! Progress was made by the very same ‘wandering off into different fields’ whose undesirability now so greatly exercises the critic. Aristotle saw the world as a super-organism, as a biological entity, while one essential element of the new science of Descartes, Galileo and their followers in medicine and biology is its exclusively mechanistic outlook. Are such developments to be forbidden? And if they are not, what, then, is left for the complainant?’

different theories – different perspectives – different world views – are the life blood of science – are the life blood of a rational – and I would say – joyous – life

no theory – perspective or world view is beyond question – beyond doubt –

any proposal put in any setting is logically speaking – uncertain –

however for purposes of work – for the purpose of utility – it is necessary to have some propositional discipline – otherwise – no theory gets properly formulated – nothing constructive gets done

which perspective to pursue – which to develop – which world view to investigate – is always a live question

and a live question at any stage of any propositional investigation – of any propositional development

faced with this uncertainty – we make decisions – albeit logically uncertain decisions – but decisions nevertheless

what we pursue – and what we don’t pursue – is a question of propositional practice –

the fact that we have a range of different propositional paths open to us – is where we start –

there is no news in this –

where we go – is where the action is

‘A closely connected objection starts from the notion of explanation or reduction and emphasizes that this notion assumes continuity of concepts (other notions could be used for starting exactly the same kind of argument). To take my example, relativity is supposed to explain the valid parts of classical physics, hence it cannot be incommensurable with it! The reply is obvious! Why should the relativist be concerned with the fate of classical mechanics except as a part of a historical exercise? There is only one task we can legitimately demand of a theory, and that is that it should give a correct account of the world, i.e. of the totality of facts as constituted by its own basic concepts. What have the principles of explanation got to do with this demand? Is it not reasonable to assume that a point of view, such as the point of view of classical mechanics, that has been found wanting in various respects and gets into difficulty with its own facts (see above, on crucial experiments), cannot have entirely adequate concepts? Is it not equally reasonable to try to replace its concepts by those of a more successful cosmology? Besides, why should the notion of explanation be burdened by the demand for conceptual continuity? This notion has been found to be too narrow before (demand for derivability) and it had to be widened to include partial and statistical connections. Nothing prevents us from widening it still further to admit, say, ‘explanations by equivocation’.’

Feyerabend says that there is one task that we can legitimately demand of a theory – that it gives us a correct account of the world – within its own facts

a correct account – within it’s own facts –

well that depends on just how its own facts are interpreted –

‘facts’ – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

‘correctness’ – like beauty – is in the eye of the beholder –

and it should be a skeptical eye at that

classical mechanics and relativity theory are different accounts of the physical world

the idea that one theory explains another – really doesn’t get off the ground logically speaking – they are different proposals – different conceptions

what we face in the absence of either account – or for that matter any account at all – is the unknown

our theories are responses to the unknown –

the unknown is the common ground –

and we make known with our proposals our different proposals – our theories –

and yes – it is reasonable to assume that the concepts of classical mechanics – are not entirely adequate

and the reason is that any concept – that is any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

this applies equally to relativity theory

as for ‘a more successful cosmology’ –

we have different proposals – different theories for different tasks –

which cosmology is more ‘successful’ – will in the end depend on what you are doing – and what you can accomplish – with the theories – the cosmologies – you have at your disposal – and of course – how you judge success

conceptual continuity? –

yes well you can always make up a story of conceptual continuity –

prime facie some such a story will satisfy those who get comfort from the myth of the ascent of man – or some other teleological rubbish

but it won’t survive detailed analysis

‘explanations by equivocation’ – yes –

there is no other explanation –

any explanation is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

quite a surprise – a pleasant surprise – to find that this is where Feyerabend has finally landed

let’s hope he doesn’t equivocate – on equivocation

‘Incommensurable theories, then can be refuted by reference to their own respective kinds of experience; i.e. by discovering internal contradictions from which they are suffering (in the
absence of commensurable alternatives these refutations are quite weak, however, as can be
seen from the arguments for proliferation in chapters 2 and 3.) Their contents cannot be
compared. Nor is it possible to make a judgment of verisimilitude except within the confines
of a particular theory (remember that the problem of incommensurability arises only when
we analyse the change of comprehensive points of view – restricted theories rarely lead to
the needed conceptual revisions). None of the methods which Carnap, Hempel, Nagel and
Popper or even Lakatos want to use for rationalizing scientific changes can be applied, and
the one that can be applied, refutation, is greatly reduced in strength. What remains are aesthetic judgments of taste, metaphysical prejudices, religious desires, in short, what remains are our subjective wishes: science at its most advanced and general returns to the individual a freedom he seems to lose when entering its more pedestrian parts, and even its ‘third world’ image, the development of its concepts, ceases to be ‘rational’. This is the last argument needed for retaining
the conclusion of Chapter 15 ( and of the entire book) despite the attacks of our most modern and sophisticated rationalists.’

yes – well as to falsification –

in the end it is the decision not to proceed –

and this decision – as with its opposite – is open to question – open to doubt – is always –

uncertain

‘internal contradictions’ – point to uncertainty

any comparison – is really only the decision to expand the critical domain – to bring in other theories – and with respect to some more general proposal

if you decide not to adopt this perspective – but to simply stick with your theory – you make it incommensurable

a theory is neither commensurable or incommensurable – per se

commensurability – or indeed incommensurability is an action – in respect of the theory

if you decide to make your theory commensurable – to place in a multi-theoretical context – with respect to some other proposal –

you simply broaden the critical domain

if you decide – not to do this – to render your theory – incommensurable – it and you – go nowhere

as to the methods of Carnap, Hempel, Nagel, Popper and Lakatos – these are proposals

and as with any proposal – open to question – to doubt – they are uncertain

nevertheless they are valid perspectives – that have provided deep and interesting insights into the nature of science – they deserve respect

and as with any methodological perspective – if they have a use – they have a use –

where and when why and by whom – is an empirical matter –

so it’s not a question of ‘what remains’ –

I have no problem with ‘aesthetic judgments of taste, metaphysical prejudices, religious desires’ – or anything else you want to throw up

any proposal is worthy – is valid – has a seat at the table – and any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘Thus science is much closer to myth than a scientific philosophy is prepared to admit. It is one of the many forms of thought that have been developed by man, and not necessarily the best. It is conspicuous, noisy, impudent, but it is inherently superior only for those who have already decided in favour of a certain ideology, or who have accepted without ever having examined its advantages and its limits. And as the accepting and rejecting of ideologies should be left to the individual it follows that the separation of state and church must be complemented by the separation of state and science, that most recent, most aggressive, and most dogmatic religious institution. Such a separation may be our only chance to achieve a humanity we are capable of, but have never fully realised’

‘The idea that science can and should, be run according to fixed and universal rules, is both unrealistic and pernicious. It is unrealistic, for it takes too simple a view of the talents of man and the circumstances which encourage, or cause, their development. and it is pernicious, for the attempt to enforce the rules is bound to increase our professional qualifications at the expense of our humanity. In addition, the idea is detrimental to science, for it neglects the complex physical and historical conditions which influence scientific change. It makes our science less adaptable and more dogmatic: every methodological rule is associated with cosmological assumptions, so that using the rule we take it for granted that the assumptions are correct. Naïve falsification takes it for granted that the laws of nature are manifest and not hidden beneath disturbances of considerable magnitude. Empiricism takes it for granted that sense experience is a better mirror of the world than pure thought. Praise of argument takes it for granted that the artifices of reason give better results than the unchecked play of emotions. Such assumptions may be perfectly plausible and even true. Still one should occasionally put them to a test. Putting them to a test means that we stop using the methodology associated with them and see what happens. Case studies as those reported in the preceding chapters show that such tests occur all the time, and that they speak against the universal validity of any rule. All methodologies have their limitations and the only rule that survives is ‘anything goes’.’

yes – it is unrealistic to suggest that science can and should be run in accordance with fixed and universal rules – if the idea here is that any rule suggested is beyond question

a ‘rule’ is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt is uncertain –

that we have rule governed propositional systems has more to do with getting things done in an efficient manner

‘increasing our professional qualifications at the expense of humanity’ –

this is a bit of a put-on –

it’s pretentious to think that what we do is at the expense of humanity –

I mean who is to say what this ‘humanity’ amounts to?

the complex physical and historical conditions which influence scientific change?

you can make scientific change as complex and historical as you like –

the reality is that we have change – propositional change – that science is a driver of propositional change –

what we have in science – at any level is proposal – open to question – open to doubt –

uncertain

naïve falsification – empiricism – praise of an argument – may well be methodologies that scientists use –

these methodologies – as with the science they ‘determine’ – are open to question

and as for ‘true’ –

a ‘true’ proposal – is one that is affirmed – for whatever reason

any proposal has an assumption – if you decide to give it one – to propose one

and you can argue – what is effectively an a priori argument – that every method presumes assumptions –

I really don’t see the point of it – the value of such –

it strikes me that all such a view does is load up a basic proposal with propositional / conceptual baggage – which in the end – just clogs up the works

that is it holds back and retards clear and straightforward thinking and action –

assumptions are propositional packaging

putting assumptions to the test?

there is no real ‘test’ of assumptions – you either think assumptions have a role to play – or you don’t –

no one is bound by them – no one is bound by this idea that every proposal – every theory is based on assumptions

so called ‘assumptions’ – logically are no different to any other proposal – they are open to question – they are uncertain

yes – all methodologies have their limitations –

is to say – all methodologies – all proposals – are – from a logical point of view – uncertain

it is not a matter of ‘anything goes’ –

such high-handed rhetoric is just as useless as the ‘fixed and universal rules’ idea – it purports to replace –

and is it not the case that for Feyerabend ‘anything goes’ – amounts to a fixed and universal rule?

the reality is – that in science – as in any propositional activity – it is rather –

what goes – is what goes –

and any interpretation of this – is what goes – too

we never leave the reality of proposal – be it in science – or in the interpretation of science

at all times we deal with what is put – the propositional reality

‘The change of perspective brought about by these discoveries leads on to the long forgotten problem of the excellence of science. It leads to it for the first time in modern history, for modern science overpowered its opponents, it did not convince them. Science took over by force, not by argument (this is especially true of the former colonies where science and the religion of brotherly love were introduced as a matter of course, and without consulting, or arguing with, the inhabitants). Today we realise that rationalism, being bound to science, cannot give us any assistance in the issue between science and myth and we also know, from inquires of an entirely different kind, that myths are vastly better than rationalists have dared to admit. Thus we are now forced to raise the question of the excellence of science. An examination then reveals that science and myth overlap in many ways, that the differences we think we perceive are often local phenomena which may turn into similarities elsewhere and that fundamental discrepancies are results of different aims rather than different methods trying to reach one and the same ‘rational’ end (such as, for example, ‘progress’, or increase of content, or ‘growth’).’

‘the excellence of science’?

this is just rhetoric – science as with any propositional activity is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

there is no propositional excellence – there is only propositional uncertainty –

nevertheless it is to be expected that scientists will promote and advertise their activity – they will put the best foot forward – political and religious leaders – do the same

we all do it

I think the reason that most people regard science with respect is that it delivers tangible practical – empirical outcomes

at the same time – it is not as if the populace has abandoned metaphysics –

i.e. people still hold to spiritual and religious and superstitious conceptions of reality –

and some regard these as ‘excellent’ too –

the reality I suspect is that people hold to various ‘excellencies’ – if you want to put the matter in those terms –

it is I think – for most – what conceptual scheme – works for what purpose –

and yes – the result is a mishmash of different conceptions – different schemes – and overall inconsistency

‘modern science overpowered its opponents, it did not convince them. Science took over by force’ –

by force of what?

I would say that science is dominant in the culture that I live in –

but the bloke next door is a religious fanatic –

in his world – in the culture he lives in – in his mind – science barely figures

how dominant is western science in Tibet at the present time?

or in the culture – the dreamtime culture – of Australian aboriginals?

and still the majority of human beings on this planet subscribe to some form of religion –

so where was the takeover – the victory?

this idea that science ‘overpowered its opponents’ – is just a crude myth –

I am skeptical about the power of argument – and of convincing anyone of anything –

and the reason is that I think that at their best human beings exhibit a healthy skepticism –

or perhaps this is just another form of the Australian heresy?

my real point is just that all you can have here with historical argument is different proposals – different perspectives –

so enjoy the different proposals – explore the possibilities – and keep an open mind

also we can ask – are we talking here about science – or the uses it is put to?

I think it is far enough to suggest that science has been used as an authoritarian weapon –

however the same could well be said of various myths and ideologies –

all this depends on the kind of story you want to tell –

and the ground of any such story telling – is not ‘objective fact’ – rather it is subjective perspective –

and where that comes from – how it is to be accounted for – is – really – anyone’s guess

there is no issue between science and myth –

if we de-mythologize myth for a moment – what we are talking about is proposal

science and myth are different proposals –

what they have in common is that they are attempts to make known

their object – is the unknown –

human beings make their knowledge – and this making of knowledge – in whatever form it takes – is uncertain

science and myth are uncertain – uncertain proposals – to make the unknown – known

the unknown is silent –

all we have is proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

it is this uncertainty that is the fertile ground of all our propositional endeavors – the ground of human diversity – the ground of human creativity and freedom

yes science and myth can be said to cross paths –

from what I see and what I can deduce – it strikes me that no one actually operates exclusively with any one cosmological theory –

I suggest – it just doesn’t happen

people operate with various theories and ideas –

some of which may be scientific – some mythical – some religious – whatever –

and people’s ideas and approaches to life – are invariably – inconsistent

and the reason for this not a failure to think rationally or logically –

it is in fact a recognition of the logic of uncertainty – it is an embrace of rational uncertainty

and that – I think is a natural state of affairs –

and if so then those who advocate for universal rules of any kind – are flying in the face of empirical reality

their argument is not based on what occurs – it is rather the same tired old authoritarian / moral – argument – of what ‘should’ be the case

and why – why should it be the case?

presumably because someone is afraid of uncertainty – afraid of propositional diversity – and would like to stomp it (reality) out

I think the authoritarian argument – in whatever form it takes – is based on fear –

and a fear based in logical ignorance

as to rational goals – or irrational goals – or any notion of a goal –

a ‘goal’ – is best understood as a pragmatic imperative –

no more complex than ‘something to aim for’ –

and this ‘something to aim for’ – this ‘goal’ – however it is expressed – gets the propositional game going –

and gives it a bit of grunt

‘The image of 20^th-century science in the minds of scientists and laymen is determined by technological miracles such as colour television, the moon shots, the infra-red oven, as well as by a somewhat vague but still influential rumour, or fairy-tale, concerning the manner in which these miracles are produced.

According to the fairy-tale the success of science is a result of a subtle, but carefully balanced combination of inventiveness and control. Scientists have ideas. And they have special methods for improving ideas. The theories of science have passed the test of method. They give a better account of the world than the ideas that have not passed the test.’

yes – the layman is impressed with the ‘miracles’ of 20^th-century science – and particularly impressed by the ones that he can use – that make his life more comfortable and more interesting –

as to the ‘influential rumour’ – or ‘fairy-tale’ – that is probably all it is –

a belief that there is a way of producing such effects –

as to the in and outs of that method – does it matter?

and I think that probably the same point applies to the scientist –

what counts for the scientist is the result – the effect

any methodology – can be put to the question – to doubt –

any methodological proposal can be shown to be uncertain –

nevertheless what we get from this ‘science’ – is usable results –

and that I suggest is the reason for science being held in high regard –

observable – practical – useful effects –

so even if it is a fairy-tale – it is a fairy-tale that produces concrete results

the point being that other propositional systems – i.e. religious conceptions of the world – may well produce their results – i.e. spiritual enlightenment and understanding – but they don’t throw up colour TV’s

I can still be a Christian a Jew or a Moslem or Buddhist etc. – and respect modern science

still regard it as instructive and useful

this is not to say that modern science gives ‘a better account of the world’ – it is only to say that modern science gives us a different account of the world –

and furthermore an account that while not consistent with other accounts – is of value

I take the view that there is no one approach – no one methodology –

that what we in fact have is propositional diversity –

and with propositional diversity comes propositional inconsistency –

the ground of this inconsistency – is uncertainty –

and our world is a world of propositional uncertainty –

and it is in this world of propositional uncertainty that we live –

it is in this world that we create –

it is in this world that we suffer –

and it is in this world that we find joy

‘But the fairy-tale is false, as we have seen. There is no special method that guarantees success or makes it probable. Scientists do not solve problems because they posses a magic wand – methodology or a theory of rationality – but because they have studied a problem for a long time, because they know the situation fairly well, because they are not too dumb (though that is rather doubtful nowadays when almost anyone can become a scientist), and because the excesses of one scientific school are almost always balanced by the excesses of some other school. (Besides, scientists only rarely solve their problems, they make lots of mistakes, and many of their solutions are quite useless.) Basically there is hardly any difference between the process that leads to the announcement of a new scientific law and the process preceding passage of a new law in society: one informs either all citizens or those immediately concerned, one collects ‘facts’ and prejudices, one discusses the matter, and one finally votes. But while democracy makes some effort to explain the process so everyone can understand it, scientists either conceal it, or bend it, to make it fit their sectarian interests.’

there is no special method that guarantees success or makes it probable –

any propositional enterprise – its method – its ‘success’ – its probability – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

no guarantees

Feyerabend says scientists do not solve problems with methodology and theory of rationality –

my argument is that there is no solution to problems – if by ‘solution’ – is meant a proposal that is – not open to question – not open to doubt – that is certain

that is the fairy-tale

Feyerabend says that scientists solve problems – because they have studied hard – they know the situation well enough – and they are not too dumb

wow – a radical analysis of science and scientists – if ever I’ve heard one

this response from Feyerabend – is quite simply pathetic

‘studying a problem for a long time’ – means nothing –

you can study a problem for a long time – and at the end of it be none the wiser –

also isn’t it conceivable that a scientist could have a quick look at a problem and see the solution immediately?

‘knowing the situation fairly well’ – is in the same boat –

it just doesn’t follow that therefore a solution will be found –

and here I am not even getting into the issue of just what ‘knowing the situation fairly well’ – is supposed to mean

however I have to give it to him on the ‘not too dumb’ argument –

that you would imagine goes without saying –

we learn absolutely nothing here – from Feyerabend about scientific problem solving

the reality is that what goes for a solution in science – is what is agreed upon – by those involved –

and this is not a logical solution – it is a pragmatic solution

and of course any agreement is tenuous – is uncertain

Feyerabend says that democracy makes some effort to explain – so that everyone can understand –

well yes – in theory

and I guess Feyerabend has not heard of political skulduggery – of back room deals

and he says scientists either conceal or bend their results to fit with sectarian interests –

I suppose there are examples of this

however it strikes me that at least in this country – Australia – that scientific practice is open and accessible

there are any number of ways a citizen can find out what is going on in the scientific world –

and from what I have observed – any scientist given the opportunity to explain his work – jumps at it

and as to who is more open and accountable – the politician or the scientist?

it’s no contest –

the scientist win hands down

‘No scientist will admit that voting plays a role in his subject. Facts, logic, methodology alone decide – this is what the fairy-tale tells us. But how do facts decide? What is their function in the advancement of knowledge? We cannot derive our theories from them. We cannot give a negative criterion by saying, for example, that good theories are theories which can be refuted, but which are not contradicted by any fact. A principle of falsification that removes theories because they do not fit the facts would have to remove the whole of science (or it would have to admit that large parts of science are irrefutable). The hint that a good theory explains more than its rivals is not very realistic either. True: new theories often predict new things – but almost always at the expense of things already known. Turning to logic we realise that even the simplest demands are not satisfied in scientific practise, and could not be satisfied, because of the complexity of the material. The ideas which scientists use to present the known and to advance into the unknown are only rarely in agreement with the strict injunctions of logic or pure mathematics and the attempt to make them conform would rob science of the elasticity without which progress cannot be achieved. We see: facts alone are not strong enough for making us accept, or reject, scientific theories, the range they leave to thought is too wide: logic and methodology eliminate too much, they are too narrow. In between these two extremes lies the ever changing domain of human ideas and wishes. And a more detailed analysis of successful moves in the game of science (‘successful’ from the point of view of scientists themselves) shows indeed that there is a wide range of freedom that demands a multiplicity of ideas and permits the application of democratic procedures (ballot – discussion – vote) but that is actually closed by power politics and propaganda. This is where the fairy-tale of special method assumes its decisive function. It conceals the freedom of decision which creative scientists and the general public have even inside the most rigid and most advanced parts of science by a recitation of ‘objective’ criterion and it thus protects the ‘big-shots’ (Nobel Prize winners; heads of laboratories, of organizations such as the AMA, of special schools; ‘educators’; etc.) from the masses (laymen; experts in non-scientific fields; experts in other fields of science): only those citizens count who are subjected to the pressures of scientific institutions (they have undergone a long process of education), who succumbed to those pressures (they have passed their examinations), and who are now firmly convinced of the truth of the fairy-tale. This is how scientists have deceived themselves and everyone else about their business, but without any real disadvantage: they have more money, more authority, more sex appeal than they deserve, and the most stupid procedures and the most laughable results in their domain are surrounded by an aura of excellence. It is time to cut them down in size, and to give them a more modest position in society.’

proposals get put – arguments are made – decisions get made –

the culture of science as far as I know is hierarchical – it’s not democratic – it’s not one vote one value

and as far as I know working scientists are happy with that culture – and if they’re not – it’s up to them to change it

and yes – it is fair enough that others have an opinion here –

but it will be working scientists who decide how they proceed

‘facts’ – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

facts don’t decide anything –

the facts of the matter – the proposals advanced – are decided upon by those involved in the propositional process

and here we are talking about which proposal – or proposals to take forward

and any decision made – like any ‘fact’ – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘we cannot derive theories from them’ –

a proposal (fact) may just lead to another proposal – i.e. a broader proposal (theory) – or an alternative proposal

‘derivation’ – may be the argument – inspiration may be the argument –

and a connection between proposals might be made – without any argument –

however the relation between proposals – however it might be described – or not –

will be open to question – open to doubt – will be uncertain

as to ‘falsification’ –

if falsification is understood in a broad sense – as the decision not to proceed with a theory – it has a role to play –

but yes in the narrow sense of removing a theory from consideration altogether – it is crude and stupid

‘The hint that a good theory explains more than its rivals is not very realistic either’

a good theory – to my mind – gives a different understanding – to its rivals – therefore its explanation – is different

‘Turning to logic we realise that even the simplest demands are not satisfied in scientific practise …’

yes – this idea of logic – as the imposing of a language game on science – and furthermore the imposing of an ‘authority’ on scientific thinking and practise – is old hat

I doubt that it has ever in fact been taken up by working scientists –

and Feyerabend is right – if it ever was taken up – it would rob science of its elasticity –

which is to say – it would rob science of its uncertainty – and hence its life blood

‘… there is a wide range of freedom that demands a multiplicity of ideas and permits the application of democratic procedures (ballot – discussion – vote) but that is actually closed by power politics and propaganda.’ –

there will naturally be a multiplicity of ideas – in a healthy propositional environment –

and yes – of course the application of democratic procedures is permitted –

the real issue is whether scientists regard such procedures as useful to their practise –

I haven’t seen a move in that direction – and if there is to be such a move – it’ll come from the scientists

Feyerabend draws a distinction between ‘democratic procedures’ and ‘power politics and propaganda’ – this strikes me a very odd –

as if there is no power politics and propaganda in the democratic process –

what planet does he live on?

I agree that there are those in power in science – who cover their asses with so called ‘objective criterion’ –

and yes this masquerade works – and it is welcomed by scientists and laymen alike –

they like to hear that there is an authority –

the idea being that some one really knows what’s going on

this – Feyerabend calls – a ‘fairy-tale’ –

it’s authoritarianism – plain and simple

science is not some special propositional activity – where there is no authoritarianism – no pretension – no prejudice and no rhetoric

science is human –

you don’t need to cut science or scientists down to size – there is only one size – and it fits all – it’s humanity –

and humanity is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

‘This advice, which only a few of our well-conditioned contemporise are prepared to accept, seems to clash with certain simple and widely-known facts.

Is it not a fact that a learned physician is better equipped to diagnose and to cure illness than a layman or the medicine-man of a primitive society? Is it not a fact that epidemics and dangerous individual diseases have disappeared only with the beginning of modern medicine? Must we not admit that technology has made tremendous advances since the rise of modern science? And are not the moon-shots a most impressive and undeniable proof of its excellence? These are some of the questions which are thrown at the impudent wretch who dares criticize the special position of science.

These questions reach their polemical aim if one assumes that the results of science which no one will deny have arisen without any help from non-scientific elements, and that they cannot be improved by an admixture of such elements either. ‘Unscientific’ procedures such as the herbal lore of witches and cunning men, the astronomy of mystics, the treatment of the ill in primitive societies are totally without merit. Science alone gives us a useful astronomy, an effective method, a trustworthy technology. One must also assume that science owes its success to the correct method and not merely to a lucky accident. It was not a fortunate cosmological guess that led to progress, but correct and cosmologically neutral handling of data. These are the assumptions we must make to give the questions the polemical force they are supposed to have. Not a single one of them stands up to closer examination.’

what we get in what follows from Feyerabend is histories of modern science – astronomy – medicine – technology –

histories in which he argues that these modern forms owe their development and thus their successes to – non-scientific investigations and speculations –

you could well argue that all these non-scientific background stories show – is that science has changed as it has gone along –

and if that is the case then it is foolish to have too definite a view of science – modern or ancient –

is it not better to keep an open mind – to question – to doubt – to recognise that science – as with any propositional activity – is essentially – uncertain?

also what you have in Feyerabend’s argument here – is a proposal about the nature of science –

this is not the only view of the nature of science –

it is one among many – all of which are open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

anyway my first point here is that there is an argument that the term ‘science’ – covers both ancient and modern – science – its methods and results.

the other option as I see it is to argue that herbal lore – witches – cunning men and mystics – are representatives of different propositional structures – different propositional paths –

this argument is effectively that such different propositional realities – are prime facie

incommensurable with modern science –

so drop off on the idea of comparing them –

and instead recognise the difference – respect it – and see it in terms of propositional enrichment –

and what this view can lead to is the idea that – yes modern science is successful – within its terms –

and that is to point to what it has achieved in medicine – astronomy and technology – etc.

I don’t know – but it may well be the case that herbal lore – witchcraft – and mysticism – are just as successful in their own terms –

modern witches – I assume – don’t produce colour TVs – and modern physicists and physicians don’t cast spells

different propositional realities –

and I know it annoys modern physicians that people spend billions on herbal cures – as well as going to their general practitioner for a check up

and the scientifically minded – must just shake their heads when they see that there are modern men and women – who believe in and practice magic – as well as watching television programmes on science or reading books on science

uncertainty – open doors

how we regard modern science – its relation to any proposal regarding its history – and its relation to what is not held to be non-scientific – but perhaps superstitious or metaphysical – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

all we ever have here is proposals –

knowledge is – proposal

Feyerabend concludes with the following –

‘How often is science improved, and turned into new directions by non-scientific influences! It is up to us, it is up to the citizens of a free society to either accept the chauvinism of science without contradiction or to overcome it by the counterforce of public action. Public action was used against science by the Communists in China in the fifties, and it was again used, under very different circumstances, by some opponents of evolution in California in the seventies. Let us follow their example and let us free society from the strangling hold of an ideologically petrified science just as our ancestors freed us from the strangling hold of the one true religion!

The way towards this aim is clear. A science that insists on possessing the only correct method and the only acceptable results is ideology and must be separated from the state. One may teach it, but only to those who have decided to make this particular superstition their own. On the other hand, a science that has dropped such totalitarian pretensions is no longer independent and self-contained, and it can be taught in many different combinations (myth and modern cosmology might be one combination). Of course, every business has the right to demand that its practitioners be prepared in a special way, and it may even demand acceptance of a certain ideology. (I for one am against the thinning out of subjects so that they become more and more similar to each other; whoever does not like present-day Catholicism should leave it and become a Protestant or an Atheist, instead of ruining it by such insane changes as mass in the vernacular). This is true of physics, just as it is true of religion, or of prostitution. But such special ideologies, such special skills have no room in the process of general education that prepares a citizen for his role in society. A mature citizen is not one who has been instructed in a special ideology, such as Puritanism, or critical rationalism, and who now carries this ideology with him like a mental tumour, a mature citizen is a person who has learnt how to make up his mind and who has then decided in favour of what he thinks suits him best. He is a person who has a certain mental toughness (he does not fall for the first ideological street singer he happens to meet) and who is therefore able consciously to choose the business that seems to be most attractive to him rather than being swallowed by it. To prepare him for his choice he will study the major ideologies as historical phenomena, he will study science as a historical phenomenon and not as the one and only sensible way of approaching a problem. He will study it together with other fairy-tales such as the myths of ‘primitive’ societies so that he has the information needed for arriving at a free decision. An essential part of a general education of this kind is an acquaintance with the most outstanding propagandists in all fields, so that the pupil can build up his resistance against all propaganda, including the propaganda called ‘argument’. It is only after such a hardening procedure that he will be called upon to make up his mind on the issue rationalism-irrationalism, science-myth, science-religion, and so on. His decision in favour of science – assuming he chooses science – will then be much more rational than any decision in favour of science is today. At any rate – science and the schools will be just as carefully separated as religion and the schools today. Scientists will of course participate in governmental decisions, for everyone participates in such decisions. But they will not be given overriding authority. It is the vote of everyone concerned that decides fundamental issues such as the teaching methods used, or the truth of basic beliefs such as the theory of evolution, or the quantum theory, and not the authority of big-shots hiding behind a non-existing methodology. There is no need to fear that such a way of arranging society will lead to undesirable results. Science itself uses the method of ballot, discussion, vote, though without a clear grasping of its mechanism, and in a heavily biased way. But the rationality of our beliefs will certainly be increased.’.

‘How often is science improved, and turned into new directions by non-scientific influences! –

if we drop the labels –‘scientific’ and ‘non- scientific’ – for a moment – and hold off on the rhetoric of ‘progress’ – the question is how often is one propositional structure modified by another?

well I think modification – change – goes on all the time –

propositional systems are not static

‘an ideologically petrified science’ –

what is this supposed to mean?

does it mean that because science operates with certain ideas – ideas that have proved fruitful – it is ideological – and further ‘ideologically petrified’?

I think this ‘ideologically petrified’ assertion – can’t really call it an argument – it is just a rhetorical grab

it makes sense to question – to doubt – to regard as uncertain – whatever it is you are doing –

this is to behave logically

but I would say – most will stick with what works – in the face of doubt – until a different way of doing things is shown to have some advantage over the status quo – and then they will give the alternative a go

and that strikes me as sensible –

keep an open mind as best you can – but work with what you think works best

one can speculate and propose until the cows come home – but if they come home on the same track night after night–

there you have it –

‘let us free society from the strangling hold of an ideologically petrified science just as our ancestors freed us from the strangling hold of the one true religion!’.

‘the strangling hold’ –

I don’t think any ideology – any system of ideas has a ‘strangling hold’ –

yes a particular ideology may well dominate the scene for a time – may be the fashion of times –

however logically speaking – any propositional system is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

and it is for this reason – the logic of the matter – that there will be opposing points of view

so – while it is true that some propositional systems do get entrenched – and I might add some democratically entrenched – no system of proposals – no system of ideas – will have a ‘strangling hold’ –

there will always be question – doubt uncertainty – even in the most authoritarian contexts

‘The way towards this aim is clear. A science that insists on possessing the only correct method and the only acceptable results is ideology and must be separated from the state.’

I don’t like this idea –

if you allow a system of ideas and all that goes with it to operate outside of state sanction and oversight – then that ideology is not accountable to the people –

this is hardly the way to operate a democratic system

Feyerabend’s argument here is an argument for sectional privilege

the ‘privilege’ – if you can call it that – of not being accountable to democratic processes

it is just exactly what organised crime would like to see

to the list of special ideologies with special skills - physics – religion – prostitution – does Feyerabend wish to add – the mafia?

and if not – why not?

furthermore – I think any group that wants to argue that they have the only correct method and the only acceptable results – should be able to have their say –

of course their argument is stupid and pretentious –

but how will those who advocate it – ever come to know this – if they are excluded from rational discussion and debate –

and who knows – in the whole mix of it – they might have something of interest to contribute – even something of value?

I am not in favour of excluding or prohibiting any views –

I am not afraid of different perspectives – even ones I think are illogical – irrational – or dangerous

‘One may teach it, but only to those who have decided to make this particular superstition their own. On the other hand, a science that has dropped such totalitarian pretensions is no longer independent and self-contained, and it can be taught in many different combinations (myth and modern cosmology might be one combination).’

big concession here from Feyerabend – teach the evil ideology to those who have decided to embrace it

this is pretty dumb

what we need is critical teaching –

those who hold to an uncompromising ideology – ought to be respected – but they ought – also to be challenged – challenged with different ideas

yes – you may teach science in combination with myth – and that is all very well –

but your working scientist is not likely to be interested in myth – when he is conducting a physical experiment –

his focus will be on following a method that he thinks will deliver the results

this is not engaging in ‘a totalitarian pretension’ –

it is rather getting on with the job at hand – with the tools at one’s disposal – and doing the job in a way that it will be recognized by others as being well done

you have to wonder just who it is that has the ‘totalitarian pretensions’ here

‘Of course, every business has the right to demand that its practitioners be prepared in a special way, and it may even demand acceptance of a certain ideology… This is true of physics, just as it is true of religion, or of prostitution. But such special ideologies, such special skills have no room in the process of general education that prepares a citizen for his role in society.’

‘no room in the process of general education’ –

no room at the inn

again – the ideology of exclusion –

of course there can be a place in general education for specialist ideologies and specialist skills –

how do you teach high school science subjects without introducing the students into the ideas of the sciences – and the particular skills required to engage in these enterprises?

a general education if it is to have any substance at all – will involve the teaching of ideologies and specialist skills –

in the absence of such content – all you have is generalities –

‘A mature citizen is not one who has been instructed in a special ideology, such as Puritanism, or critical rationalism, and who now carries this ideology with him like a mental tumour, a mature citizen is a person who has learnt how to make up his mind and who has then decided in favour of what he thinks suits him best.’

‘a mature citizen”?

a mature citizen could be someone who has had little or no education – general or specialist –

but nevertheless is open minded and treats everyone with respect and kindness

how does one learn to make up one’s mind?

one learns by being taught to question – to doubt – and to not be fooled by any claim of authority –

we all do what we think suits us best

‘He is a person who has a certain mental toughness (he does not fall for the first ideological street singer he happens to meet) and who is therefore able consciously to choose the business that seems to be most attractive to him rather than being swallowed by it. To prepare him for his choice he will study the major ideologies as historical phenomena, he will study science as a historical phenomenon and not as the one and only sensible way of approaching a problem.’

studying science as an historical phenomenon – should sharpen his critical skills –

but let’s be clear studying the history of science – is not doing science

and until you do it – you won’t really know what you are talking about – you won’t really know what it is –

and this is true of any propositional enterprise –

a background story of any kind is all very well – but it is not be confused with actually getting down and engaging in the enterprise itself

‘An essential part of a general education of this kind is an acquaintance with the most outstanding propagandists in all fields, so that the pupil can build up his resistance against all propaganda, including the propaganda called ‘argument’

propaganda is persuasion – argument is persuasion – argument is propaganda

if you build up a resistance against all propaganda – you take yourself out of the propositional game – out of the propositional life

you become some who is persuaded of nothing – and not able to be persuaded – and someone who is unable to persuade others –

you become a dead-head – and this it seems is Feyerabend’s idea of the new man

any propaganda – any persuasion – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

nevertheless a good deal of our propositional life just is the business of propaganda – persuading and being persuaded

without it – there wouldn’t be much going on

it’s pretty rich of Feyerabend to be disparaging of propaganda –

he is one of the great propagandists of his time

‘It is only after such a hardening procedure that he will be called upon to make up his mind on the issue rationalism-irrationalism, science-myth, science-religion, and so on. His decision in favour of science – assuming he chooses science – will then be much more rational than any decision in favour of science is today.’

this is I think a very traditional – old fashioned approach to learning –

you must study the basics before you can decide which way you will proceed

it’s a method that runs the risk of stifling any original inspiration or talent

what is against just following your instincts – into a specialized study – and not worrying about a so called general education?

who says you are not allowed to do this?

the important thing is that society provides you with the options of a general education – and specialist pathways –

if these options are available and real – then I think the student will begin by making the choice that best suits him or her

and a good education allows for re-thinks – and changes in direction

as for ‘more rational’ –

rationality is the underlying logic of question – doubt – uncertainty

in whatever you are doing – in whatever propositional adventure you embark on

‘At any rate – science and the schools will be just as carefully separated as religion and the schools today’

in Australia we have schools set up by the different religions – and we have religious studies in state schools

the reality on the ground is that religious studies – of whatever kind are integrated into a general education –

and the integration works well – largely I think because the Australian people regard religious education as part of a general education

for those parents and children who object to religious studies in the curriculum –

they can opt-out of the religion subject –

also you find in some schools – religious studies as part of a more general study of ethical systems

as to separating out science studies from the general curriculum – that is not going to happen

no one in their right mind would argue for this

‘Scientists will of course participate in governmental decisions, for everyone participates in such decisions. But they will not be given overriding authority’ –

I don’t know where it is that they are given overriding authority

the science community has to argue its case – just as all other vested interests have to argue their cases

‘It is the vote of everyone concerned that decides fundamental issues such as the teaching methods used, or the truth of basic beliefs such as the theory of evolution, or the quantum theory, and not the authority of big-shots hiding behind a non-existing methodology.’

there is a place for the big-shot in a democratic process – he like ‘everyone concerned’ should have a chance to put his case – and persuade others to his point of view –

and his point of view – like any other point of view – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

any claim to authority should be recognised for what it is –

pretentious rhetoric

‘There is no need to fear that such a way of arranging society will lead to undesirable results. Science itself uses the method of ballot, discussion, vote, though without a clear grasping of its mechanism, and in a heavily biased way. But the rationality of our beliefs will certainly be increased.’

‘There is no need to fear that such a way of arranging society will lead to undesirable results’ –

arranging society in any way – will lead to the results that it will lead to

desirable – undesirable? –

it depends on who makes the assessment

‘Science itself uses the method of ballot, discussion, vote, though without a clear grasping of its mechanism, and in a heavily biased way’

this view of the practice of science – requires an evidential argument –

and Feyerabend offers no evidence for this view –

without some elaboration from Feyerabend – why should we accept this claim?

in the absence of argument here – all we have is rhetoric

we can reasonably ask – in every scientific setting is the method of ballot – discussion – vote – the way it goes?

hard to imagine that in all contexts such an approach is used

and where it is not used – does science suffer?

and really how does a democratic process lead to better scientific results?

participation by all and sundry won’t necessarily result in good science –

and some might say democratizing scientific method and practice is more likely to result in bad science –

granted – a democratic procedures gives the ‘appearance’ of rationality – but is it anything more than that – a pretence of rationality?

‘But the rationality of our beliefs will certainly be increased.’

a belief is a proposal – how a proposal is arrived at – by what ‘process’ – democratic or otherwise – is logically irrelevant –

a proposal is held rationally – if it is held to be open to question – open to doubt – held to be uncertain

increasing – or decreasing rationality – makes no sense –

you either hold your beliefs – your propositions – open to question – open to doubt – or you don’t –

if your proposal is only – as it were – open – ‘to some extent’ –

it is not genuinely open – and your so called ‘openness’ –

is pretentious

Feyerabend's Against Method

Saturday, April 28, 2018

Feyerabend's Against Method 11 - 18