Feyerabend's Against Method: Feyerabend's Against method 1

In this work I will argue against Feyerabend’s methodological anarchism and argue for methodological scepticism.

Introduction

‘Science is an essentially anarchistic enterprise: theoretical anarchism is more humanitarian and more likely to encourage progress than its law and order alternatives’

Feyerabend begins with a reworking of a quote from Lenin –

‘‘History generally, and the history of revolutions in particular, is always richer in content, more varied, more many sided, more lively and subtle than even ‘the best methodologist can imagine’ –

how does Lenin or Feyerabend know history ‘is always richer in content, more varied, more many sided, more lively and subtle’ – if no methodologist can imagine such a state of affairs?

on what basis is any such claim made about the nature of history?

as against this ‘argument’ I would put that history is no more than what we make it – how we propose it

the point being if we have a history that is rich in content, varied, many sided and lively and subtle it is because we have constructed such a history

beyond our imagination the world we operate in is unknown

any response to the unknown is an attempt to give reality character –

which is to say we propose some basis from which we can operate both conceptually and practically

and any proposal here – from a logical point of view – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

Feyerabend goes on to quote Herbert Butterfield –

‘history is full of ‘accidents and conjectures and curious juxtapositions of events’ and it demonstrates to us the ‘complexity of human change and the unpredictable character of the ultimate consequences of any given act or decision of men’’

yes – what we face is uncertainty – and any proposal we make regarding the acts and decisions of men – is open to question – open to doubt

and he asks –

‘Are we really to believe that the naïve and simple-minded rules which methodologists take as their guide are capable of accounting for (what Hegel calls) such a ‘maze of interactions’?

no – but the reason is just that any proposal – any rule – is logically speaking – open to question – is uncertain – regardless of how simple-minded or comprehensive it is

‘And is it not clear that successful participation in a process of this kind is possible only for a ruthless opportunist who is not tied to any particular philosophy and who adopts whatever procedure seems to fit the occasion?’

Feyerabend presents a picture of the ‘ruthless opportunist’ – as a player who is neither ruthless or opportunistic –

he is hardly ‘ruthless’ if he adopts whatever procedure fits the occasion – he’s a mindless conformist

and as for ‘opportunist’ – if you just fit with whatever is going on – what chances do you take – what moves do you make – that in anyway alter the status quo?

Feyerabend’s ‘ruthless opportunist’ – is just a harmless fraud – a nuisance

he gets back to Lenin –

‘Two very important practical conclusions follow from this (character of the historical process). First that in order to fulfil its task, the revolutionary class must be able to master all forms or aspects of social activity without exception….second it must be able to pass from one to the other in the quickest and most expedient manner.’

the revolutionary class must be able to master all – yes all forms or aspects of social activity –

now if this is the pre-condition for the revolutionary class to advance – there will be no advance – Lenin’s condition is not realizable – in the real world that is

no one can master all forms or aspects of social activity –

to suggest that this possible is utopian rubbish

Feyerabend goes on to quote Einstein –

‘The external conditions which are set for (the scientist) by the facts of experience do not permit him to let himself be too much restricted, in the construction of his conceptual world, by the adherence to an epistemological system. He therefore, must appear to the systematic epistemologist as a type of unscrupulous opportunist…’

here Einstein puts that experience – by its nature – does not permit ‘too much restriction’

and therefore that the scientist should in the construction of his conceptual world – not permit too much restriction

and yes – from the point of view of those who adhere to a strict conception of experience

the scientist who is not too much restricted might appear as an unscrupulous opportunist

Einstein here is recommending that the scientist – as far as the conceptual world goes – should keep an open mind

Einstein is not here claiming ‘that science is an essentially anarchistic enterprise’

Feyerabend continues –

‘A complex medium containing and unforseen developments demands complex procedures and defies analysis on the basis of rules which have been set up in advance and without regard to the ever-changing conditions of history’

if what we are facing is the ever changing conditions of history –

what then is the essential difference between basic rules – and complex procedures?

if what we face is ‘a complex medium and unforseen developments’ – then ‘complex procedures’ – will be just as inadequate to the task as simple rules

will a complex procedure account for unforseen developments?

how could you possibly know that it would?

and in any case we can’t deal with ‘unforseen developments’ – just because they are not seen

and by the way – it is not history that is ever-changing – if by history you mean the past –

you can have different theories of history – and they might change –

but accounting for ‘a complex medium’ is dealing with the present state of science –

as to the ‘unforseen developments’ –

we wait until the future becomes the present – and then we can set about dealing with it

so ‘basic rules’ or ‘complex procedures’?

what is required here is recognizing that any proposal that we put forward – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

you deal with an uncertain world – with uncertain proposals

when something occurs that is not accounted for by your theory – you think again

‘Now it is, of course, possible to simplify the medium in which a scientist works by simplifying its main actors. The history of science, after all, does not just consist of facts and conclusions drawn from the facts. It also contains ideas, interpretations of facts, problems created by conflicting interpretations, and so on. On closer analysis we find that science knows no ‘bare facts’ at all but that the ‘facts’ that enter our knowledge are already viewed in a certain way and are, therefore essentially ideational. This being the case, the history of science will be complex, chaotic, full of mistakes, and entertaining as the ideas it contains, and these ideas in turn will be complex, chaotic, full of mistakes, and entertaining as the minds of those who invented them. Conversely, a little brainwashing will go a long way in making the history of science duller, simpler, more uniform, more ‘objective’ and more easily accessible to treatment by strict and unchangeable rules.’

firstly ‘the history of science’ – doesn’t exist

what does exist is different accounts of the history of science

secondly any so called ‘fact’ – is a proposal –

and any interpretation of a fact is a proposal –

conflicting interpretations of facts – are simply the result of different proposals in relation to the fact-proposal

yes – you can interpret / describe your proposal / fact as ‘essentially ideational’

you can survey proposals in science – and yes you can interpret the propositional landscape – as complex – chaotic – full of mistakes –

in logical terms all you have uncovered is propositional uncertainty

describing science as ‘dull’ – ‘simple’ – ‘more uniform’ – ‘more objective’ – is no great sin –

if such descriptions – fit the situation – and are useful – then they have a place

‘strict and unchangeable rules’ – is nothing more than authoritarian rhetoric

any rule – any description – logically speaking – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

this applies equally to Feyerabend’s proposals – as much as it does to the proposals of those who put contrasting and different views

‘Scientific education as we know it today has precisely this aim. It simplifies ‘science’ by simplifying its participants: first a domain of research is defined. The domain is separated from the rest of history (physics, for example, is separated from metaphysics and from theology) and given a ‘logic’ of its own. A thorough training in such a ‘logic’ then conditions those working in the domain: it makes their actions more uniform and it freezes large parts of the historical process as well. Stable ‘facts’ arise and persevere despite the vicissitudes of history. An essential part of the training which makes such facts appear consists in the attempt to inhibit intuitions that might lead to the blurring of boundaries. A person’s religion, for example, or his metaphysics, or his sense of humour (his natural sense of humour and not the inbred and always rather nasty kind of jocularity one finds in specialized professions) must not have the slightest connection with his scientific activity. His imagination is restrained, and even his language ceases to be his own. This is again reflected in the nature of scientific ‘facts’ which are experienced as being independent of opinion, belief, and cultural background.’

I can understand ‘scientific education as we know it today’ – as something of an initiation rite –

learning in such a manner will get students into the intellectual discipline required in science –

and as for the historical – theological – metaphysical – issues and back stories –

I imagine most teachers of science reckon there will be time for that –

the really crucial thing in any education process is to activate a student’s critical capacity – encourage question – encourage doubt – encourage uncertainty –

a skilful teacher can do this while at the same time teaching intellectual and experimental discipline –

the sense of humour argument leaves me a little perplexed –

I don’t think you need a sense of humour to do science – and even if you have one – I would say it is irrelevant to science

nature is not a joke –

and even if it is seen as such from some metaphysical perspective –

it’s no barrel of laughs

as for ‘the nasty kind of jocularity one finds in specialized professions’ – par for the course – and irrelevant

when I was fifteen doing elementary high school science I remember a lesson on force

the teacher was explaining the equation f = ma

I piped up and asked – “but sir, what is force?”

I remember he looked at me quite intently and said – “that is a philosophical question” – and went on with the lesson

well his answer was for me good and bad –

bad in that I concluded there and then that physics was not what I was going to be interested in

and good – in that I realized that this ‘philosophy’ – whatever it was – was where I would be heading

it was only in second year philosophy at La Trobe University –

in a class with Professor Brian Ellis –

that I got back to the question of the nature of force –

and I was delighted

‘It is thus possible to create a tradition that is held together by strict rules, and that is also successful to some extent. But is it desirable to support such a tradition to the exclusion of everything else? Should we transfer to it the sole rights for dealing in knowledge, so that any result that has been obtained by other methods is at once ruled out of court? This is the question I intend to ask in the present essay. And to this question my answer will be a firm and resounding NO’.

well a tradition held together by strict rules is only functional if those in the tradition hold to those rules –

and why would they hold to such rules ?

the only reasonable answer is that they will hold to these rules –.if they deliver the results

if they don’t deliver the results – then clearly – the rules don’t function –

and if that is the case they will be reviewed – if not discarded – or replaced –

the real point here is that there is no one rule as to how to proceed –

the best we can do is see what happens – see what people do –

and underpin any such ‘seeing’ – with an attitude of uncertainty

as to what is and is not desirable – that is anyone’s guess

different desires will fight it out in the same way as different propositions – or different theories – or different world views – fight it out

it becomes a question of who wins the day – who is the most persuasive –

and that is not a logical issue – it is a rhetorical issue –

and in any serious matter – there is not likely to be any final agreement

should we support such a tradition to the exclusion of everything else?

no – of course not – but if a tradition has a use – we should give it its due

and further it is logical – to look at different ways of doing things – different methods – and further to develop different approaches

and if you understand this – you realise that any result obtained by other methods – is valid –

and the reason is that any method – as with any result – in short – any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘There are two reasons why such an answer seems to be appropriate. The first reason is that the world which we want to explore is a largely unknown entity. We must, therefore, keep our options open and we must not restrict ourselves in advance. Epistemological prescriptions may look splendid when compared with other epistemological prescriptions, or with general principles – but who can guarantee that they are the best way to discover, not just a few isolated facts ‘facts’ but also some deep-lying secrets of nature?”

in the absence of description what we face – is the unknown

description makes known –

any description is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

our knowledge is uncertain

keeping our options open – is recognizing propositional reality – as open to question – open to doubt – as uncertain

epistemological prescriptions – general principles – are proposals –

why one epistemological prescription is preferred to another – is ultimately a question of circumstance

there are no logical guarantees –

so called ‘guarantees’ are the province of authoritarian rhetoric –

rhetoric is all authoritarianism of any form comes to

‘facts’ – are proposals that have become the focus – of question – of doubt –

‘deep-lying secrets of nature’ –

there are no ‘deep-lying secrets’ – there is only what is proposed –

and any proposal is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘The second reason is that a scientific education as described above (and practised in our schools) cannot be reconciled with a humanitarian attitude. It is in conflict ‘with the cultivation of individuality which alone produces, or can produce, well developed human beings’, [John Stuart Mill] it ‘maims by compression, like a Chinese lady’s foot, every part of human nature which stands out prominently, and tends to make a person markedly different in outline’ [John Stuart Mill] from the ideals of rationality that happen to be fashionable in science, or in the philosophy of science. The attempt to increase liberty, to live a full and rewarding life, and the corresponding attempt to discover the secrets of nature and of man entails, therefore, the rejection of all universal standards and of all rigid tradition. (Naturally, it also entails the rejection of a large part of contemporary science.)

‘the cultivation of individuality which alone produces, or can produce, well developed human beings’ –

a proposal – open to question – open to – uncertain –

how we increase liberty – how we live full and rewarding lives – is a matter that is always – under consideration – open to question – always uncertain –

as for ‘discovering the secrets of nature’ – what we are talking about here is new and fruitful proposals

there is no need to reject anything – what is required is an open and critical mind

‘It is surprising to see how rarely the stultifying effect of ‘the Laws of Reason’ or of scientific practice is examined by professional anarchists. Professional anarchists oppose any kind of restriction and demand that the individual be permitted to develop freely, unhampered by laws, duties or obligations. And yet they swallow without protest all the severe standards which scientists and logicians impose upon research and upon any kind of knowledge-creating and knowledge-changing activity. Occasionally, the laws of scientific method, or what are thought to be the laws of scientific method by a particular writer are even interpreted into anarchism itself. ‘Anarchism is a world concept based upon a mechanical explanation of phenomena’ writes Kropotkin. ‘Its method of investigation is that of the exact natural sciences … the method of induction and deduction.’ It is not clear, writes a modern ‘radical’ professor at Columbia, ‘that scientific research demands an absolute freedom of speech and debate. Rather the evidence suggests that certain kinds of unfreedom place no obstacle in the way of science … [R.P. Wolff.] ’

well I would say that the laws of reason or of scientific practise have not been the focus of ‘professional’ anarchists –

probably because they haven’t recognised their relevance to the anarchist debate –

or because they haven’t had the intellectual skills to challenge them

and possibly too – they had other matters to occupy their attention

opposing any kind of restriction – is as absolutist as endorsing any kind of restriction

these ‘professional anarchists’ – are in the same boat as the authoritarians they oppose –

‘Anarchism is a world concept based upon a mechanical explanation of phenomena’ –

‘a world concept’ – what this amounts to is that anarchism is the rule – or should be

and if such a prescription is not authoritarian – what is it?

hard to see how the idea of ‘a world concept’ – is anything other than an argument for dominance

so – at the heart of such anarchism – is hypocrisy –

this so called ‘anarchist’ argues against standard authoritarian concepts and systems –

but endorses a ‘world concept’ – vague as that is – to take their place –

presumably ‘anarchist freedom’ sloshes around in the vagueness of the ‘world concept’

‘Its method of investigation is that of the exact natural sciences … the method of induction and deduction.’

it’s pretty clear from this that Kropotkin was quite happy to claim the backing of what he saw as the authority of science – for his ‘anarchism as a world concept’

as for the ‘radical professor at Columbia’ – this notion of ‘unfreedom’ – is unnecessary –

yes – we know science operates in a world of obstacles –

and if there were no obstacles to knowledge there would be no reason for science

the logical reality is that the only authority – is the authority of authorship –

and the authorship of a proposal – is logically irrelevant to the assessment of proposals –

any claim to authority – beyond authorship – is rhetorical – rhetorical and deceptive

the proposition is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

our freedom rests in propositional uncertainty

there is no place for ‘authority’ in propositional logic –

there is no place for authority in science – or indeed in any other propositional action or pursuit that human beings engage in

claims to authority beyond the claim of authorship have no logical basis –

and in so far as there are such claims what we are faced with is logical deception –

and it is this deception that is or should be the primary focus of all philosophical attack

the so called ‘anarchist’ – is the least equipped for this task – for he is a first order player in the very deception – that is to be unmasked –

frauds abound

‘There are certainly some people for whom this is ‘not so clear.’ Let us, therefore, start with our outline of an anarchistic methodology and a corresponding anarchist science. There is no need to fear that the diminished concern for law and order in science and in society that characterizes an anarchism of this kind will lead to chaos. The human nervous system is too well organized for that. There may, of course, come a time when it will be necessary to give reason a temporary advantage and when it will be wise to defend its rules to the exclusion of everything else. I do not think that we are living in such a time today.’

‘the human organism is too well organized for that’ –

so the backstop – the authority – for avoiding chaos – is the human nervous system –

the human nervous system apparently – is inviolable –

and is not a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

rather it is a bedrock against chaos

and presumably – according to Feyerabend – the anarchist argument – proceeds from this bedrock –

great to have such a solid and incontestable basis for one’s anarchism – for one’s anti- authoritarianism!

on top of this – yes – we can play deceptive games – if necessary –

what a victory!

‘There may, of course, come a time when it will be necessary to give reason a temporary advantage and when it will be wise to defend its rules to the exclusion of everything else.’

reason is – question – doubt – uncertainty

if you give reason a rest at anytime – you give up on knowledge – and you stay stuck in prejudice

‘I do not think that we are living in such a time today.’

presumably – for the time being – we can play a straight bat –

but the question is – what for Feyerabend is playing a straight bat?

what does this anarchist methodology amount to?

an argument against authority in science?

as I have stated you don’t have to fly the anarchist flag to argue against authority – in science – or for that matter – in any other propositional activity

all you need to do is understand propositional logic –

that is understand that the proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

this logic applies equally to anarchism –

anarchism – as with any other political doctrine is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

if it is not held to be – it is held not logically – but rhetorically

the real argument against authority in science – and authority in any propositional activity or context – is the argument for propositional uncertainty

it is the argument for a positive scepticism

and by positive scepticism – I mean a scepticism that regards propositional uncertainty as the reality we face – as the reality we live in – as the reality that is

our knowledge is uncertain

for too long – really since Socrates – scepticism has been negative –

it has been the argument against – the method used for tearing down

the positive sceptic embraces reality as it is – embraces its uncertainty –

and sees uncertainty as the engine of creativity.

Feyerabend begins chapter 1 with –

‘This is shown by an examination of historical episodes and by an abstract analysis of the relation between idea and action. The only principle that does not inhibit progress: is anything goes.’

‘The idea of a method that contains firm, unchanging, and absolutely binding principles for conducting the business of science meets considerable difficulty when confronted with the results of historical research. We find then, that there is not a single rule, however plausible, and however firmly grounded in epistemology, that is not violated at some time or another. It becomes evident that such violations are not accidental events, they are not results of insufficient knowledge or of inattention which might have been avoided. On the contrary, we see that they are necessary for progress. Indeed one of the most striking features of recent discussions in the philosophy of science is the realization that events and developments, such as the invention of atomism in antiquity, the Copernican revolution, the rise of modern atomism (kinetic theory; dispersion theory; stereochemistry; quantum theory), the gradual emergence of the wave theory of light, occurred only because some thinkers either decided not to be bound by certain ‘obvious’ methodological rules, or because they unwittingly broke them.’

the argument from history that Feyerabend suggests here is fair enough –

but history depends on who writes it –

and what is written depends of the assumptions of the historian

a different set of assumptions – delivers a different history

my point is that the historical argument – is really no more than a restatement of assumptions – and an elaboration of those assumptions

it really is something like the mast head for the perspective that is to be argued

as I see it the real issue here is logical – not historical

science is propositional

and any proposition – that is any proposal – from a logical point of view – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

science – as with any other propositional activity – reflects this logical reality –

the reality of question – doubt – uncertainty

where it does not – what we have is not logical behaviour – but rhetorical behaviour

the battle between logic and rhetoric in propositional life –

is the difference between a closed-minded approach to the world – and an open-minded approach

I would suggest that in science – as in all propositional activity – you will see logical behaviour and rhetorical behaviour

this seems to be the natural tension in propositional action – in propositional life

‘On the contrary, we see that they are necessary for progress.’

‘progress’ – is a value judgment –

what is ‘progress’ from one point of view – may well be considered a retrograde step from another

the reality is that propositional systems change – and people move with the change –

it is just this propositional movement – when given the sanction of those involved – that gets written up as ‘progress’

science – as with any other propositional action – is what occurs

and it is scientists – the propositional players in the propositional activity – who decide what is – and what is not to count as science – and indeed – what is and is not to count as good science

philosophers of science – are secondary players – they are at best – observers of the process –

they may have some interesting and useful insights into scientific activity – that might be of use to the practicing scientist – but they are not legislators

‘The idea of a method that contains firm, unchanging, and absolutely binding principles for conducting the business of science’ –

who’s idea is this?

Feyerabend keeps referring to it – but does not identify its proponents

we can ask – does anyone hold to such a view – if so who?

and how relevant would their opinion be – to anyone actually working in science?

one has the suspicion that Feyerabend is putting up a ’straw man argument’ – and that this straw man argument – is central to his enterprise

‘This liberal practice, I repeat, is not just a fact of the history of science. It is both reasonable and absolutely necessary for the growth of knowledge. More specifically, one can show the following: given any rule, however ‘fundamental’ or ‘necessary’ for science, there are always circumstances where it is advisable not only to ignore the rule, but to adopt its opposite. For example, there are circumstances where it is advisable to introduce, elaborate, and defend ad hoc hypotheses, or hypotheses which contradict well-established and generally accepted experimental results, or hypotheses whose content is smaller than the content of the existing and empirically adequate alternative, or self consistent hypotheses, and so on.’

the so called ‘history of science’ – regardless of whose history you are talking about –

is no guarantee of the future of science – is no guarantee of how science will be – how it will proceed

what we are getting here from Feyerabend – is an inductive account of scientific methodology –

I am surprised – I would never have imagined that Feyerabend would fall head first into Hume’s trap

science – at any time – just is what the scientists – the practitioners – say it is –

it is how they propose it

there may well be circumstances – where ad hoc hypotheses are introduced – or where scientists work with hypotheses which contradict well established experimental results etc. etc. –

whether or not science proceeds in this manner – is up to the scientists

whether or not such methods are ‘advisable’ – will be decided by the working scientist

as for the ‘growth of knowledge’ – knowledge is what is proposed –

and our proposals are open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

and it is this logical reality that leads to new proposals –

‘growth of knowledge’ amounts to – new proposals – new ways of understanding – new ways of seeing –

and any new proposal – new understanding – new way of seeing –

is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘There are even circumstances – and they occur rather infrequently – when argument looses its forward-looking aspect and becomes a hindrance to progress. Nobody would claim that the teaching of small children is exclusively a matter of argument (though argument may enter into it, and should enter into it to a larger extent than is customary), and almost everyone now agrees that what looks like a result of reason – the mastery of a language, the existence of a richly articulated perceptual world, logical ability – is due partly to indoctrination and partly to a process of growth that proceeds with the force of natural law. And where arguments do seem to have an effect, this is more than often due to their physical repetition than to their semantic content.’

‘when argument looses its forward-looking aspect and becomes a hindrance to progress’

argument is argument –

whether it is forward looking – or not – depends on who’s doing the looking

and ‘a hindrance to progress’ – again depends on who’s idea of progress we are talking about here

argument if it is logical – is critical –

whether it is forward looking or a hindrance – has to do with the use – it is put to – and how that use is evaluated

‘the mastery of a language, the existence of a richly articulated perceptual world, logical ability’ –

how these faculties come about – and are developed – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘the force of natural law’ – is really the explanation you have – when you have no explanation at all

argument – is a means of persuasion – and not the only one

‘Having admitted this much we must also concede the possibility of non-argumentative growth in the adult as well as in (the theoretical parts of) institutions such as science, religion, prostitution, and so on. We certainly cannot take for granted that what is possible for a small child – to acquire new modes of behaviour on the slightest provocation, to slide into them without any noticeable effort – is beyond the reach of his elders. One should rather expect that catastrophic changes in the environment, wars, the breakdown of encompassing morality, political revolutions, will transform adult reaction patterns as well, including important patterns of argumentation. Such a transformation may again be an entirely natural process and the only function of a critical argument may lie in the fact that it increases the mental tension that precedes and causes the behavioural outburst.’

the question is how to explain growth in the adult – as well as in institutions –

any explanation offered – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘one should rather expect that catastrophic changes will transform adult reactions and patterns of argumentation’

of course you can expect change in humans who face changing circumstances –

just what that amounts to is open to question

‘an entirely natural process’ – yes – but what does this mean – beyond saying – yes – change happens?

‘the mental tension that precedes and causes the behavioural outburst’?

look this ‘mental tension’ idea – is a theory – an explanation – that Feyerabend is putting up – to account for what he calls a ‘behavioural outburst’ – whatever that amounts to

‘the only function of rational argument’ – is to put such theories – such explanations – to question – to doubt –

in short – to explore the uncertainty in any such proposal

‘Now, if there are events, not necessarily arguments which cause us to adopt new standards, including new and more complex forms of argumentation, is it then not up to the defenders of the status quo to provide, not just counter arguments, but also contrary causes? (‘Virtue without terror is ineffective’, says Robespierre.) And if the old forms of argumentation turn out to be too weak a cause, must not these defenders either give up or resort to stronger and more ‘irrational’ means? (It is very difficult and perhaps entirely impossible, to combat the effects of brainwashing by argument.) Even the most puritanical rationalist will then be forced to stop reasoning and use propaganda and coercion, not because some of his reasons have ceased to be valid, but because the psychological conditions which make them effective, and capable of influencing others, have disappeared. And what is the use of an argument that leaves people unmoved?

however new standards are put – in whatever form they are proposed –

the adoption of new standards will not be without question – doubt – and uncertainty –

or if they are they – they are not being considered rationally

and defenders of the status quo – if they behave rationally – will question – and doubt – the new proposals

Robespierre – was an authoritarian – whose advocacy of terror – was a statement of his impotence and ignorance

winning the argument – is a rhetorical issue

yes – you can give up – resort to force – or just step back and wait for another chance to win the day

and whatever approach is taken – logically speaking – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

argument is persuasion – argument is propaganda

‘And what is the use of an argument that leaves people unmoved?’ –

exactly

‘Of course the problem never arises quite in this form. The teaching of standards and their defence never consists in merely putting them before the mind of the student and making them as clear as possible. The standards are supposed to have maximum causal efficacy as well. This makes it very difficult to distinguish between the logical force and the material effect of an argument. Just as a well trained pet will obey his master no matter how great the confusion in which he finds himself, and no matter how urgent the need to adopt new patterns of behaviour, so in the very same way a well trained rationalist will obey the mental image of his master, he will conform to the standards of argumentation he has learned, he will adhere to these standards no matter how great the confusion in which he finds himself, and he will be quite incapable of realizing that what he regards as the ‘voice of reason’ is but a causal after-effect of the training he has received. He will be quite unable to discover that the appeal to reason to which he succumbs so readily is nothing but a political manoeuvre.’

‘The teaching of standards and their defence never consists in merely putting them before the mind of the student and making them as clear as possible.’ –

making them ‘as clear as possible’ – ok –

but simply presenting so called clear proposals – is a waste of time –

what needs to be taught is question – doubt – and the exploration of logical uncertainty

‘clarity’ is a con – a logical con

‘the logical force and the material effect of an argument’ –

arguments have no logical force – the force of an argument – is rhetorical –

and the rhetorical force of an argument – is what does or does not have a material effect –

rhetoric – is persuasion –

the logical reality is that any proposal put – however it is put – and with whatever force it is put –

is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

logic is the only defence against rhetoric

this ‘voice of reason’ – is no more than a piece of rhetoric –

a rhetorical device – which like all rhetoric – is designed to stop question – stop doubt – and to pretend – certainty

it is pretence

‘political manoeuvre’? –

yes – you can call any rhetorical argument – any pretentious action – a power-play

‘That interests, forces, propaganda and brainwashing techniques play a much greater role than is commonly believed in the growth of our knowledge and in the growth of science, can also be seen from an analysis of the relation between idea and action. It is often taken for granted that a clear and distinct understanding of new ideas precedes, and should precede, their formulation and institutional expression. (An investigation starts with a problem, says Popper.) First, we have an idea, or a problem, then we act. i.e. either speak, or build, or destroy. Yet this is certainly not the way in which small children develop. They use words, they combine them, they play with them, until they grasp a meaning that has so far been beyond their reach. And the initial playful activity is an essential prerequisite of the final act of understanding. There is no reason why this mechanism should cease to function in the adult. We must expect, for example, that the idea of liberty could be made clear only by means of the very same actions, which were supposed to create liberty. Creation of a thing, and creation plus full understanding of a correct idea of the thing, are very often parts of one and the same indivisible process and cannot be separated without bringing the process to a stop. The process itself is not guided by a well-defined programme, and cannot be guided by such a programme, for it contains the conditions for the realisation of all possible programmes. It is guided rather by a vague urge, by a ‘passion’; (Kierkegaard). The passion gives rise to specific behaviour which in turn creates circumstances and the ideas necessary for analysing and explaining the process, for making it ‘rational’.’

‘That interests, forces, propaganda and brainwashing techniques play a much greater role than is commonly believed in the growth of our knowledge and in the growth of science,’

yes

‘It is often taken for granted that a clear and distinct understanding of new ideas precedes, and should precede, their formulation and institutional expression.’

yes –

but those who take this for granted are falling for a myth –

‘a clear and distinct understanding’ – is a pretence

from a logical point of view – any ‘understanding’ – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

a ‘clear understanding’ is what you have – when you regard your ‘understanding’ – as beyond question – beyond doubt –

an investigation starts with a proposal – a proposition

the proposal – the proposition – is put to question – to doubt –

a logical investigation is an exploration of propositional uncertainty

Feyerabend’s theory of how small children learn and what he draws from this theory – is all very well

it is a proposal – open to question –

‘Creation of a thing, and creation plus full understanding of a correct idea of the thing, are very often parts of one and the same indivisible process and cannot be separated without bringing the process to a stop. The process itself is not guided by a well-defined programme, and cannot be guided by such a programme, for it contains the conditions for the realisation of all possible programmes.’

‘full understanding of a correct idea of a thing’ – is rubbish –

there is no ‘full understanding’ – there is only the pretence of a ‘full understanding’ –

and the ‘correct’ idea – is simply the idea that is no longer put to question

it may well be that the process is guided by a ‘well defined programme’ – and the result may be what is desired –

nevertheless the ‘process’ and the ‘result’ – logically speaking – are open to question – open to doubt

there is no certainty in propositional behaviour

‘The passion gives rise to specific behaviour which in turn creates circumstances and the ideas necessary for analysing and explaining the process, for making it ‘rational’.’ –

this ‘passion’ argument is interesting but irrelevant –

what makes any behaviour ‘rational’ – is that it is held open to question – open to doubt – and regarded as uncertain

‘The development of the Copernican point of view from Galileo to the 20^th century is a perfect example of the situation I wish to describe. We start with a strong belief that runs counter to contemporary reason and contemporary experience. The belief spreads and finds support in other beliefs which are equally unreasonable, if not more so (law of inertia; the telescope). Research now gets deflected in new directions, new kinds of instruments are built; ‘evidence’ is related to theories in new ways until there arises an ideology that is rich enough to provide independent arguments for any particular part of it and mobile enough to find such arguments wherever they seem to be required. We can say today that Galileo was on the right track, for his persistent pursuit of what once seemed to be a silly cosmology has by now created the material needed to defend it against all those who will accept a view only if it is told in a certain way and who will trust it only if it contains certain magical phrases, called ‘observational reports’. And this is not an exception – it is the normal case; theories become clear and reasonable only after incoherent parts of them have been used for a long time. Such unreasonable, nonsensical, unmethodical foreplay thus turns out to be an unavoidable precondition of clarity and of empirical success.’

if you cut out all the rhetoric and histrionics in Feyerabend’s account – i.e. ‘strong belief’ – ‘runs counter to contemporary experience’ – ‘equally unreasonable’ – ‘rich enough to provide’ – ‘ideology’ – etc.

what you start with is a proposal – plain and simple –

the proposal gains support – for whatever reason –

critical investigation leads to other and new proposals – (law of inertia – the telescope etc.) –

the original proposal – becomes a propositional complex – and new arguments are developed

‘We can say today that Galileo was on the right track’ –

oh the benefit of retrospective 20:20 tunnel vision!

what we can say is that Galileo – was on a track –

and further that there are cosmologists – of the 21^st century – who regard Galileo’s track as the way that led to the currently accepted view of the physical world –

had Galileo’s theory and argument not found the support and acceptance that it did – at the time and over time – we would be hearing a different history and different view of the physical world –

I am surprised that Feyerabend would say that Galileo was on the ‘right’ track –

logically – all we can say is that Galileo’s proposal – was – and is – open to question – open to doubt

that it was – and is – uncertain

there is no ‘right’ propositional track –

there is only that track which is – for whatever reason supported and adopted –

and as Feyerabend said earlier –

‘That interests, forces, propaganda and brainwashing techniques play a much greater role than is commonly believed in the growth of our knowledge and in the growth of science,’

why one theory won the day – and others were not successful in the court of scientific opinion – is not a logical issue – it is a matter of historical speculation

fascinating as such can be – we never leave the realm of speculation – with all its uncertainty

as for ‘observational reports’ –

in the end – I think – a mainstay of scientific ritual

‘Such unreasonable, nonsensical, unmethodical foreplay thus turns out to be an unavoidable precondition of clarity and of empirical success.’

this ‘clarity and empirical success’ – is just rhetoric

proposals are put – reasonable / unreasonable – sensible / nonsensical –

the point is that whatever is put and however it is put – it is open to question –

the process of evaluation may be disciplined and rigid – or messy and unmethodical –

any evaluation – is likewise – open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘Now, when we attempt to describe and to understand developments of this kind in a general way, we are, of course, obliged to appeal to the existing forms of speech which do not take them into account and which must be distorted, misused, beaten into new patterns in order to fit unforseen situations (without a constant misuse of language there cannot be any discovery, any progress). ‘Moreover, since the traditional categories are the gospel of everyday thinking (including ordinary scientific thinking) and of everyday practice, [such an attempt at understanding] in effect presents rules and forms of false thinking and action – false, that is, from the standpoint of (scientific) common sense.’

{Marcuse}. This is how dialectical thinking arises as a form of thought that ‘dissolves into nothing the determinations of the understanding’,{Hegel} formal logic included.’

‘we are, of course, obliged to appeal to the existing forms of speech which do not take them into account and which must be distorted, misused, beaten into new patterns in order to fit unforseen situations (without a constant misuse of language there cannot be any discovery, any progress).’ –

what underpins language – and language use – or what is reflected in language and language use – is propositional logic

the logic of the proposition is that any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

language – and language use – is characterized by – logical uncertainty –

‘an existing form of speech’ – is a logical / propositional uncertainty –

it is not ‘a constant misuse of language’ – but rather an instance of propositional uncertainty –

and it is this propositional uncertainty that allows language to accommodate and embrace new proposals

‘Moreover, since the traditional categories are the gospel of everyday thinking (including ordinary scientific thinking) and of everyday practice, [such an attempt at understanding] in effect presents rules and forms of false thinking and action – false, that is, from the standpoint of (scientific) common sense.’ –

this is just naïve rubbish from Feyerabend via Marcuse

there is no ‘gospel’ in propositional activity –

propositional action – propositional life is – uncertain –

and it is this uncertainty that is the source of propositional vitality – flexibility and creativity

rules and forms –

rules are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

there are no true forms of thinking and action – there are no false forms of thinking and action

any form of thinking – any form of action – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

a true proposal – logically speaking – is one you affirm –

a false proposal – one you deny

and any decision on the truth value of a proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

‘(Incidentally, my frequent use of such words as ‘progress’, ‘advance’, ‘improvement’ etc., does not mean that I claim special knowledge about what is good and what is bad in the sciences and that I want to impose this knowledge on my readers. Everyone can read the terms in his own way and in accordance with the tradition to which he belongs. Thus for an empiricist, ‘progress’ will mean transition to a theory that provides direct empirical tests for most of its basic assumptions. Some people believe the quantum theory to be a theory of this kind. For others ‘progress’ may mean unification and harmony, perhaps even at the expense of empirical adequacy. This is how Einstein viewed the general theory of relativity. And my theory is that anarchism helps achieve progress in any one of the senses one cares to choose. Even a law and order science will succeed if anarchistic moves are occasionally made.)’

‘progress’ – ‘advance’ – ‘improvement’? –

it is not a matter of whether everyone can read these terms in his own way and in accordance with the tradition to which he belongs – but rather that as a matter of fact everyone does –

this is just what does happens –

and yes – logically speaking – these terms – as with any term – and as with any methodology – are open to question – open to doubt – are uncertain

‘And my theory is that anarchism helps achieve progress in any one of the senses one cares to choose. Even a law and order science will succeed if anarchistic moves are occasionally made’

the obvious question is –

if i.e. ‘a law and order science’ will succeed without them – why bother with these so called ‘anarchistic moves’?

at best are they not irrelevant? –

and at worst a distraction – basically an annoyance?

in any case I have my doubts about just whether this so called anarchist method is as complimentary as Feyerabend pretends –

isn’t Feyerabend’s point to disrupt the status quo – whatever that may be?

so do we actually have anything here from Feyerabend?

I mean he has failed to show how his proposal adds anything to existing practises –

we can say too – it hasn’t taken anything away from existing practices

the point is – it is neither a plus or a minus – rather an irrelevant distraction –

an irrelevant distraction from genuine scientific endeavour

‘It is clear, then, that the idea of a fixed method, or of a fixed theory of rationality, rests on too naive a view of man and his social surroundings. To those who look at the rich material provided by history and who are not intent on impoverishing it in order to please their lower instincts, their craving for intellectual security in the form of clarity, precision, ‘objectivity’, ‘truth’, it will become clear that there is only one principle that can be defined under all circumstances and in all stages of human development. It is the principle: anything goes.’

whatever ‘goes’ –

that is – whatever is proposed –

is open to question – open to doubt –

and is uncertain

‘For example, we may use hypotheses that contradict well-confirmed theories and / or well-established experimental results. We may advance science by proceeding counter-inductively.’

‘Examining the principle [anything goes] in concrete detail means tracing the consequences of ‘counterrules’ which oppose some familiar rules of scientific enterprise. To see how this works, let us consider the rule that it is ‘experience’, or ‘the facts’, or ‘experimental results’ which measure the success of our theories, that agreement between the theory and the ‘data’ favours the theory (or leaves the situation unchanged) while disagreement endangers it, and perhaps even forces us to eliminate it. This rule is an important part of all theories of confirmation and collaboration. It is the essence of empiricism. The ‘counterrule’ corresponding to it advises us to introduce and elaborate hypotheses which are inconsistent with well established theories and / or well established facts. It advises us to proceed counterinductively.’

‘Examining the principle [anything goes] in concrete detail means tracing the consequences of ‘counterrules’ which oppose some familiar rules of scientific enterprise.’

it is quite clear from this that ‘anything goes’ – just does not mean – anything goes –

what it means is ‘tracing the consequences of counter rules’ –

‘tracing the consequences of counterrules’ – is not ‘anything goes’

‘The ‘counterrule’ corresponding to it advises us to introduce and elaborate hypotheses which are inconsistent with well established theories and / or well established facts. It advises us to proceed counterinductively.’

let us be clear here that a ‘rule’ – is just a guiding proposal of practice

if you put your rules to question – to doubt – if you explore their uncertainty –

then you may well come up with Feyerabend’s so called ‘counterrule’

this counterrule notion has nothing to do with ‘anything goes’ –

finding a counterrule is quite simply a result of a critical analysis of the prevailing practice –

and whether you should or should not put this counterrule into practice – is not a moral question – there is no imperative here –

it is simply a matter of looking at it as a proposal – and considering whether in the circumstances such a rule – such a practice – will be of use

if the proposal is put – a decision will be made

and any decision made – will be open to question – open to doubt – will be – uncertain

‘The counterinductive procedure gives rise to the following questions: Is counterinduction more reasonable than induction? Are these circumstances favouring its use? What are the arguments for it? What are the arguments against it? Is perhaps induction always preferable to counterinduction? And so on.’

‘Are there circumstances favouring its use?’ –

there may well be

‘What are the arguments against it?’ –

arguments against it will be proposed in those circumstances where it is deemed to be of no use

‘Is perhaps induction always preferable to counterinduction?’ –

we can’t say that any methodological proposal is always preferable – will be functional in all circumstances –

we can’t say this because we cannot know that a methodology works in all circumstances

we can’t know all circumstances

what we can say is that a scientist can have at his disposal a number of methodologies that are candidates for use in whatever circumstance – whatever propositional context – he is working in –

and further – that any methodology – and any decision to use a methodology – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘These questions will be answered in two steps. I shall first examine the counterrule that urges us to develop hypotheses inconsistent with well established facts. The results may be summarized as follows.

In the first case it emerges that the evidence that might refute a theory can often be unearthed only with an incompatible alternative: the advise (which goes back to Newton and is still very popular today) to use only alternatives when refutations have already discredited the orthodox theory puts the cart before the horse. Also, some of the most important formal properties of a theory are found by contrast, not by analysis. A scientist who wishes to maximise the empirical content of the views he holds and who wants to understand them as clearly as he possibly can must therefore introduce other views; that is he must adopt a pluralistic methodology. He must compare ideas with other ideas rather than with ‘experience’ and he must rather try to improve rather than discard views that have failed in the competition. Proceeding in this way he will retain the theories of man and cosmos that are found in Genesis, or in the Pimander, he will elaborate them and use them to measure the success of evolution and other ‘modern’ views. He may then discover that the theory of evolution is not as good as is generally assumed and that it may be supplemented, or entirely replaced, by an improved version of Genesis. Knowledge as so conceived is not a series of self-consistent theories that converge towards an ideal view; it is not a gradual approach to the truth. It is rather an ever increasing ocean of mutually incompatible (and perhaps incommensurable) alternatives, each single theory, each fairy tale, each myth that is part of the collection forcing the others into greater articulation and all of them contributing, via the process of competition, to the development of our consciousness. Nothing is ever settled, no view can ever be omitted from a comprehensive account. Plutarch, or Diogenes Laertius and not Dirac, or even von Neumann are the methods for presenting knowledge of this kind in which the history of science becomes an inseparable part of science itself – it is essential for its further development as well as for giving content to the theories it contains at any one moment. Experts and laymen, professionals and dilettanti, truth freaks and liars – they are all invited to participate in the contest and to make their contribution to the enrichment of our culture. The task of the scientist, however, is no longer ‘to search for truth’, or ‘to praise God’, or ‘to systematize observations’, or ‘to improve predictions’. These are but side effects of an activity to which his attention is now firmly directed and which is ‘to make clear the weaker case the stronger’ as the sophists said, and thereby sustain the motion of the whole.’

‘In the first case it emerges that the evidence that might refute a theory can often be unearthed only with an incompatible alternative: the advise (which goes back to Newton and is still very popular today) to use only alternatives only when refutations have already discredited the orthodox theory puts the cat before the horse.’

the problem with ‘anything goes’ – for Feyerabend is that on this principle – whatever occurs in the name of science is legitimate – even that is – the positions that Feyerabend argues against –

and why would he argue against any approach – any methodology – if as he says ‘anything goes’?

yes the evidence that might refute a theory might only be unearthed with an incompatible alternative

and there is nothing against this ‘incompatible alternative’ approach –

however whether it is in fact used or not depends on the circumstances in which the scientist is operating – what he decides to do – and what he wants to achieve –

perhaps he is not after a refutation – perhaps – for whatever reason – he has decided for the theory – and his work on the theory is an exploration of its consequences and applicability?

it is quite pointless to generalize about how scientists should proceed in all circumstances

and any assessment of a particular scientific context – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

what scientists do – is what science is –

whether you like the way they go about it or not

‘A scientist who wishes to maximise the empirical content of the views he holds and who wants to understand them as clearly as he possible can must therefore introduce other views; that is he must adopt a pluralistic methodology.’

‘as clearly as possible’ –

is an open-ended proposal – which could mean anything – and therefore amounts to nothing

the issue I would suggest is never ‘clarity’ – clarity is a ruse – the issue is uncertainty –

exploring theoretical – propositional – uncertainty –

a pluralistic methodology – is one way of approaching this – it is not the only way

a monolithic methodology – is just as open to question – open to doubt – is just as uncertain – as a pluralistic approach

‘Proceeding in this way he will retain the theories of man and cosmos that are found in Genesis or in the Pimander, he will elaborate them and use them to measure the success of evolution and other ‘modern’ views. He may then discover that the theory of evolution is not as good as is generally assumed and that it may be supplemented, or entirely replaced, by an improved version of Genesis.’

yes – proceeding in this way he may well retain – every theory that has come his way –

but really how useful would that be for investigating a theoretical or empirical issue?

I am not saying it wouldn’t – but it does strike me that too much background knowledge might blunt rather than sharpen one’s critical faculties –

and really you have to decide what it is you are on about –

are you making a survey of different cosmological and metaphysical systems – or are you having a hard look at a particular theory?

‘Knowledge as so conceived is not a series of self-consistent theories that converge towards an ideal view; it is not a gradual approach to the truth. It is rather an ever increasing ocean of mutually incompatible (and perhaps incommensurable) alternatives, each single theory, each fairy tale, each myth that is part of the collection forcing the others into greater articulation and all of them contributing, via the process of competition, to the development of our consciousness.’

knowledge is what is proposed –

and our proposals are open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

knowledge is uncertain

and yes it is not ‘a gradual approach to truth’ –

or for that matter – which I think effectively amounts to exactly the same thing – ‘the development of our consciousness’

Feyerabend – I suggest is not putting an alternative epistemology at all – he runs with exactly the same ideas he claims to be arguing against

his argument is a fraud – no matter how it is dressed up

‘Nothing is ever settled, no view can ever be omitted from a comprehensive account. Plutarch, or Diogenes Laertius and not Dirac, or even von Neuman are the methods for presenting knowledge of this kind in which the history of science becomes an inseparable part of science itself – it is essential for its further development as well as for giving content to the theories it contains at any one moment. Experts and laymen, professionals and dilettanti, truth freaks and liars – they are all invited to participate in the contest and to make their contribution to the enrichment of our culture.’

nothing is ever settled –

but that does not mean that every view has a place in every account of anything

we choose – we decide – what is and is not relevant to the issue we are considering –

if you can’t make such a decision – then you don’t begin the critical process

and yes any decision you make is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

nothing is ever settled –

but decisions are made – actions are taken – we move on

the history of science – or should I say – someone’s history of science – might be of use in some context – that’s all –

on the other hand – it may well be entirely irrelevant – and a real distraction from the issue at hand –

as for inviting every man and his dog into the tent – no one does this

and the idea that doing so would be of use to a working scientist – or to anyone who’s actually doing anything constructive – is just laughable

‘The task of the scientist, however, is no longer ‘to search for truth’, or ‘to praise God’, or ‘to systematize observations’, or ‘to improve predictions’. These are but side effects of an activity to which his attention is now firmly directed and which is ‘to make clear the weaker case the stronger’ as the sophists said, and thereby sustain the motion of the whole.’

look – the task of scientist – is just what the scientist says it is –

philosophers can remind any hot-shot that whatever he proposes – at any stage of his work – is logically speaking – open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘The second counterrule which favours hypotheses inconsistent with observations, facts and experimental results, needs no special defence, for there is not a single interesting theory that agrees with all the known facts in its domain. The question is, therefore, not whether counter-inductive theories should be admitted into science, the question is, rather, whether the existing discrepancies between theory and fact should be increased, or diminished, or what else should be done with them.’

yes – the discrepancies –

as to what to do about discrepancies between theory and fact – yes we have options

the discrepancies can be increased – decreased – ignored –

what option will be taken up – will depend on the scientist and what he wants to achieve

what he thinks can be achieved

here there just are no rules – or if you like – every rule is a candidate

decisions are taken – and these decisions are open to question – open to doubt – they are uncertain

there is no universal answer to the question of how to deal with discrepancies – it is a question of circumstance and judgment

and if Feyerabend’s ‘should’ suggests that there is some universal or objective answer to the question

it should be dropped from any methodological proposal – any methodological statement

what we are really talking about here is –

that method that one proposes – at the time – that will best do the job – whatever that job is –

and the whole matter is entirely uncertain

‘To answer this question it suffices to remember that observational reports, experimental results, ‘factual’ statements, either contain theoretical assumptions or assert them by the manner in which they are used…Thus our habit of saying ‘the table is brown’ when we view it under normal circumstances, with our senses in good order, but ‘the table seems to be brown’ when either the lighting conditions are poor or when we feel unsure in our capacity of observation expresses the belief that there are familiar circumstances, when our senses are capable of seeing the world ‘as it really is’ and other, equally familiar circumstances, when they are deceived. It expresses the belief that some of our sensory impressions are veridical while others are not. We also take it for granted that the material between the object and us exerts no distorting influence, and that the physical entity that establishes the contact – light – carries a true picture. All these are abstract, and highly doubtful, assumptions which shape our view of the world without being accessible to a direct criticism. Usually, we are not even aware of them and we recognise their effects only when we encounter an entirely different cosmology: prejudices are found by contrast, not by analysis. The material which the scientist has at his disposal, his most sublime theories and most sophisticated techniques included, is structured in exactly the same way. It contains principles which are not known and which, if known, would be extremely hard to test. (As a result, a theory may clash with the evidence not because it is not correct, but because the evidence is contaminated.)’

‘It expresses the belief that some of our sensory impressions are veridical while others are not. We also take it for granted that the material between the object and us exerts no distorting influence, and that the physical entity that establishes the contact – light – carries a true picture. All these abstract, and highly doubtful, assumptions shape our view of the world without being accessible to a direct criticism.’

that a sensory impression is termed ‘veridical’ or termed ‘illusory’ – does not give it some kind of logical immunity

all these abstract assumptions – are highly doubtful – yes

they are open to question – open to doubt – they are uncertain –

and as such are accessible to direct criticism

and yes –

‘The material which the scientist has at his disposal, his most sublime theories and most sophisticated techniques included, is structured in exactly the same way.’ –

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

‘(As a result, a theory may clash with the evidence not because it is not correct, but because the evidence is contaminated.)’

no theory is ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’ –

a proposal is either adopted or it is not – a theory is either applied or it is not

all ‘evidence’ – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

the evidence is not ‘contaminated’ – the evidence is uncertain

‘Now – how can we possibly examine something we are using all the time? How can we analyse the terms in which we habitually express our most simple and straightforward observations? How can we discover the kind of world we presuppose when proceeding as we do?

The answer is clear: we cannot discover it from the inside. We need an external standard of criticism, we need a set of alternative assumptions or, as these assumptions will be quite general, constituting, as it were, an entire alternative world, we need a dream world in order to discover the features of the real world we think we inhabit (and which may be just another dream world). The first step in our criticism of familiar concepts and procedures, the first step in our criticism of ‘facts’, must therefore be an attempt to break the circle. We must invent a new conceptual scheme that suspends, or clashes with our most carefully established observational results, confounds the most plausible
theoretical principles, and introduces perceptions that cannot form part of the existing perceptual world. This step is again counter-inductive. Counterinduction is therefore, always reasonable and it has a chance of success.’

‘Now – how can we possibly examine something we are using all the time?

this is a stupid question –

we can and we do – as a matter of fact – question – doubt – ‘what we are using all the time’ –

‘How can we analyse the terms in which we habitually express our most simple and straightforward observations?

we can analyse the terms we use – if we question the meaning – the use – of these terms

‘How can we discover the kind of world we presuppose when proceeding as we do?

first off – who is to say we are presupposing?

someone can of course argue this

but is this presupposition – that we presuppose – anything more than just another proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

what if someone says – look I’m not presupposing anything – look at just what I have proposed – and deal with that – fair and square –

what are you going to say?

that they don’t know what they are talking about – but you do? –

that is presumptuous indeed

‘we cannot discover from the inside’ –

the ‘inside’ of what?

all we have is what is proposed –

and any ‘discovery’ – so called – in relation to what is proposed – is a proposal

inside – outside – internal – external – are unnecessary categorizations –

they are a hangover from out-dated epistemology

‘We need an external standard of criticism, we need a set of alternative assumptions or, as these assumptions will be quite general, constituting, as it were, an entire alternative world, we need a dream world in order to discover the features of the real world we think we inhabit (and which may be just another dream world).’

‘an external standard of criticism’?

if you question – if you doubt – if you explore a proposal’s uncertainty – that is if you behave logically – you behave critically

there is no ‘standard’ involved here – and it is not ‘external’ to propositional activity

it simply a matter of question and doubt and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

alternative assumptions – can be a platform from which to launch a critical investigation

these alternative assumptions like the proposal they are directed at – are open to question – open to doubt – are uncertain

you don’t need to construct a ‘dream world’ to question – to doubt – to regard as uncertain

there are not two worlds – the ‘real world’ – and the ‘dream world’ – or any other kind of world

there is the propositional world –

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

by all means invent a new conceptual scheme – and contrast it with the current one –

the new conceptual scheme – as with the current one – is a proposal – and is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

counterinduction simply adds new proposals to be critically evaluated –

this may be useful – or it may not – it depends on the circumstance –

that is all you can say –

and if you try to set up counterinduction – as a method that will fit all circumstance –

then you are indeed in a dream world

‘Counterinduction is therefore, always reasonable and it has a chance of success.’

any proposal is reasonable – if it is open to question

as for ‘success’ – that is just a question of gaining support –

always a matter of persuasion – of rhetoric –

propositional arm twisting

‘In the following seven chapters, this conclusion will be developed in greater detail and it will be elucidated with the help of historical examples. One might therefore get the impression that I recommend a new methodology which replaces induction with counterinduction and uses a multiplicity of theories, metaphysical views, fairy-tales instead of the customary pair theory/observation. This impression would certainly be mistaken. My intention is not to replace one set rules by another such set: my intention is, rather, to convince the reader that all methodologies, even the most obvious ones, have their limits. The best way to show this is to demonstrate the limits and even the irrationality of some rules which she, or he, is likely to regard as basic. In the case of induction (including induction by falsification) this means demonstrating how well the counterinductive procedures can be supported by argument. Always remember that the demonstrations and rhetorics used do not express any ‘deep convictions’ of mine. They merely show how easy it is to lead people by the nose in a rational way. An anarchist is like an undercover agent who plays the game of reason in order to undercut the authority of Reason (Truth, Honesty, Justice, and so on).’

‘My intention is not to replace one set rules by another such set: my intention is, rather, to convince the reader that all methodologies, even the most obvious ones, have their limits.’

there is no argument here – I doubt that there is a methodologist of any persuasion who doesn’t recognise that his methodology has its limits

where the argument starts – where it begins – is with question of which methodology best facilitates scientific discovery?

does Feyerabend have anything to say here?

‘In the case of induction (including induction by falsification) this means demonstrating how well the counterinductive procedures can be supported by argument.’

ok – this is fair enough – and it might be news to some scientists – so it is worth making the point that counterinductive procedures are valid

however given that Feyerabend has already put that all methodologies – including counterinduction are limited – he hasn’t added anything to the obvious

as to the question – which methodology best facilitates scientific discovery?

I would argue not for one and against another – or for all or none

my argument is that – in practice – we can’t say – in any objective sense

the matter is uncertain –

what we can say is that there are different methodologies – it is worth knowing them – and understanding how they might be used

now science will be – what scientists determine it to be –

and any determination here will be open to question – open to doubt – will be uncertain

‘Always remember that the demonstrations and rhetorics used do not express any ‘deep convictions’ of mine. They merely show how easy it is to lead people by the nose in a rational way. An anarchist is like an undercover agent who plays the game of reason in order to undercut the authority of Reason (Truth, Honesty, Justice, and so on).’

it is one thing to question – to doubt – to be uncertain –

quite another to bullshit

if Feyerabend can’t be straight up about what he thinks – then what he says is not worth listening to

his anarchist – as the undercover agent – is corrupt

‘The consistency condition which demands that new hypotheses agree with accepted theories is unreasonable because it preserves the older theory. Hypotheses contradicting well-confirmed theories give us evidence that cannot be obtained in any other way. Proliferation of theories is beneficial for science, while uniformity impairs critical power. Uniformity also endangers the free development of the individual.’

‘In this chapter I shall present more detailed arguments for the counter rule that urges us to introduce hypotheses which are inconsistent with well-established theories. The argument will be indirect. They will start with a criticism of the demand that new hypotheses must be consistent with such theories. This demand will be called the consistency condition.’

any proposal – any theory – from a logical point of view – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

this ‘consistency condition’ – in so far as it is designed to reduce – minimize – or protect

a theory from criticism – from question – from doubt – from the exploration of its uncertainty – is not logical

to protect against any kind of criticism – is to operate prejudicially

Feyerabend’s so called ‘counter-rule’ – ‘that urges us to introduces hypotheses which are inconsistent with well established theories’ – has a place – or can have a place in any open and critical discussion

however that a scientist doesn’t operate counterinductively – does not mean that therefore he proceeds illogically

he may well question – doubt – and regard his theory as uncertain – without availing himself of counterinductive procedures –

there is no demand to operate counterinductively – it is an option

as to whether counterinductive procedures produce better results – that is a matter open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

it is important to bear in mind that the logic of science – is not always reflected in the practice of science

science – as with any propositional activity can be logical – that is open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

or it can be – to varying degrees – closed to question – to doubt – to uncertainty – and thus illogical –

whether logical or illogical – science is what scientists say it is – science is what they do – and how they do it –

you might be tempted to think ‘anything goes’ –

it is rather a case of – what goes – is what goes

‘Prime Facie, the case of consistency condition can be dealt with in a few words. It is well known (and has also been shown in detail by Duhem is that Newton’s theory is inconsistent with Galileo’s law of free fall and with Kepler’s laws; that statistical thermodynamics is inconsistent with the second law of phenomenological theory; that wave optics is inconsistent with geometrical optics; and so on. Note that what is being asserted here is logical inconsistency; it may well be that the differences of prediction are too small to be detected by experiment. Note also that what is being asserted is not the inconsistency of, say Newton’s theory and Galileo’s law, but rather the inconsistency of some consequences of Newton’s theory in the domain of validity of Galileo’s law, and Galileo’s law. In the last case the situation is especially clear. Galileo’s theory asserts that the acceleration of free fall is a constant but decreases (although imperceptibly) with the distance from the centre of the earth.’

different theories – will have different theoretical constructs – different terminologies – and in that respect – will be inconsistent

a focus on whether theories are consistent or not – is to miss the point

for the working scientist the real issue between theories – is which theory has the greater explanatory scope – and which theory has the greater predictive power

now of course these matters are open to question – open to doubt – and are uncertain –

but they will not be addressed or resolved by consideration of the question of consistency

methodological prescriptions with regard to which theories can or cannot be considered in any scientific argument have no place in a free and open discussion

decisions will be made as to the value of pursuing and developing different proposals –

and any such decision is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘To speak more abstractly: consider a theory Tʹ that successfully describes the situation inside domain Dʹ. Tʹ agrees with a finite number of observations (let their class be F) and it agrees with these observations inside a margin M of error. Any alternative that contradicts Tʹ outside F and inside M is supported by exactly the same observations and is therefore acceptable if Tʹ is acceptable (I shall assume that F are the only observations made). The consistency condition is much less tolerant. It eliminates a theory or hypothesis not because it disagrees with the facts; it eliminates it because it disagrees with another theory, with a theory moreover, whose confirming instances it shares. It thereby makes the as yet untested part of that theory a measure of validity. The only difference between such a measure and a more recent theory is age and familiarity. Had the younger theory been there first, then the consistency condition would have worked in its favour. ‘The first adequate theory has the right of priority over equally adequate aftercomers’ [C.Truesdell]. In this respect the effect of the consistency condition is rather similar to the effect of the more traditional methods of transcendental deduction, analysis of essence, phenomenological analysis, linguistic analysis. It contributes to the preservation of the old and familiar not because of any inherent advantage in it – for example not because it has a better foundation in observation than has the newly suggested alternative, or because it is more elegant – but because it is old and familiar. This is not the only instance where on closer inspection a rather surprising similarity emerges between modern empiricism and some of the school philosophies it attacks.’

‘It eliminates a theory or hypothesis not because it disagrees with the facts; it eliminates it because it disagrees with another theory, with a theory moreover, whose confirming instances it shares.’ –

logically speaking – any theory – that is any proposal – is valid

that a theory – for whatever reason – is proceeded with or not proceeded with – is a contingent matter

and there could be any number of reasons for proceeding or not proceeding with a particular theory –

decisions get made –

any decision made is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘The only difference between such a measure and a more recent theory is age and familiarity.’

I would imagine that this argument of ‘age and familiarity’ – would only appeal to those who – for whatever reason – have stopped questioning – stopped doubting – and settled into ignorance

‘The firstadequate theory has the right of priority over equally adequate aftercomers’ [C.Truesdell].’

any dictate as to how scientists should proceed – is when you strip it of pretence – simply a proposal

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

‘Now it seems to me that these brief considerations, although leading to an interesting tactical criticism of the consistency condition, and to some first shreds of support for counterinduction, do not yet go to the heart of the matter. They show that an alternative to the accepted point of view which shares its confirming instances cannot be eliminated by factual reasoning. They do not show that such an alternative is acceptable; even less do they show that it should be used. It is bad enough, a defender of the consistency condition might point out, that the accepted view does not possess full empirical support. Adding new theories of an equally unsatisfactory character will not improve the situation; nor is there much sense in trying to replace the accepted theories by some of their possible alternatives. Such replacement will be no easy matter. A new formalism might have to be learned and familiar problems may have to be calculated in a new way. Textbooks must be rewritten, university curricula readjusted, experimental results reinterpreted. And what will be the result of the effort? Another theory which from an empirical standpoint has no advantage whatsoever over and above the theory it replaces. The only real improvement, so the defender of the consistency condition will continue, derives from the addition of new facts. Such new facts will either support the current theories, or they will force us to modify them by indicating precisely where they go wrong. In both cases they will precipitate real progress and not merely arbitrary change. The proper procedure must therefore consist in the confrontation of the accepted point of view with as many relevant facts as possible. The exclusion of alternatives is then simply a measure of expediency: their invention not only does not help, it even hinders progress by absorbing time and manpower that could be devoted to better things. The consistency condition eliminates such fruitless discussion and it forces the scientist to concentrate on the facts which, after all, are the only acceptable judges of a theory. This is how the practising scientist will defend his concentration on a single theory to the exclusion of empirically possible alternatives.’

‘They show that an alternative to the accepted point of view which shares its confirming instances cannot be eliminated by factual reasoning. They do not show that such an alternative is acceptable; even less do they show that it should be used.’

proposals – theories – are not ‘eliminated’ –

they are either put into play – or not put into play

the decision to proceed with a proposal – or indeed the decision not to proceed – can logically speaking – be based on any consideration

the point here is that there is no ‘authority’ to determine the ground of decision making

the matter is contingent – which is to say – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

yes – we have proposed standards and proposed criteria which have come about and been developed within different propositional traditions and contexts –

Feyerabend mentions one here in the propositional context of science – ‘factual reasoning’

that ‘factual reasoning’ might not indicate a difference between two theories – simply means that that criterion cannot be used to differentiate between the two theories in question

there may be any number of other criteria that can be used – i.e. first principles – explanatory scope – predictive power – simplicity – elegance – etc

and any criterion proposed will be open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

as to what is ‘acceptable’ – that comes down to what is in fact accepted by those involved in the propositional activity

and as to what ‘should’ be used –

logically speaking there is no ‘imperative’ – there is just what is used – or not used – for whatever reason

the ‘should’ comes into it when you have theorists who are primarily interested in pushing their own agendas – i.e. Feyerabend

‘should’ here is authoritarian and rhetorical

proposals – propositions – theories – are different – and therefore relative to each other –

inconsistent

the so- called ‘consistency condition’ – is a pretence – a logical fraud

‘It is worthwhile repeating the reasonable core of this argument. Theories should not be changed unless there are pressing reasons for doing so. The only pressing reason for changing a theory is disagreement with facts. Discussion of incompatible facts will therefore lead to progress. Discussion of incompatible hypotheses will not. Hence, it is sound procedure to increase the number of relevant facts. It is not sound procedure to increase the number of factually adequate but incompatible alternatives. One might wish to add that formal improvements such as increased elegance, simplicity, generality, and coherence should not be excluded. But once these improvements have been carried out, the collection of facts for the purpose of tests seems to be indeed the only thing left to the scientist.’

if a scientist operates exclusively and rigorously within the terms of the theory that he is proposing – what he will see – the facts he uncovers – will be consistent with that theory

incompatible facts may be noticed along the way – but logically they will not be relevant to the theory – if he sticks to that theory

such is a very stilted approach to science – or for that matter life

and I doubt that such an approach is in fact the way of the working scientist

a properly engaged scientist will question any theory that he operates with – question its adequacy – and indeed question the ‘facts’ that it leads to

and critical observation will most likely lead to the proposing of facts which are not consistent with the theory in play

and I would think that an essential part of any critical evaluation of a theory – would be the consideration of alternative theories

in any case the ‘collection of facts’ – is of no use – if these ‘facts’ are not critically evaluated – that is to say – regarded as open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘And so it is – provided facts exist, and are available independently of whether or not one considers alternatives to the theory to be tested. This assumption, on which the validity of the foregoing argument depends in a most decisive manner, I shall call the assumption of the relative autonomy of facts, or the autonomy principle. It is not asserted by this principle that the discovery and description of facts is independent of all theorizing. But it is asserted that the facts which belong to the empirical content of some theory are available whether or not one considers alternatives to this theory. I am not aware that this very important assumption has ever been explicitly formulated as a separate postulate of the empirical method. However, it is clearly implied in almost all investigations which deal with questions of confirmation and test. All these investigations use a model in which a single theory is compared with a class of facts (or observation statements) which are assumed to be ‘given’ somehow. I submit that this is much too simple a picture of the actual situation. Facts and theories are much more intimately connected than is admitted by the autonomy principle. Not only is the description of every single fact dependent on some theory (which may, of course, be very different from the theory to be tested), but there also exist facts which cannot be unearthed except with the help of alternatives to the theory to be tested, and which become unavailable as soon as such alternatives are excluded. This suggests that the methodological unit to which we must refer when discussing questions of test and empirical content is constituted by a whole set of partly overlapping, factually adequate, but mutually inconsistent theories.’

‘It is not asserted by this principle that the discovery and description of facts is independent of all theorizing. But it is asserted that the facts which belong to the empirical content of some theory are available whether or not one considers alternatives to this theory.’

the relative autonomy of facts?

a fact is a proposal –

if a proposal / fact is put – it is put – and as such can be regarded as autonomous

relative to a theory – it will be interpreted in terms of that theory

relative to an alternative theory – it will have an alternative interpretation

different interpretations point to the logical reality of the fact – of the proposal –

that it is open to question – open to doubt – that it is uncertain

‘All these investigations use a model in which a single theory is compared with a class of facts (or observation statements) which are assumed to be ‘given’ somehow.’

facts – are proposed – and in that sense ‘given’ to us

theories may be proposed to account for accepted facts – that is accepted proposals –

and theories – explanatory proposals – may lead to new facts – proposals which are regarded as novel

‘Facts and theories are much more intimately connected than is admitted by the autonomy principle’

any proposal – fact or theory – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘Not only is the description of every single fact dependent on some theory (which may, of course, be very different from the theory to be tested), but there also exist facts which cannot be unearthed except with the help of alternatives to the theory to be tested, and which become unavailable as soon as such alternatives are excluded.’

yes – the description of every single fact is dependent on some theory – on some proposal

and yes of course there are facts / proposals which will not come to light without alternative theories – alternative descriptions of the world

‘facts’ are unavailable – if they are not proposed

‘This suggests that the methodological unit to which we must refer when discussing questions of test and empirical content is constituted by a whole set of partly overlapping, factually adequate, but mutually inconsistent theories.’

the methodological unit to which we refer when discussing questions of test and empirical content is the proposal –

and the proposal is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

Feyerabend continues –

‘I want to discuss an example which shows very clearly the function of alternatives in the discovery of critical facts.

It is now known that the Brownian particle is a perpetual motion machine of the second kind and that its existence refutes the phenomenological second law. Brownian motion therefore belongs to the domain of relevant facts for the law. Now could this relation between Brownian motion and the law have been discovered in a direct manner i.e. could it have been discovered by an examination of the observational consequences of the phenomenological theory that did not make use of an alternative theory of heat? The question is really divided into two: (1) Could the relevance of the Brownian particle have been discovered in this manner? (2) Could it have been demonstrated that it actually refutes the second law?

The answer to the first question is that we don’t know. It is impossible to say to say what would have happened if the kinetic theory had not been introduced into the debate. It is my guess, however, that, in that case the Brownian particle would have been regarded as an oddity – in much the same way as Professor Ehrenhaft’s astounding effects were regarded as an oddity, and that it would not have been given the decisive position in contemporary theory. The answer to the second question is simply – No. Consider what the discovery of an inconsistency between the phenomenon of Brownian motion and the second law would have required. It would have required (a) measurement of the exact motion of the particle in order to ascertain the change in its kinetic energy plus the energy spent on overcoming the resistance of the fluid ; and (b) it would have required precise measurements of temperature and heat transfer in the surrounding medium in order to establish that any loss of energy of the moving particle and the work done against the fluid. Such measurements are beyond experimental possibilities: neither the heat transfer nor the path of the particle can be measured with desired precision. Hence a ‘direct’ refutation of the second law that would consider only the phenomenological theory and the ‘facts’ of the Brownian motion, is impossible. It is impossible because of the structure of the world in which we live and because of the laws that are valid in this world. And it is well known, the actual refutation was brought about in a very different manner. It was brought about via the kinetic theory and Einstein’s utilization of it in his calculation of the statistical properties of Brownian motion. In the course of this procedure, the phenomenological theory (T’) was incorporated into the wider context of statistical physics (T) in such a manner that the consistency condition was violated, and it was only then that a crucial experiment was staged (investigations of Svedberg and Perrin).

‘Now could this relation between Brownian motion and the law have been discovered in a direct manner i.e. could it have been discovered by an examination of the observational consequences of the phenomenological theory that did not make use of an alternative theory of heat?’

the reality is that the relation between Brownian motion and the law was not discovered directly –

Feyerabend suggests that if the kinetic theory of heat had not been introduced into the debate – the Brownian particle would have been considered an oddity – and therefore not been regarded as decisive

Ok – we can speculate here – but we don’t know what would have happened – we only know what didn’t happen –

no direct relation was proposed

‘And it is well known, the actual refutation was brought about in a very different manner. It was brought about via the kinetic theory and Einstein’s utilization of it in his calculation of the statistical properties of Brownian motion. In the course of this procedure, the phenomenological theory (T’) was incorporated into the wider context of statistical physics (T) in such a manner that the consistency condition was violated, and it was only then that a crucial experiment was staged (investigations of Svedberg and Perrin)’

we have a different proposal – a different theory from Einstein – a theory that places both the phenomenological theory and Brownian motion in the wider context of statistical physics – and in terms of this theory – this propositional context – a crucial experiment can be proposed – and is performed

we can ask the question –

was the phenomenological theory – before the context of statistical physics – the same theory as the phenomenological theory that was incorporated into statistical physics?

the same question can be asked with respect to Brownian motion

be that as it may – the logical reality is that any decision between theories – is a decision between different – and hence inconsistent theories

bare in mind too that any ‘crucial experiment’ – is open to question open to doubt –

is uncertain

‘It seems to me that this example is typical of the relation between fairly general theories, or points of view, and the ‘facts’. Both the relevance and the refuting character of decisive facts can be established only with the help of other theories which, though factually adequate are not in agreement with the view to be tested. This being the case, the invention and articulation of alternatives may have to precede the production of refuting facts. Empiricism, at least in some of its more sophisticated versions, demands that the empirical content of whatever knowledge we possess be increased as much as possible. Hence the invention of alternatives to the view at the centre of discussion constitutes an essential part of the empirical method. Conversely the fact that the consistency condition eliminates alternatives now shows it to be in disagreement not only with scientific practice but with empiricism as well. By excluding valuable tests it decreases the empirical content of the theories that are permitted to remain (and these, as I have indicated above, will usually be theories that were there first); and it especially decreases the number of those facts that could show their limitations. The result of a determined application of the consistency condition is of very topical interest. It may well be that the refutation of the quantum-mechanical uncertainties presupposes just such an incorporation of the present theory into a wider context which no longer agrees with complementarity and therefore suggests new and decisive experiments. And it may also be that the insistence, on the part of the majority of contemporary physicists, on the consistency condition will, if successful, forever protects the uncertainties from refutation. This is how the condition may finally create a situation where a certain point of view petrifies into dogma by being, in the name of experience, completely removed from any conceivable criticism.’

yes – this scenario is quite possible –

if this ‘consistency condition’ amounts to the view that the reining scientific theory is beyond question –

then quite clearly we do not have an open and critical scientific practice

such a science defies logic – defies propositional reality

it is up to the scientists – the practitioners to decide how they want their activity to be – how they want science to proceed

I think the reality is that questions will be asked – doubts will be raised – uncertainties explored

yes there will be those who at certain times – and at certain points in any discussion – are affronted by question – doubt – and uncertainty

but that is the way of things –

propositional life just is this tension between logic and rhetoric –

open and critical discussion – and dogmatism

I think that to expect anyone – scientists included – to behave rationally in all circumstances is at best fanciful –

and – if you wish to be empirical about it – what does the evidence tell us?

‘It is worthwhile examining this apparently ‘empirical’ defence of a dogmatic point of view in somewhat greater detail. Assume the physicists have adopted, either consciously or unconsciously, the idea of the uniqueness of complementarity and that they elaborate the orthodox point of view and refuse to consider the alternatives. In the beginning such a procedure might be quite harmless. After all, a man and even an influential school can only do so many things at a time and it is better if they pursue a theory in which they are interested rather than a theory they find boring. Now assume that the pursuit of the chosen theory has led to successes, and that the theory has been explained, in a satisfactory manner, circumstances that had been unintelligible for some time. This gives empirical support to an idea which to start with seemed to possess only this advantage: it was interesting and intriguing. The commitment to the theory will now be reinforced, and the attitude towards alternatives will become less tolerant. Now if it is true, as has been argued in the last section, that many facts become available only with the help of alternatives, then the refusal to consider them will result in the elimination of potentially refuting facts as well. More especially, it will eliminate facts whose discovery would show the complete and irreparable inadequacy of the theory. Such facts having been inaccessible, the theory will appear to be free from blemish and it will seem that ‘all evidence points with merciless definiteness in the … direction …that all the processes involving … unknown interactions conform to the fundamental quantum law’ [L. Rosenfeld]. This will further reinforce the belief in the uniqueness of the accepted theory and in the futility of any account that proceeds in a different manner. Being now firmly convinced that there is only one good microphysics, the physicists will try to explain adverse facts in its terms, and they will not mind when such explanations occasionally turn out to be clumsy. Next the development becomes known to the public. Popular science books (and this includes many books on the philosophy of science) spread the basic postulates of the theory; applications are made in distant fields, money is given to the orthodox, and is withheld from the rebels. More than ever the theory seems to possess tremendous empirical support. The chances for consideration of alternatives are now very slight indeed. The final success of the fundamental assumptions of the quantum theory, and the idea of complementarity, seems to be assured.’

‘Now if it is true, as has been argued in the last section, that many facts become available only with the help of alternatives, then the refusal to consider them will result in the elimination of potentially refuting facts as well. More especially, it will eliminate facts whose discovery would show the complete and irreparable inadequacy of the theory.’

logically speaking – any theory is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

the methodological recommendation therefore is to explore the uncertainty in any theory

this is to proceed logically

one can proceed logically without entertaining alternative views

however where alternative theories are available – or where they can be developed – it makes sense to consider them

and to subject them to the same critical process as the original theory –

that is to regard them as open to question – open to doubt –

to explore their uncertainty

the logical reality is that whatever theory is considered – it is open to question – open to doubt

propositional uncertainty does not dictate – what path the scientist is to take –

we cannot say whether a particular path will lead to refuting facts – or will eliminate refuting facts

decisions will be made – and these decisions will be uncertain

‘Being now firmly convinced that there is only one good microphysics, the physicists will try to explain adverse facts in its terms, and they will not mind when such explanations occasionally turn out to be clumsy. Next the development becomes known to the public…’

‘being now firmly convinced’ of anything – is illogical

if we are talking about being ‘convinced’ – we are talking about pretension –

and the flagship of pretension – is rhetoric

pretension and rhetoric are what we must fight against – if our aim is to proceed logically

you can’t always be successful here – asking questions – raising doubts – exploring uncertainties – can fall flat – if people are not open – are not critical

in the end I think – broadly speaking – it’s a question of intelligence –

the ignorant hold hard to their prejudices –

and who is to say they shouldn’t?

‘At the same time it is evident, on the basis of our considerations, that this appearance of success cannot in the least be regarded as a sign of truth and correspondence with nature. Quite the contrary, the suspicion arises that the absence of major difficulties is a result of the decrease of empirical content brought about by the elimination of alternatives, and of facts that can be discovered with their help. In other words, the suspicion arises that this alleged success is due to the fact that that the theory, when extended beyond its starting point, was turned into rigid ideology. Such ideology is ‘successful’ not because it agrees so well with the facts; it is successful because no facts have been specified that could constitute a test, and because some such facts have been removed. Its ‘success’ is entirely man-made. It was decided to stick to some ideas, come what may, and the result was, quite naturally, the survival of these ideas. If now the initial decision is forgotten, or made only implicitly, for example, if it becomes common law in physics, then the survival itself will seem to constitute independent support, it will reinforce the decision, or turn it into an explicit one, and in this way close the circle. This is how empirical ‘evidence’ may be created by a procedure which quotes as its justification the very same evidence it has produced.’

‘this appearance of success cannot in the least be regarded as a sign of truth and correspondence with nature.’

there is no correspondence with nature – if by ‘nature’ is meant a proposition-independent reality –

there is no such reality – our reality is propositional

any proposed correspondence between one proposition and another – i.e. the proposal of nature and a description of that proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

a true proposition – is a proposition affirmed –

affirmed that is by those involved in its assessment –

any such affirmation – is open to question

if a proposition is held to be true – it will be proceeded with – and as such will be regarded as successful

‘Quite the contrary, the suspicion arises that the absence of major difficulties is a result of the decrease of empirical content brought about by the elimination of alternatives, and of facts that can be discovered with their help.’

yes – this suspicion – may arise – this doubt may surface

‘In other words, the suspicion arises that this alleged success is due to the fact that that the theory, when extended beyond its starting point, was turned into rigid ideology.’

yes – the suspicion could arise that the theory has become a rigid ideology

how in practice though would this be determined?

let’s say that those who accept the theory – say they are open to it being questioned – that they are open to it being put to doubt – that they regard it as uncertain –

that nevertheless they have decided to run with it

Feyerabend might say – ‘but you haven’t considered alternative theories?

they say – ‘true – we have decided to proceed with this theory for the time being – to understand it more completely and to further develop and test its consequences’

they could even add – ‘investigating alternative theories – is a good idea – but we’ll stick with this one for the present’

here the scientists have decided what they will work with – while keeping an open mind – and adopting a critical attitude

hardly dogmatic

Feyerabend’s argument regarding alternative theories – could well be used in regard to any alternative theorizing that he advocates

what about an alternative to the alternative?

that is a third alternative – and really why stop there – a fourth alternative – etc. etc.

the point is clear – decisions with regard to what will and will not be considered – must be made – if any work is to go forward –

yes – and any such decision – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

but decisions get made – and propositional action is taken

‘Its ‘success’ is entirely man-made. It was decided to stick to some ideas, come what may, and the result was, quite naturally, the survival of these ideas. If now the initial decision is forgotten, or made only implicitly, for example, if it becomes common law in physics, then the survival itself will seem to constitute independent support, it will reinforce the decision, or turn it into an explicit one, and in this way close the circle. This is how ‘empirical ‘evidence’ may be created by a procedure which quotes as its justification the very same evidence it has produced.’

yes – ‘success’ is entirely man-made – what else could it be?

sticking with ideas ‘come what may’ – is not logical – is not rational – it is dogmatic – it is stupid

and yes – ‘empirical evidence’ may be created by a procedure which quotes as its justification the very same evidence it has produced.’

any method – any procedure – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

there is no justification

‘justification’ is a rhetorical notion – not a logical notion

‘evidence’ – is a proposal – a proposal to be tested –

that is to say – put to question – put to doubt – it’s uncertainty – explored –

if you fall into the justification trap – yes you will end up in a vicious circle

the vicious circle of stupidity –

and you go nowhere

Feyerabend goes on to consider dogmatic theories –

‘At this point an ‘empirical’ theory of the kind described (and let us always remember that the basic principles of the present quantum theory, and especially the idea of complementarity, are uncomfortably close to forming such a theory) becomes indistinguishable from a second rate myth. In order to realise this, we need only consider a myth such as the myth of witchcraft and of demonic possession that was developed by Roman Catholic theologians that dominated 15^th-, 16^th- and 17^th century thought on the European continent. The myth is a complex explanatory system that contains numerous explanatory hypotheses designed to cover special cases, so it easily achieves a high degree of confirmation on the basis of observation. It has been taught for a long time; its content is enforced with fear, prejudice, and ignorance, as well as by a jealous and cruel priesthood. Its idea permeates the most common idiom, infect[s] all modes of thinking and many decisions which mean a great deal in human life. It provides models for the explanation of any conceivable event – conceivable for those who have accepted it. This being the case, its key terms will be fixed in an unambiguous manner and the idea (which may have led to such a procedure in the first place) that they are copies of unchanging entities and that change of meaning, if it should happen, is due to human mistake – this idea will now be very plausible. Such plausibility reinforces all manoeuvres which are

used for preservation of the myth (elimination of opponents included). The conceptual

apparatus of the theory and the emotions connected with its application, having penetrated all means of communication, now guarantees the success of methods such as transcendental deduction, analysis of usage, phenomenological analysis – which are means for further solidifying the myth (which shows, by the way, that all these methods, which have been the trademark of various philosophical schools old and new, have one thing in common: they tend to preserve the status quo of intellectual life). Observational results, too, will speak in favour of the theory as they are formulated in it’s terms. It will seem that the truth has been arrived at. At the same time, it is evident that all contact with the world has been lost and that the stability achieved, the semblance of absolute truth, is nothing but the result of absolute conformism. For how can we possibly test, or improve on a theory if it is built in such a manner that any conceivable event can be described, and explained, in terms of its principles? The only way of investigating such all embracing principles would be to compare them with a different set of equally all-embracing principles – but this procedure has been excluded from the beginning. The myth is, therefore of no objective relevance; it continues to exist solely as the result of the effort of the community of believers and their leaders, be these now priests or Nobel prize winners. This, I think, is the most decisive argument against any method that encourages uniformity, be it empirical or not. Any such method is, in the last resort, a method of deception. It enforces an unenlightened conformism, and speaks of truth; it leads to a deterioration of intellectual capabilities, of the power of the imagination, and speaks of deep insight; it destroys the most precious gift of the young – their tremendous power of imagination, and speaks of education.’

‘For how can we possibly test, or improve on a theory if it is built in such a manner that any conceivable event can be described, and explained, in terms of its principles? The only way of investigating such all embracing principles would be to compare them with a different set of equally all-embracing principles – but this procedure has been excluded from the beginning.’

yes – a set of all-embracing principles does not allow for an alternative – by definition

so called ‘all-embracing principles’ – are not open to question – are not open to doubt – are not regarded as uncertain

such all embracing principles – are not proposals – they are not propositions – they are prejudices –

and as such – they are not relevant to a rational discussion

the logical reality is that any proposal – any principle – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

if you drop this notion of ‘all-embracing’ – as in beyond question – beyond doubt – then a critical analysis of these principles can begin

the ‘all embracing principles’ notion – is just straight out pretence and rhetoric –

and that is the case whether it is put forward by the conformist – or by a flamboyant dissident

yes – you can play the rhetorical game –

or you can question – and doubt – and deal with propositional uncertainty

the choice is logic or rhetoric

‘The myth is, therefore of no objective relevance; it continues to exist solely as the result of the effort of the community of believers and their leaders, be these now priests or Nobel prize winners.’

or indeed so called ‘methodological anarchists’

as to – ‘of no objective relevance’ –

just what counts as ‘objective’?

my view is that a proposal – is objective – if it is put – and put publicly –

it is relevant to those who affirm it – irrelevant to those who don’t

‘This, I think, is the most decisive argument against any method that encourages uniformity, be it empirical or not. Any such method is, in the last resort, a method of deception’

any method that encourages non-critical acceptance of propositions – that doesn’t encourage question and doubt – is illogical –

and yes – in so far as it is represented as logical – as rational – such a method is a method of deception

‘It enforces an unenlightened conformism, and speaks of truth; it leads to a deterioration of intellectual capabilities, of the power of the imagination, and speaks of deep insight; it

destroys the most precious gift of the young – their tremendous power of imagination, and speaks of education.’

any method that unenlightened conformism –is pretentious authoritarianism

does it lead to a deterioration of intellectual capabilities – and the power of the imagination?

most likely I would think – but it might just be that such repression – sparks intellectual capacities and fires the imagination

‘the precious gift of the young’?

‘the tremendous power of imagination’?

it may be that there are some young people – who do have a ‘tremendous power of imagination’ – some old people too

it is more likely that most young people – have an imagination that is determined – not by its own ‘tremendous power’ – but rather by the social and artistic structures and contexts that they are born into – and that they live in

in any case – ‘unenlightened conformism’ – is a recipe for dullness – and stupidity

and we can always do better than that

‘To sum up: Unanimity of opinion may be fitting for a church, for the frightened or greedy victims of some (ancient, or modern) myth, or for the weak and willing followers of some tyrant. Variety of opinion is necessary for objective knowledge. And a method that encourages variety is also the only method that is compatible with a humanitarian outlook. (To the extent to which the consistency condition delimits variety, it contains a theological element which lies, of course, in the worship of ‘fact’ so characteristic of nearly all empiricism.)’

‘Unanimity of opinion’?

it depends how it comes about –

if it comes about quite naturally – what’s the problem?

if on the other hand – it is an opinion presented as being beyond question – beyond doubt – as certain – then it is not an ‘opinion’ – it is a prejudice

and prejudicial thinking is illogical – and irrational

‘Variety of opinion is necessary for objective knowledge’

any proposal made public – is objective

a variety of opinion is natural

and a methodology that encourages variety is logical – if it presents our proposals – as open to question – open to doubt – as uncertain

if the consistency condition is to be used logically –

its use will be held open to question – open to doubt – and will regarded as – uncertain

‘There is no idea, however ancient and absurd that is not capable of improving our knowledge. The whole history of thought is absorbed into science and is used for improving every single theory. Nor is political interference rejected. It may be needed to overcome the chauvinism of science that resists alternatives to the status quo.’

‘This finishes the discussion of part one of counterinduction dealing with the invention and elaboration of hypotheses inconsistent with a point of view that is highly confirmed and generally accepted. It is pointed out that the examination of such a point of view often needs an incompatible alternative theory so that the (Newtonian) advice to postpone alternatives until after the first difficulty has arisen means putting the cart before the horse. A scientist who is interested in maximal empirical content, and who wants to understand as many aspects of his theory as possible, will accordingly adopt a pluralistic methodology, he will compare theories with other theories rather than with ‘experience’, ‘data’, or ‘facts’, and he will try to improve rather than discard the views that appear to lose in the competition. For the alternatives, which he needs to keep the contest going, may be taken from the past as well. As a matter of fact, they may be taken from wherever one is able to find them – from ancient myths, and modern prejudices; from lucubrations of experts and from the fantasies of cranks. The whole history of a subject is utilized in the attempt to improve its most recent and ‘advanced’ stage. The separation between the history of science, its philosophy and the science itself dissolves into thin air and so does the separation between science and non-science.’

‘It is pointed out that the examination of such a point of view often needs an incompatible alternative theory so that the (Newtonian) advice to postpone alternatives until after the first difficulty has arisen means putting the cart before the horse.’

‘often needs’ –

perhaps also – ‘often doesn’t need’?

what we are dealing with here is uncertainty – methodological uncertainty

where a theory is critically evaluated without consideration of an alternative –

presumably that is because those involved in the critical examination decide that the alternative is not relevant –

now of course they may at some point reconsider this view –

however – not considering an alternative – does not render their science invalid

consideration of an alternative – is an option – a valid option – and where it is relevant to consider an alternative – you would expect that that is what would happen –

it is the working scientist that makes this call

practitioners make decisions – they have to make decisions – for their work to proceed

if they proceed logically – they recognise that their decisions – are open to question – open to doubt – that they are uncertain

if the idea is that all alternatives must be considered at all times –

the question can be asked – ‘says who?’

and also if you are to take this methodological edict to its logical conclusion – all you would ever be looking at is alternatives – and alternatives to alternatives – etc. etc.

this is not going to happen –

and to even go some way down this path – runs the risk of losing the plot –

the real issue for the working scientist is a keen focus on the business at hand – not alternatives to alternatives – to alternatives

or is the idea that if alternatives have not been proposed – they must be found –

again – says who?

also – not I would think a useful methodological proposal –

if he followed this edit the working scientist would do little or no science –

as his attention and time would be devoted to discovering theories –

theories he is not working on

all very well to issue edicts – and put yourself up as an authority about something you are not actually doing –

however to the working scientist I would think such rhetoric would be regarded as pretentious and irrelevant

I think any methodological proposal is valid –

the role for the philosopher of science here is to develop methodological proposals and argue for them

philosophy of science provides the working scientist with a range of methodological insights perspectives and options –

anyone of which might prove to be of use to an intelligent scientist – at some time

and it is the working scientist who will decide the value of any such proposal –

and he will decide not as a matter of principle – but as a matter of utility –

the question for the scientist – who has at his disposal a range of methodological options might be something like this –

‘what perspective on this matter will best enable me to get to where I want to go?’

or ‘might a different methodology take my work to a new and interesting place?”

as for the cart before the horse argument –

look it doesn’t matter whether an alternative is brought into play – before or after difficulties arise in the theory –

yes – either way – there are likely to be differences in what eventually emerges –

but that is science – that is life

it’s a decision for the those critically evaluating the theory –

and there are no rules here

‘A scientist who is interested in maximal empirical content, and who wants to understand as many aspects of his theory as possible, will accordingly adopt a pluralistic methodology, he will compare theories with other theories rather than with ‘experience’, ‘data’, or ‘facts’, and he will try to improve rather than discard the views that appear to lose in the competition.’

yes different methodologies will produce different empirical propositions – different tests – and perhaps different testing procedures –

different perspectives on the theory

at some point however a decision has to be made as to what methodology – to proceed with

some decision has to be made on the plurality of methods – and the plurality of understandings

any such decision will be open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

but it will be made – if there is to be any actual science done

‘theories’ – ‘experience’ – ‘data’ – ‘facts’ –

logically speaking these are categorizations of proposals –

‘theories’ are proposals – ‘experience’ is proposal – ‘data’ are proposals – ‘facts’ are proposals –

the scientist will put proposal against proposal – whether that is theory against theory – theory against experience – theory against data – theory against facts –

or facts against data – data against experience – etc. etc.

these terms – ‘theory’ – ‘experience’ – ‘data’ – ‘facts’ –

are propositional classifications

what is put against what – will be the decision – the critical decision of the scientist –

there are no rules here – or – any so called ‘rule’ is just the rhetoric of some methodologist –

as for the ‘competition’ – this is a pretty superficial view of science –

a scientist will attempt to improve – rather than discard a theory that has not gained enough support – if he thinks for some reason – it is worth sticking with it –

if he doesn’t think it has merit – he won’t proceed with it –

if he worked on a theory that he thought had no value – he would be an idiot –

plain and simple

‘The whole history of a subject is utilized in the attempt to improve its most recent and ‘advanced’ stage. The separation between the history of science, its philosophy and the science itself dissolves into thin air and so does the separation between science and non- science.’

this is just mumbo-jumbo –

‘the whole history of a subject’ – for one thing – there is no such thing

what we have at best – is different histories of a subject –

and any such history is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘the most recent and advanced stage‘ –

what you have here – when you drop the rhetoric (‘advanced stage’) –

is the propositional work that is being done at present

‘The separation between the history of science, its philosophy and the science itself dissolves into thin air and so does the separation between science and non-science.’

the history of science – the philosophy of science – science and non-science – are different proposition activities – different propositional practices

however any proposal – any proposition – regardless of how it is described – regardless of how it is classified – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘This position which is a natural consequence of the arguments presented above, is frequently attacked – and not by counter-arguments, which would be easy to answer, but by rhetorical questions. ‘If any metaphysics goes,’ writes Dr. Hesse in her review of an earlier essay of mine, ‘then the question arises why we do not go back and exploit the objective criticism of modern science available in Aristotelianism, or indeed in Voodoo?” – and insinuates that a criticism of this kind would be altogether laughable. Her insinuation, unfortunately, assumes a great deal of ignorance in her readers. Progress was often achieved by a ‘criticism from the past’, of precisely the kind that is now dismissed by her. After Aristotle and Ptolemy, the idea that the earth moves – that strange, ancient and ‘entirely ridiculous’, Pythagorean view – was thrown on the rubbish heap of history, only to be revived by Copernicus and to be forged by him into a weapon for the defeat of its defeaters. The Hermetic writings played an important part in this revival, which is still not sufficiently understood, and they were studied with care by the great Newton himself. Such developments are not surprising. No idea is ever examined in all its ramifications and no view is ever given all the chances it deserves. Theories are abandoned and superseded by more fashionable accounts long before they have an opportunity to show their virtues. Besides, ancient doctrines and ‘primitive’ myths appear strange and

nonsensical only because their scientific content is not known, or is distorted by philologists or anthropologists unfamiliar with the simplest physical, medical or astronomical knowledge. Voodoo, Dr Hesse’s piece de resistance, is a case in point. Nobody knows it, everybody uses it as a paradigm of backwardness and confusion. And yet Voodoo has a firm though not sufficiently understood material basis, and a study of its manifestations can be used to enrich, and perhaps even revise, our knowledge of physiology.’

Dr. Hesse’s question – ‘If any metaphysics goes, then the question arises why we do not go back and exploit the objective criticism of modern science available in Aristotelians, or indeed in Voodoo?” – is fair enough –

Feyerabend’s answer – ‘Progress was often achieved by a ‘criticism from the past’, or precisely the kind that is now dismissed by her’ – is fair enough

‘No idea is ever examined in all its ramifications and no view is ever given all the chances it deserves.’ – correct –

any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

I think the real issue here has to do with scientific practice – what scientists actually do

the reality is that voodoo – is not used in physiology

my point with regard to ‘anything goes’ is that if anything goes – then what in fact does go – whatever that may be – is valid –

and that Feyerabend – given his principle – ‘anything goes’ – can’t argue against any actual practice

what he can do is suggest alternative approaches – but what he can’t do – is go on about what should happen

there is no imperative – no ‘should’ – ‘in anything goes’

his argument about what should happen – which is the argument of ‘Against Method’ –

is authoritarian rhetoric pure and simple

‘An even more interesting example is the revival of traditional medicine in Communist China. We start with a familiar development: a great country with great traditions is subjected to Western domination and is exploited in the customary way. A new generation recognises or thinks it recognizes the material and intellectual superiority of the West and traces it back to science. Science is imported, taught and pushes aside all traditional elements. Scientific chauvinism triumphs: ‘What is compatible with science should live, what is not compatible with science should die.’ [Chou Shao] ‘Science’ in this context means not just a specific method, but all the results the method has so far produced. Things incompatible with the results must be eliminated. Old style doctors, for example, must either be removed from medical practice, or they must be re-educated. Herbal medicine, acupuncture, moxibustion and the underlying philosophy are things of the past, no longer to be taken seriously. This was the attitude up to about 1954, when the combination of bourgeois elements in the ministry of Health started a campaign for the revival of traditional medicine. No doubt the campaign was politically inspired. It contained at least two elements, viz. (1) the identification of Western science with bourgeois science and (2) the refusal of the party to except science from political supervision and to grant experts special privileges. But it provided the counterforce that was needed to overcome the scientific chauvinism of the time and to make a plurality (actually a duality) of views possible. (This is an important point. It often happens that parts of science become hardened and intolerant so that proliferation must be enforced from the outside, and by political means. Of course, success cannot be guaranteed – see the Lysenko affair. But this does not remove the need for non-scientific controls on science.)’

‘But it provided the counterforce that was needed to overcome the scientific chauvinism of the time and to make a plurality (actually a duality) of views possible.’

the reality is that a plurality – or duality – of different views – was always there –

political moves gave an emphasis to traditional medicine – after it had taken a backseat to western science

‘It often happens that parts of science become hardened and intolerant so that proliferation must be enforced from the outside, and by political means.’

‘proliferation must be enforced’?

this statement puts pay to Feyerabend’s anti-authoritarian ‘argument’ – for what he calls his philosophical or methodological anarchism –

for Feyerabend science is an authoritarian / political battleground –

where ‘anything goes’ – if it bring about his view of science

‘Now this politically enforced dualism has led to most interesting and puzzling discoveries both in China and in the West and to the realization that there are effects and means of diagnosis for which modern medicine cannot repeat and for which it has no explanation. It revealed sizeable lacunae in Western medicine. Nor can one expect that the customary scientific approach will eventually find an answer. In the case of herbal medicine the approach consists of two steps. First, the herbal concoction is analysed into its chemical constituents. Then the specific effects of each constituent are determined and the total effect on a particular organ explained on their basis. This neglects the possibility that the herb, taken in its entirety, changes the state of the whole organism and that it is this new state of the whole organism rather than a specific part of the whole concoction that cures the diseased organ. Here as elsewhere knowledge is obtained from a proliferation of views rather than from the determined application of a particular ideology. And we realise that proliferation may have to be enforced by non-scientific agencies whose power is sufficient to overcome the most powerful scientific institutions. Examples are the public discontent, or money: the best single entity to get a modern scientist away from what his ‘scientific conscience’ tells him to pursue is still the Dollar (or, more recently, the German Mark)’

‘This neglects the possibility that the herb, taken in its entirety, changes the state of the whole organism and that it is this new state of the whole organism rather than a specific part of the whole concoction that cures the diseased organ.’

whether it is an organ by organ investigation from the start –

or a holistic proposal – which is put forward – and then the specifics are tested –

is no more than the difference between a deductive and inductive approach to the question

‘the determined application of a particular ideology’ –

be it of western science – or of eastern science – a determined application of a particular ideology has its place – but it also has its limitations –

and in any critical process these limitations should be identified and investigated

‘And we realise that proliferation may have to be enforced by non-scientific agencies whose power is sufficient to overcome the most powerful scientific institutions.’

no – we don’t realise that proliferation may heave to be enforced –

(how is it that these so called radicals and revolutionists – turn into the very same bastards they started out deploring – and often turn out to be even worse?)

it is not a matter of enforcing anything –

this authoritarianism is a stone-age mentality –

it is the method of meat-heads and ignoramuses

what is required – which I think Feyerabend and his ilk are secretly afraid of – is the critical investigation of all methodologies – including their methodologies –

that is – actually holding your methodology – whatever it is –

open to question – open to doubt – and facing up to and dealing with its uncertainty

as to scientific institutions – they can be made and unmade –

and furthermore – new institutions can be proposed and developed by those interested in doing so

no methodological proposal is guaranteed support – or success

‘Examples are the public discontent, or money: the best single entity to get a modern scientist away from what his ‘scientific conscience’ tells him to pursue is still the Dollar (or, more recently, the German Mark)’

yeah – well scientists must be relieved – even over joyed that that they don’t have to consult their consciences – don’t have to deal with their uncertainties –

how lucky are they to have Feyerabend as the conscience of science!

logically speaking I think motivation is irrelevant – what counts is what is proposed – and how it is investigated

‘The examples of Copernicus, the atomic theory, Voodoo, Chinese medicine show that even the most secure theory is not safe, that it can be modified or entirely overthrown with the help of views which the conceit of ignorance has already put into the dustbin of history. This is how the knowledge of today may become the fairy-tale of tomorrow and how the most laughable myth may eventually turn into the most solid piece of science.’

yes the most secure theory can be modified or entirely overthrown –

if it is held open to question – open to doubt – if it is regarded logically – as an uncertain proposal

from a logical point of view – there is no history – there is no dustbin

any proposal is live – if it is put

and if it is put – it is open to question – open to doubt – and its uncertainty is there to be explored

knowledge is what is proposed

that certain propositions and propositional systems are held to be ‘secure’ –

is pretentious rhetoric

‘Pluralism of theories and metaphysical views is not only important for methodology, it is also an essential part of a humanitarian outlook. Progressive educators have always tried to develop the individuality of their pupils and to bring to fruition the particular, and sometimes quite unique talents and beliefs that a child possesses. Such an education, however, has very often seemed to be a futile exercise in day dreaming. For is it not necessary to prepare the young for life as it actually is? Does this not mean that they must learn one particular set of views to the exclusion of everything else? And if a trace of their imagination is still to remain, will it not find its proper application in the arts or in a thin domain of dreams that has but little to do with the world we live in? Will this procedure not finally lead to a split between a hated reality and welcome fantasies, science and the arts, careful description and unrestrained self expression? The argument for proliferation of views shows this need not happen. It is possible to retain what one might call the freedom of artistic creation and to use it to the full, not just as a road of escape but as a necessary means for discovering and perhaps even changing the features of the world we live in. This coincidence of the part (individual man) with the whole (the world we live in), of the purely subjective and arbitrary with the objective and lawful, is one of the most important arguments in favour of a pluralistic methodology. For details the reader is advised to consult Mill’s magnificent essay On Liberty.’

our realities are what we propose

our proposals are open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

seeing that there are different proposals – that people create different propositional realities – is seeing life as it actually is

‘pluralism of theories and metaphysical views’ – is the norm

and this is blatantly obvious to anyone with their eyes open

Feyerabend’s ‘revolutionary argument’ – is a statement of the obvious – a rhetorical burst – that leaves everything as it is

as to educating the young –

I say expose them to as many different propositional realities as possible –

and teach them that whatever is put to them – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

encourage them to propose their own realities – and to keep an open mind –

on themselves – and the world

‘No theory ever agrees with all the facts of its domain, yet it is not always the theory that is to blame. Facts are constituted by older ideologies, and a clash between facts and theories may be proof of progress. It is also a first step in our attempt to find principles implicit in familiar observational notions.’

‘Considering now the invention, the elaboration and use of theories which are inconsistent, not just with other theories, but even with experiments, facts, observations, we may start by pointing out that no single theory ever agrees with all the known facts in its domain. And the trouble is not created by rumours, or the result of sloppy procedure. It is created by experiments and measurements of the highest precision and reliability.’

this ‘trouble’ according to Feyerabend is created by ‘experiments and measurements of the highest precision and reliability’

‘this trouble’ – is only a trouble – if you are troubled by logical reality –

‘theories’ – ‘experiments’ – ‘facts’ – ‘observations’ – are from a logical point of view – different characterizations of proposals

and any proposal – be it a ‘theory’ – an ‘experiment’ – a ‘fact’ – an ‘observation’ – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

the ‘trouble’ – so called – is uncertainty

‘experiments and measurements of the highest precision and reliability’ –

are when you drop the rhetoric (‘highest precision and reliability’) – proposals –

proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

if we operate logically – we never leave uncertainty –

and if we operate illogically – we deal in pretension and rhetoric –

questions can always be asked – doubts raised – and uncertainties revealed –

pretension and rhetoric – for all their show and bluster – are grounded in prejudice and ignorance –

our only defence is logic

‘It will be convenient, at this place, to distinguish two kinds of disagreement between theory and fact: numerical disagreement, and qualitative failures.

The first case is quite familiar: a theory makes a numerical prediction and the value that is actually obtained differs from the prediction made by more than the margin of error. Precision instruments are usually involved here. Numerical disagreements abound in science. They give rise to an ‘ocean of anomalies’ that surrounds every single theory.

Thus the Copernican view at the time of Galileo was inconsistent with facts so plain and obvious that Galileo had to call it ‘surely false’. There is no limit to my astonishment’, he writes in a later work ‘when I reflect that Aristarchus and Copernicus were able to make reason so conquer sense that, in defiance of the latter, the former became mistress of their belief.’ Newton’s theory of gravitation was beset, from the very beginning, by difficulties serious enough to provide material for refutation. Even today and in the non-relativistic domain their ‘exist numerous discrepancies between observation and theory’. [Max Jammer] Bohr’s atomic model was introduced, and retained, in the face of precise and unshakable contrary evidence. The general theory of relativity was retained despite Kaufman’s unambiguous experimental results of 1906, and despite D.C. Miller’s refutation (I am speaking of a refutation because the experiment was, from the point of view of contemporary evidence, at least as well preferred as were the earlier experiments of Michelson and Morley). The general theory of relativity, though surprisingly successful in some domains…failed to explain 10˝ in the movement of the nodes of Venus and more that 5˝ in the movement of the nodes of Mars, moreover, it is now again in trouble due to the new calculations on the motion of Mercury by Dicke and others. All these are quantitative difficulties, which can be resolved by discovering a better set of numbers but which do not force us to make qualitative adjustments.’

numerical disagreement –

where the value that is actually obtained – differs from the prediction made –

Feyerabend says it is just a matter of discovering a better set of numbers –

any theory is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

its predictions are – uncertain

and any value actually obtained – will be a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

this is the logical reality

any proposal of agreement between theory and fact –

or any proposal of disagreement between theory and fact –

is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

agreement or disagreement – are pragmatic decisions – in the face of propositional uncertainty

you decide to endorse the theory in the face of quantitative difficulties –

or you decide to give more weight – a greater value – to the quantitative difficulties – than to the theory

any decision either way – will be open to question – open to doubt – will be uncertain

hoping that a better set of numbers will come along – may be why you decide to stick with the theory

and there may well be any number of other reasons

the logical fact remains – any decision here – is a proposal – and as such is uncertain

‘The second case, the case of qualitative failures, is less familiar, but of much greater interest. In this case a theory is inconsistent not with a recondite fact, that can be unearthed with the help of complex equipment and is known to experts only, but with circumstances which are easily noticed and which are familiar to everyone.

The first and, to my mind, the most important example of an inconsistency of this kind is Parmenides’ theory of the unchanging and homogeneous One which is contradicted by almost everything we know and experience. The theory has much in its favour and plays a role even today in the general theory of relativity. Used in an undeveloped form by Anaximander, it led to the insight by Heisenberg in his theory of elementary particles that the basic substance, or the basic elements of the universe, cannot obey the same laws as the visible elements. The theory was supported by Zeno’s arguments, which showed the difficulties inherent in the idea of a continuum consisting of isolated elements. Aristotle took these arguments seriously and developed his own theory of the continuum. Yet the concept of the continuum as a collection of elements remained and continued to be used, despite the quite obvious difficulties, until these difficulties were almost removed in the 20^th century.’

‘but with circumstances which are easily noticed and which are familiar to everyone.’ –

this so called ‘easily noticed and familiar to everyone’ – whatever that amounts to – will be a proposal – regarding what is seen – what is experienced –

what you get with Parmenides’ theory of the unchanging and homogeneous One – is an alternative account of what is experienced

two different proposals –

both open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

the proposal regarding the ‘easily noticed and familiar to everyone’ – has a use – and has a function – in everyday life

and as Feyerabend demonstrates here – Parmenides’ proposal can be shown to have significance in physics

is anyone going to suggest that a proposal of the ‘easily noticed and familiar to everyone’ – will function in Heisenberg’s theory of elementary particles?

or that the unchanging and homogeneous One – will get a good run on the street?

what we have here is different proposals – different propositions – that function in different propositional contexts – that have different uses

yes you can put them side by side – and pretend a conflict –

but if you do this – all you show is an ignorance of propositional diversity and use –

we are not dealing here with ‘qualitative failure’ – that is rubbish

what we have is propositional difference – plain and simple

‘Yet the concept of the continuum as a collection of elements remained and continued to be used, despite the quite obvious difficulties, until these difficulties were almost removed in the 20^thcentury.’

proposals / theories – will remain significant if they have a use –

difficulties come and go –

what remains is propositional uncertainty

‘A further example of a theory with qualitative defects is Newton’s theory of colours. According to this theory, light consists of rays of different refrangibility which can be separated, united, refracted, but which are never changed in their internal constitution, and which have a very small lateral extension in space. Considering that the surface of mirrors is much rougher than the lateral extension of rays, the ray theory is found to be inconsistent with the existence of mirror images (as is admitted by Newton himself): if light consists of rays, then a mirror should behave like a rough surface, i.e. it should look to us like a wall. Newton retained his theory, eliminating the difficulty with the help of an ad hoc hypothesis: ‘The reflection of a ray is effected, not by a single point of the reflecting body, but by some power of the body which is evenly diffused all over its surface.

In Newton’s case the qualitative discrepancy between theory and fact was removed by an ad hoc hypothesis. In other cases not even this very flimsy manoeuvre is used: one retains the theory and tries to forget its shortcomings. An example of this is the attitude towards Kepler’s rule according to which an object viewed through a lens is perceived at the point at which the rays travelling from the lens towards the eye intersect. The rule implies that an object situated at the focus will be seen infinitely far away.

‘But on the contrary’, writes Barrow, Newton’s teacher and predecessor at Cambridge, commenting on this prediction, ‘we are assured by experience that [a point situated close to the focus] appears variously distant, according to the different situations of the eye … And it does almost never seem further off than it would be if it were beheld with the naked eye; but on the contrary, it does sometimes appear much nearer …All of which does seem repugnant to our principles.’ ‘But for me’, Barrow continues, ‘neither this nor any other difficulty shall have so great an influence on me, as to make me renounce that which I know to be manifestly agreeable to reason.’

Barrow mentions the qualitative difficulties, and he says that he will retain the theory nevertheless. This is not the usual procedure. The usual procedure is to forget the difficulties, never talk about them, and to proceed as if the theory were without fault. This attitude is very common today.

Thus the classical electrodynamics of Maxwell and Lorentz implies the motion of a free particle is self-accelerated. Considering the self-energy of the electron one obtains divergent expression for point charges while charges of finite extension can be made to agree with relativity only by adding untestable stress and pressures inside the electron. The problem reappears in the quantum theory, though it is here partially covered by ‘renormalization’. This procedure consists in crossing out the results of certain calculations and replacing them by a description of what is actually observed. Thus one admits, implicitly, that the theory is in trouble with formulating it in a manner suggesting that a new principle has been discovered. Small wonder when philosophically unsophisticated authors get the impression that ‘all evidence points with merciless definitiveness in the … direction …
[that] all the processes involving … unknown interactions conform to the fundamental quantum law.’ [Rosenfeld in Observation and Interpretation, London, 1957, p.44].’

Newton’s ‘some power of the body which is evenly diffused all over its surface’ –

is hardly empirical – and for that matter barely theoretical –

but presumably Newton did not see the mirror problem as a good enough reason to dump the ray theory

and Kepler’s rule – quite obviously does not fit with veridical visual perception – or what would go for a normal understanding of it

and Barrow – for whatever reason is quite prepared to go with the theory – against the senses

it is examples like this – which makes you ask the question – well what really does drive science – what drives scientists?

I think in all honesty – we can only say – we don’t know –

and they don’t know either

yes – we will have theories of science – and of scientists – but such theories – are open to question – open to doubt – and for all intents and purposes – uncertain

‘all evidence points with merciless definitiveness in the … direction … [that] all the processes involving … unknown interactions conform to the fundamental quantum law’ [Rosenfeld]

do scientists fear that if they represented themselves and their enterprise as uncertain – they would loose any power they have?

I guess so – but if so – I think they are wrong about that –

I suspect that the uncertainty of science and the scientist – is already understood by the layman

and further that the public also recognise that uncertain as it is –

science has great value – and has delivered great benefits to humanity –

and that it has delivered catastrophes –

understanding and dealing with uncertainty – I would suggest is the common lot of man –

and it is no big jump to see that the so called ‘authorities’ – paraded before us – are in fact pretenders

I think we need pretence to get through this existence – but I think too – we can easily see it for what it is –

no more than a tool of survival – that can be of use

‘The problem reappears in quantum theory, though it is here partially covered by ‘renormalization’. This procedure consists in crossing out the results of certain calculations and replacing them by a description of what is actually observed.’

‘renormalization’ – now that’s a good one –

I think Feyerabend is right on the money here when he says –

‘Thus one admits, implicitly, that the theory is in trouble with formulating it in a manner suggesting that a new principle has been discovered.’

this leaves quantum theory – in a rather – uncertain position –

and this I would argue that is a good thing –

and that being in this uncertain position is in fact the logical reality – for any theory – for any proposal

‘To sum up this brief and incomplete list: wherever we look, whenever we have a little patience and select our evidence in an unprejudiced manner, we find that theories fail adequately to reproduce certain quantitative results, and that they are qualitatively incompetent to a surprising degree. Science gives us theories of great beauty and sophistication. Modern science has developed mathematical structures which exceed anything that has existed so far in coherence and generality. But in order to achieve this miracle all the existing troubles had to be pushed into the relation between theory and fact, and had to be concealed, by ad hoc approximations and by other procedures.’

quantitative results – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

qualitative results – are proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

this ‘miracle’ of coherence and generality – as I see it – is no miracle at all – it is the on-

going result of the exploration of propositional uncertainty

theory and fact – are propositional categories – organizational categories – that have proved to be most useful

what Feyerabend refers to as ‘existing troubles’ – are propositional uncertainties –

ad hoc procedures – are open to question –

and an ad hoc theory – may well be used to cover theoretical difficulties – that is it may be a pretence

this is not good practice

on the other hand – an ad hoc theory – may be a pragmatic action – the purpose of which is to move things along

in this case – the ad hoc action – enables work to proceed – while keeping an eye on the issues that need further investigation

any proposal – any propositional action – any propositional decision – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘This being the case, what shall we make of the methodological demand that a theory must be judged by experience and must be rejected if it contradicts accepted basic statements? What attitude shall we adopt towards the various theories of confirmation and corroboration, which all rest on the assumption that theories can be made to agree completely with known facts, and which use the amount of agreement reached as a principle of evaluation? This demand, these theories, are now all seen to be quite useless. They are as useless as medicine which heals a patient only if he is bacteria free. In practice they are never obeyed by anyone. Methodologists may point to the importance of falsifications – but they blithely use falsified theories. They may sermonize how important it is to consider all the relevant evidence, and never mention those big and drastic facts which show that the theories which they admire and accept, like the theory of relativity or the quantum theory, may be as badly off as the older theories which they reject. In practice they slavishly repeat the most recent pronouncements of the top dogs in physics, though in doing so they must violate some very basic rules of their trade. Is it possible to proceed in a more reasonable manner? Let us see.’

‘what shall we make of the methodological demand that a theory must be judged by experience and must be rejected if it contradicts accepted basic statements?’

what do we make of any demand?

a demand is authoritarian rhetoric – and we are best to see it as logically worthless –

that a theory is to be judged by experience – and rejected if it contradicts accepted basic statements – is a methodological proposal – a proposal as to how to proceed –

and as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

this judging by experience – proposal – is a propositional practice that has developed in the culture of science –

and as with other such practices it has its uses and its limitations –

there is a logic to it – and indeed it can be a pretence

‘What attitude shall we adopt towards the various theories of confirmation and corroboration, which all rest on the assumption that theories can be made to agree completely with known facts, and which use the amount of agreement reached as a principle of evaluation?’

the assumption that theories can be made to agree completely with known facts –

is an instance of the assumption of certainty –

this assumption is not just fanciful – it is illogical –

theories are proposals – ‘known facts’ – are proposals – proposals are open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

this assumption – that theories can be made to agree completely with known facts – is pretentious – and delusional

the amount of agreement reached – as a principle of evaluation?

well – any principle – any evaluation – is uncertain –

nevertheless evaluation are made – and must be made – if there is to be any propositional movement

so if ‘the amount of agreement’ is decided on as a criterion – fair enough

‘In practice they slavishly repeat the most recent pronouncements of the top dogs in physics, though in doing so they must violate some very basic rules of their trade. Is it possible to proceed in a more reasonable manner?’

yes – human all too human –

is it possible to proceed in a more reasonable manner?

well – it all depends on what you think is reasonable –

I doubt that there will be any general long lasting agreement here – by those who actually do science – and those who observe and describe it –

in any case – science will proceed – as it proceeds

and as it proceeds – it will be open to question – open to doubt – and it will be uncertain

in my view – you can’t get more reasonable than that

‘According to Hume, theories cannot be derived from facts. The demand to admit only those theories which follow from facts leaves us without any theory. Hence, science as we know it can only exist if we drop the demand and revise our methodology.’

derivation – as I see it is – an explanation of the proposal – of its origin –

an explanation which by the way – is open to question – to doubt – is therefore – uncertain

my point though is that it is actually irrelevant where a proposal comes from –

unless of course you are running an argument for a particular epistemological prejudice

a proposal is put –

whether you want to chase it down to a sense datum – or an idea – or – nothing – makes no difference

it has been put –

and so the question is – are you going to proceed with it – or not?

does it have value in the propositional context that it has been put in?

and that is the question – the doubt – the uncertainty

‘According to our present results, hardly any theory is consistent with the facts. The demand to admit only those theories which follow from the facts leaves us without any theory. (I repeat: without any theory, for there is not a single theory that is not is some trouble or another.) Hence, a science as we know it can exist only if we drop this demand also and again revise our methodology, now admitting counterinduction in addition to admitting unsupported hypotheses. The right method must not contain any rules that make us choose between theories on the basis of falsification. Rather, its rules must enable us to choose between theories we have already tested and which are falsified.’

‘Hence, a science as we know it can exist only if we drop this demand also and again revise our methodology, now admitting counterinduction in addition to

admitting unsupported hypotheses.’

any demand is just – authoritarian rhetoric –

really any free thinking individual will see through any demand – from anywhere

it is not a question of admitting – counterinduction – or unsupported hypotheses –

it is rather seeing that any proposal is valid –

and that any proposal put – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

that is the first point

the next thing to say is that whether a proposal has legs – is a question for those dealing with it

if a proposal is put in a scientific propositional context – it will be those working in that context who will determine the value of the proposal

‘The right method must not contain any rules that make us choose between theories on the basis of falsification. Rather, its rules must enable us to choose between theories we have already tested and which are falsified.’

more demands – more rules –

Feyerabend has not been able to get out of the trenches – his argument is no advance

falsification – verification – are propositional rituals that the practice of science has developed

at the end of the day whether a proposal is regarded as verified – or falsified – is logically irrelevant

it is open to question – open to doubt – it is uncertain

‘To proceed further. Not only are facts and theories in constant disharmony, they are never as neatly separated out as everyone makes them out to be. Methodological rules speak of ‘theories’, ‘observations’ and ‘experimental results’ as if these were clear-cut well defined objects whose properties are easy to evaluate and which are understood in the same way by all scientists’

the ‘fact’ – and the ‘theory’ – are propositional categories –

any distinction between a ‘theory’ and a ‘fact’ – is descriptive

we have different descriptions of propositions – because we have different uses for proposals – for propositions

logically speaking – any proposal – any proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

regardless of how it is described or categorized – regardless of its use or function

‘methodological rules’ – are proposals for procedure –

they are of course – open to question – open to doubt – and as with any proposal – uncertain

whether one person – understands another’s proposals – in the way that the person putting the proposal does – is uncertain

we make an assumption here – an assumption of ‘understanding’ – and in everyday life – not to mention science – this assumption is constantly challenged – and indeed sometimes it appears to be entirely wrongheaded –

nevertheless we proceed

‘However, the material which a scientist actually has at his disposal, his laws, his experimental results, his mathematical techniques, his epistemological prejudices, his attitude toward the absurd consequences of the theories which he accepts, is indeterminate in many ways, ambiguous, and never fully separated from the historical background. The material is always contaminated by principles which he does not know and which, if known, would be extremely hard to test. Questionable views on cognition such as the view that our senses, used in normal circumstances, give reliable information about the world, may invade the observation language itself, constituting the observational terms as well as the distinction between veridical and illusory appearance. As a result, observation languages may become tied to older layers of speculation which affect, in this roundabout fashion, even the most progressive methodology. (Example: the absolute space-time frame of classical physics which was codified and consecrated by Kant.) The sensory impression, however simple, always contains a component that expresses the physiological reaction of the perceiving organism and has no objective

correlate. This ‘subjective’ component often merges with the rest, and forms an unstructured whole which must then be subdivided from the outside with the help of counter-inductive procedures. (An example of this is the appearance of the fixed star to the naked eye, which contains the subjective effects of irradiation, diffraction, diffusion, restricted by the lateral inhibition of adjacent elements of the retina.) Finally, there are the auxiliary premises which are needed for the derivation of testable conclusions, and which occasionally form entire auxiliary sciences.’

the material that a scientist actually has at his disposal –

his laws – experimental results – his mathematical techniques – his epistemological theories (as distinct from epistemological prejudices) – his attitude toward the consequences of his theories – are proposals

if they are not separated from ‘the’ historical background –

that is because an historical background has been proposed

‘The material is always contaminated by principles which he does not know and which, if known, would be extremely hard to test’

the ‘material’ – is not ‘contaminated’ – the material is open to question – open to doubt – the ‘material’ – is uncertain –

if someone proposes a ‘principle’ – in the material – then it is known –

prior to this proposal – the ‘principle’ – is not there – it doesn’t exist

it doesn’t exist – unless it is proposed – it is not known – until it is proposed

once proposed – it is open to question – open to doubt – it is uncertain

such ‘principles’ / proposals are not hard to test – they are open to question – open to doubt – they are uncertain

‘Questionable views on cognition such as the view that our senses, used in normal circumstances, give reliable information about the world, may invade the observation language itself, constituting the observational terms as well as the distinction between veridical and illusory appearance.’

any view is questionable

the ‘language itself’ – is propositional – open to question –

a distinction between veridical and illusory experience – is as with any proposal –

open to question

‘As a result, observation languages may become tied to older layers of speculation which affect, in this roundabout fashion, even the most progressive methodology.’

if other speculations – ‘older’ or not – are proposed – so be it

‘The sensory impression, however simple, always contains a component that expresses the physiological reaction of the perceiving organism and has no objective correlate.’

the ‘sensory impression’ – is a proposal – and as the philosophical work in this area shows only too well – the proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘This ‘subjective’ component often merges with the rest, and forms an unstructured whole which must then be subdivided from the outside with the help of counter-inductive procedures.’

another proposal –

‘Finally, there are the auxiliary premises which are needed for the derivation of testable conclusions, and which occasionally form entire auxiliary sciences.’

well given that the proposal is – logically speaking – uncertain – yes it can be taken in any direction

‘Consider the case of the Copernican hypothesis, whose invention, and partial vindication runs counter to almost every methodological rule one might care to think of today. The auxiliary sciences here contained laws describing the properties and the influence of the terrestrial atmosphere (meteorology); optical laws dealing with the structure of the eye and of the telescopes, and with the behaviour of light; and dynamical laws describing motion in moving systems. Most importantly, however, the auxiliary sciences contained a theory of cognition that postulated a certain simple relation between perceptions and physical objects. Not all these auxiliary disciplines were available in explicit form, many of them emerged with the observation language, and led to the situation described at the beginning of the preceding paragraph.*’

[* ‘However, the material which a scientist actually has at his disposal, his laws, his experimental results, his mathematical techniques, his epistemological prejudices, his attitude toward the absurd consequences of the theories which he accepts, is indeterminate in many ways, ambiguous, and never fully separated from the historical background.’]

Feyerabend here puts that it is the use of auxiliary sciences – that is auxiliary propositional systems – which leads to the situation where the material a scientist has at his disposal – is indeterminate and ambiguous –

yes – science is a theoretical patchwork –

but this is not the reason it is indeterminate or ambiguous –

indeterminacy and ambiguity – are expressions of uncertainty

the propositions of science – as with the propositions of any other human acttivity or endeavour – are proposals

from a logical point of view the proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – is – uncertain

you can propose an account of a proposition – that analyses it in term of the propositional systems that have led to it – or contributed to it – or in fact have been developed from it –

this can be an interesting study – an interesting portrayal – an interesting proposal

however logically – it is neither here nor there –

the uncertainty of any propositional system is to found in the uncertainty of any proposition

‘Consideration of all theses circumstances, of observation terms, sensory core, auxiliary sciences, background speculation, suggest that a theory may be inconsistent with the evidence, not because it is incorrect, but because the evidence is contaminated. The theory is threatened because the evidence either contains unanalysed sensations which only partly correspond to external processes, or because it is presented in terms of antiquated views, or because it is evaluated with the help of backward auxiliary theories.’ The Copernican theory was in trouble for all these reasons.’

a theory inconsistent with the evidence – because the evidence is contaminated?

this ‘evidence’ is – proposal – propositions – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

in the same way that the theory is open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

Feyerabend confuses contamination – with uncertainty

I think ‘contamination’ suits Feyerabend better than uncertainty – for ‘contamination’ has more of a rhetorical ring to it

and frankly – I don’t think Feyerabend understands logical uncertainty

‘The theory is threatened because the evidence either contains unanalysed sensations which only partly correspond to external processes, or because it is presented in terms of antiquated views, or because it is evaluated with the help of backward auxiliary theories.’

if you understand that the theory is a proposal – that is uncertain – then the theory is not threatened

and not threatened by unanalysed sensations – or the terms in which it is presented or any association with auxiliary theories –

these ‘unanalysed sensations’ – ‘the terms of the theory’ – and its ‘relation to auxiliary theories’ – are proposals –

proposals that are open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

a theory gets proposed – it is argued – for and against – it is accepted – or not – it is proceeded with – or not

that’s the guts of it

and yes you can do an historical / methodological serenade or hatchet job on its success or on its lack of success

these stories are always good fun to read – and often quite insightful – but such romances and tragedies – have nothing to do with science

if you are looking for the answer to the question – why one theory prevailed – and another didn’t – keep looking –

the best you can get here is proposals – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain –

decisions get made – decisions as to whether to proceed with a theory – to proceed with the evidence

any decision is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

the dogs bark and the caravan moves on

‘It is this historico-physiological character of the evidence, the fact that it does not merely describe some objective state of affairs but also expresses subjective, mythical and long forgotten views concerning this state of affairs, that forces us to take a fresh look at methodology. It shows that it would be extremely imprudent to let the evidence judge our theories directly and without any further ado. A straightforward and unqualified judgement of theories by ‘facts’ is bound to eliminate ideas simply because they do not fit into the framework of some older cosmology. Taking experimental results and observations for granted and putting the burden of proof on the theory means taking the

observational ideology for granted without having ever examined it. (Note the experimental results are supposed to have been obtained with the greatest possible care. Hence ‘taking observations, etc., for granted’ means ‘taking them for granted after the most careful examination of their reliability’: for even the most careful examination of an observation does not interfere with the concepts in which it is expressed, or with the structure of the sensory image.)’

it is not this historical-physiological character of evidence … that forces us to take a fresh look at methodology’

this historical-physiological character of evidence – is a methodological proposal –

in the same boat as the methodological proposals – Feyerabend discredits

let’s be clear – methodological proposals are either propositional directives – before the fact of scientific activity – or they are descriptions of scientific work – after the fact

methodological directives – can either be rhetoric that serves an epistemological prejudice –

or they can be guidelines – the point of which is to get the process of investigation under way

if the former – their point is to serve a prejudice –

if the latter – then they are proposals that may be useful –

as to methodological proposals that are descriptions after the fact – they are as with any proposal – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

they may be of use to the scientist – or they may not

‘a fresh look at methodology’ –

is to see it as a propositional activity that is an ancillary activity to actual science –

and to see it as – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

‘It shows that it would be extremely imprudent to let the evidence judge our theories directly and without any further ado. A straightforward and unqualified judgement of theories by ‘facts’ is bound to eliminate ideas simply because they do not fit into the framework of some older cosmology

well any judgement that is ‘direct and without further ado’ – is unwise

our judgements are open to question

however judgements get made – and yes ideas – get eliminated –

if they don’t – what kind of ‘judgement’ is it?

as to older cosmologies – most likely they will be tossed –

this won’t be the case however – if these older cosmologies – are seen to be relevant –

and any claim of relevance will require argument – and eventually – decision

decision – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain –

decision nevertheless

‘Taking experimental results and observations for granted and putting the burden of proof on the theory means taking the observational ideology for granted without having ever examined it’ –

yes – this can happen – does happen – science proceeds

‘Now – how can we possibly examine something we use all the time and presuppose in every statement? How can we criticize the terms in which we habitually express our observations? Let us see!’

well I find it hard to believe that there would be anyone dumb enough – and rigid enough – to presuppose ‘something’ – meaning the same ‘something’ – in every statement

however – if we presuppose – then we either know we presuppose – or we don’t know –

and if we don’t know – we don’t presuppose –

someone else may say you do – but that is only their interpretation of your statement

if you are aware of a presupposition to your statement – your presupposition – that is –

you can question it – subject it to doubt – explore its uncertainty

‘the terms in which we habitually express our observations’ – are open to question – open to doubt – they are from a logical point of view – uncertain

how can we do it? –

we just do it – if we are interested in proceeding logically

‘The first step in our criticism of commonly-used concepts is to create a measure of criticism, something with which these concepts can be compared. Of course, we shall later want to know a little more about the measuring-stick itself; for example, we shall want to know whether it is better than, or perhaps not as good as, the material examined. But in order for this examination to start; there must be a measuring stick in the first place. Therefore, the first step in our criticism of customary concepts and customary reactions is to step outside the circle and either invent a new conceptual system, for example a new theory, that clashes with the most carefully established observational results and confounds the most plausible theoretical principles, or to import such a system from outside science, from religion, from mythology, from the ideas of incompetents, or the ramblings of madmen. This step is, again, counterinductive. Counterinduction is thus a fact – science could not exist without it – and a legitimate and much needed move in the game of science.’

this is methodological pragmatism –

you propose a ‘measuring stick’ – a standard – in order to start working

the ‘measuring stick’ – is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

‘Therefore, the first step in our criticism of customary concepts and customary reactions is to step outside the circle and either invent a new conceptual system, for example a new theory, that clashes with the most carefully established observational results and confounds the most plausible theoretical principles, or to import such a system from outside science, from religion, from mythology, from the ideas of incompetents, or the ramblings of madmen.’

if what Feyerabend here calls the ‘circle’ – is propositional reality – we never step out of it –

the best that you have here is different proposals – different propositions – put against each other

different proposals – will clash – because they are different

a new theory / proposal that clashes with ‘the most carefully established observational results’ – will most likely only get a look in – and most likely only if there is some catastrophic failure in the original theory

and a theory ‘that confounds the most plausible theoretical principles’ – will need a great deal of work – and some very skilful argument if it is to get a run

in principle there is nothing against proposing – an outsider

the issue is whether it will get enough support to be a serious contender

who can say?

my hunch is – that it is unlikely

‘the ideas of incompetents’ – ‘the ramblings of madmen’ – I mean who does Feyerabend think he’s kidding? –

this is just rhetorical rubbish

and I don’t think that the counterinductive argument should be reduced to this –

what Feyerabend calls counterinduction – the entry of a complete theoretical outsider – an outsider I might add that is not incompetent or the ramblings of a madman – but rather an outsider that is competent – and intelligent – may indeed be valuable – have a place – in exceptional circumstances –

and in any case this idea of counterinduction is worth keeping on the table

however the real point here is – who can say in advance what theories – what evidence – what kind of testing – what standards of evaluation – what methodologies are to be used?

the best we can hope for is a range of methodological options

science does – as science does –

it is up to the scientists to decide how they conduct themselves

we can have this kind of discussion because we know that there are certain propositional practices that scientists adopt –

that is where we start –

but once we have made this start – we see – very quickly – that any description of the practice of science – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

the best methodological approach – is to have a good understanding of the methodologies that are proposed – that are in use –

to have a critical and open mind on these methods –

and to have an eye to inventing new methodologies – new approaches

while recognizing – that any method proposed – is open to question

‘As an example of such an attempt I examine the tower argument which the Aristotelians used to refute the motion of the earth. The argument includes natural interpretations – ideas so closely connected with observation that it needs a special effort to realise their existence and to determine their content. Galileo identifies the natural interpretations which are inconsistent with Copernicus and replaces them by others.’

‘As a concrete illustration and as a basis for further discussion, I shall now briefly describe the manner in which Galileo defused an important counter-argument against the idea of the motion of the earth. I say defused, and not refuted, because we are dealing with a changing conceptual system as well as certain attempts at concealment.

According to the argument which convinced Tycho, and which is used against the motion of the earth in Galileo’s own Trattato della sfera, observation shows that ‘heavy bodies…..falling down from on high, go by a straight and vertical line to the surface of the earth. This is considered an irrefutable argument for the earth being motionless. For, if it made the diurnal rotation, a tower from whose top a rock was let fall, being carried by the whirling of the earth, would travel many hundreds of yards to the east in the time the rock would consume in its fall, and the rock ought to strike the earth that distance away from the base of the tower.

In considering the argument Galileo at once admits the correctness of the sensory content of the observation made, viz. that ‘heavy bodies …falling from a height, go perpendicularly to the surface of the earth.’ Considering an author (Chiaramonti) who sets out to convert Copernicans by repeatedly mentioning this fact, he says: ‘I wish this author would not put himself to such trouble trying to have us understand from our sense that this motion of falling bodies is simple straight motion and no other kind, nor get angry and complain because such a clear, obvious, and manifest thing should be called into question. For in this way he hints at believing that to those who say that such motion is not straight at all, but rather circular, it seems they see the stone move visibly in an arc, since he calls upon their senses rather than their reason to clarify the effect. This is not the case Simplicio; for just as I …have never seen nor expect to see, the rock fall any way but perpendicularly, just so do I believe it appears to the eyes of everyone else. It is therefore better to put aside the appearance on which we all agree, and to use the power of reason to confirm its reality or to reveal its fallacy.’ [Galileo, Dialogue] The correctness of the observation is not in question. What is in question is its ‘reality’ or ‘fallacy’. What is meant by this expression?

The question is answered by an example that occurs in Galileo’s next paragraph, ‘from which … one may learn how easily anyone may be deceived by simple appearance, or let us say by the impressions of one’s senses. This event is the appearance to those who travel along a street by night of being followed by the moon, with steps equal to theirs, when they see it go gliding along the eves of roofs. There it looks to them just as would a cat really running along the tiles and putting them behind it: an appearance which if reason did not intervene, would only too obviously deceive the senses.’

Feyerabend says here –

‘In this example we are asked to start with a sensory impression and to consider a statement that is forcefully suggested by it. (The suggestion is so strong that it has led to entire systems of belief and to rituals, as becomes clear from a close study of the lunar aspects of witchcraft and other cosmological hypotheses.) Now ‘reason intervenes’; the statement suggested by the impression is examined, and one considers other statements in its place. The nature of the impression is not changed a bit by this activity. (This is only approximately true; but we can omit from our present purpose the complications arising from an interaction of impression and proposition.) But it enters new observation statements and plays new, better or worse, parts in our knowledge. What are the reasons and methods that regulate such exchange?

To start with, we must become clear about the nature of the total phenomenon: appearance plus statement. There are not two acts – one, noticing a phenomenon; the other, expressing it with the help of the appropriate statement – but only one, viz. saying in a certain observational situation, ‘the moon is following me’, or ‘the stone is falling straight down’. We may, of course, abstractly subdivide this process into parts, and we may also try to create a situation where statement and phenomenon seem to be psychologically apart and waiting to be related. (This is rather difficult to achieve and perhaps entirely impossible.) But under normal circumstances such a division does not occur; describing a familiar situation is, for the speaker, an event in which statement and phenomenon are firmly glued together.’

what we have here is a statement – a proposal – the proposal is that there is this ‘phenomenon’ – appearance plus statement

‘This unity is the result of a process of learning that starts in one’s childhood. From our very early days we learn to react to situations with the appropriate responses, linguistic or otherwise. The teaching procedures both shape the ‘appearance’ or the ‘phenomenon’ and establish a firm connection with words, so that finally the phenomena seem to speak for themselves without outside help or extraneous knowledge assert them to be. They are what the associated statements assert them to be. The language they ‘speak’ is, of course, influenced by the beliefs of earlier generations which have been held so long that they no longer appear as separate principles, but enter the terms of everyday discourse, and, after the prescribed training, seem to emerge from the things themselves.’

first up – there is no unity of statement and phenomenon – there is only the statement – the proposal – the proposal that …

this teaching procedure which Feyerabend refers to – doesn’t establish a firm connection between phenomenon and words –

there is only the proposal – in this case in the form of language – of words

the words – the proposal(s) – make the reality –

the words propose the phenomenon

independent of any proposal – independent of propositional reality – what we deal with – what we face – is the unknown

our proposals – make known – and this making known – is the making of propositional reality

we are born into a propositional reality – we are born into proposal –

and if it can be said that there is a basis to our proposals –

it is the basis of proposals – of the propositional reality we come into learn to deal with –

and learn to deal with – with proposals

and our proposals – our propositions – are open to question – open to doubt – are uncertain

our propositional reality is uncertain – or perhaps more correctly – our propositional realities – are uncertain

‘At this point we may want to compare, in our imagination and quite abstractly, the results of the teaching of different languages incorporating different ideologies. We may even want consciously to change some of these ideologies and adapt them to more ‘modern’ points of view. It is very difficult to say how this will alter our situation, unless we make the further assumption that the quality and structure of sensations (perceptions) or at least the quality and structure of these sensations which enter the body of science, is independent of their linguistic expression. I am very doubtful about even the approximate validity of this assumption, which can be refuted by simple examples, and I am sure that we are depriving ourselves of new and surprising discoveries as long as we remain within the limits defined by it. Yet, I shall for the moment, remain quite consciously within these limits. (My first task, if I should ever resume writing, would be to explore these limits and to venture beyond them.)’

teaching different languages – incorporating different ideologies – is to teach different propositional systems

‘It is very difficult to say how this will alter our situation, unless we make the further assumption that the quality and structure of sensations (perceptions) or at least the quality and structure of these sensations which enter the body of science, is independent of their linguistic expression’

‘it is difficult say’ – the matter is open to question – open to doubt – it is uncertain

the quality and structure of these sensations – is no more than the proposals that we take as basic to our propositional system or enterprise

there is no rock bottom here – there are only proposals – open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘I am very doubtful about even the approximate validity of this assumption, which can be refuted by simple examples, and I am sure that we are depriving ourselves of new and surprising discoveries as long as we remain within the limits defined by it.’

we only stay within the limits defined by our proposals – if we fail to question – to doubt and to explore their uncertainty

‘Making the additional simplifying assumption, we can now distinguish between sensations and those ‘mental operations which follow so closely upon the senses’, and which are so firmly connected with their reactions that a separation is difficult to achieve. Considering the origin and effect of such operations, I shall call them natural interpretations.’

sensations – are proposals – are propositions

those ‘mental operations which follow so closely upon the senses’ –

are those proposals – those propositions which are interpretations – of the initial proposal – the initial proposition

‘which are so firmly connected with their reactions that a separation is difficult to achieve.’ –

our propositional reactions can be immediate – and habitual –

this immediacy and habituation is a function of the propositional culture we operate in –

and also of a non-critical approach to the initial proposal – or those propositions in common use

much of what we ‘know’ – is what is taught to us – proposed to us – in a non-critical fashion –

and much of what is taught to us – proposed to us – is in normal circumstances not challenged – either by ourselves – or by others

any ‘firm connection’ is a non-critical connection –

there is no difficulty in separating out a primary proposal from secondary proposals – or interpretative proposals –

you have to understand firstly that what you have is proposals – propositions –

and secondly that any proposal – any proposition – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

there is only a difficulty if you don’t question – if you don’t doubt – if you don’t explore propositional uncertainty

these ‘natural interpretations’ of Feyerabend – are interpretive propositions –

the point of which is to propose an understanding of the subject proposition –

the subject proposition is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

and any proposed interpretation of it is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

any proposal – any proposition – is ‘natural’

‘In the history of thought, natural interpretations have been regarded either as a priori presuppositions of science, or else prejudices which must be removed before any serious examination can begin. The first view is that of Kant, and in a very different manner and on the basis of very different talents, that of some contemporary linguistic philosophers. The second view is due to Bacon (who had predecessors such as the Greek sceptics).’

the notion of an a priori presupposition – is essentially authoritarian and rhetorical –

any principle – any presupposition – is a proposal – and from a logical point of view – is open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

if a presupposition – is not held open to question – then yes – it functions as a prejudice

in so far as we operate with presuppositions – presuppositions provide a basis for further propositional activity

and the fact that you have a basis for propositional action – does not mean that that basis is non-critical – or beyond criticism

authoritarianism – of any kind – is philosophical failure

the search for a basis in certainty – is really pre-logical – and I think just based on a fear –

fear of criticism –

it is philosophical weakness – it is a lack of courage – it is the failure to positively embrace uncertainty

according to Feyerabend Galileo’s method is the critical method –

‘Galileo is one of those rare thinkers who neither wants forever to retain natural interpretations nor altogether to eliminate them. Wholesale judgments of this kind are quite alien to his way of thinking. He insists upon a critical discussion to decide which natural interpretations can be kept and which must be replaced. This is not always clear from his writings. Quite the contrary. The methods of reminiscence, to which he appeals so freely, are designed to create the impression that nothing has changed and that we continue expressing our observations in old and familiar ways. Yet his attitude is relatively easy to ascertain: natural interpretations are necessary. The senses alone, without the help of reason cannot give us a true account of nature. What is needed for arriving at such a true account are ‘the…senses, accompanied by reasoning’. Moreover, in the arguments dealing with the motion of the earth, it is this reasoning, it is the connotation of the observational terms and not the message of the senses that causes trouble. ‘It is, therefore, better to put aside the appearance, on which we all agree, and to use the power of reason either to confirm its reality or to reveal its fallacy.’ Confirming the reality or revealing the fallacy of appearances means, however, examining the validity of these natural interpretations which are so intimately connected with the appearances that we no longer regard them as separate assumptions. I turn now to the first natural interpretation implicit in the argument from falling stones.’

and this is logically correct –

in logical reality – no proposal – no proposition is eliminated –

the question is one of utility – which proposal do we proceed with – which proposal do we think will deliver the results we have in mind?

‘He insists upon a critical discussion to decide which natural interpretations can be kept and which must be relaced’

the idea is to have a critical discussion to decide which proposals to go forward with –

a critical discussion to decide which view to adopt –

and I would venture to suggest – that this outlook – the critical outlook – is no more than common sense – in relation to science – or for that matter in relation to any propositional activity

‘The methods of reminiscence, to which he appeals so freely, are designed to create the impression that nothing has changed and that we continue expressing our observations in old and familiar ways.’

this can only be a rhetorical ploy – and one that I think that will have limited success –

eventually people adjust to new expressions

‘natural interpretations are necessary. The senses alone, without the help of reason cannot give us a true account of nature.’

natural interpretations are necessary – is only to say – proposals are necessary –

our reality in the absence of proposal is unknown

proposals – or ‘natural interpretations’ – make known

and any proposal – any ‘natural interpretation’ – is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

the distinction between ‘the senses’ – and ‘reason’ –

is no more than a distinction between propositional categories – propositional descriptions

‘The senses alone, without the help of reason cannot give us a true account of nature. What is needed for arriving at such a true account are ‘the…senses, accompanied by reasoning’.

this notion of a ‘true account of nature’ is rubbish –

all we can have – logically speaking – are different accounts of nature –

what is ‘true’ – is matter of fashion

‘Moreover, in the arguments dealing with the motion of the earth, it is this reasoning, it is the connotation of the observational terms and not the message of the senses that causes trouble.’

‘the connotation of the observational terms’ – is what is proposed as the message of the senses

and yes – there should be trouble – there should be question – doubt – uncertainty – whatever is proposed

‘Confirming the reality or revealing the fallacy of appearances means, however examining the validity of these natural interpretations which are so intimately connected with the appearances that we no longer regard them as separate assumptions.’

confirming the reality or revealing the fallacy – of the interpretations of appearances –

is the critical process –

with the rider that there is logically speaking – no final confirmation – or falsification of any proposal

confirmation and falsification – are decisions to proceed or not to proceed with a proposal

they are essentially pragmatic decisions – decisions which are open to question – open to doubt – and are uncertain

‘According to Copernicus the motion of a falling stone should be ‘mixed straight-and-circular’. By the ‘motion of the stone’, is meant not just its motion relative to some visible mark in the visual field of the observer, or its observed motion, but rather its motion in the solar system or in (absolute) space, i.e. its real motion. The familiar facts appealed to in the argument assert a different kind of motion, a simple vertical motion. This result refutes the Copernican hypothesis only if the concept of motion that occurs in the observation statement is the same as the concept of motion that occurs in the Copernican prediction. The observation statement ‘the stone is falling straight down’ must, therefore, refer to a movement in (absolute) space. It must refer to a real motion.

Now the force of an ‘argument from observation’ derives from the fact that the observation statements involved are firmly connected with appearances. There is no use appealing to observation if one does not know how to describe what one sees, or if one can only offer one’s description with hesitation only, as if one had just learned the language in which it is formulated. Producing an observation statement, then consists of two very different psychological events: (1) a clear and unambiguous sensation and (2) a clear and unambiguous connection between this sensation and parts of language. This is the way in which sensation is made to speak. Do the sensations in the above language speak the language of real motion?’

‘Now the force of an ‘argument from observation’ derives from the fact that the observation statements involved are firmly connected with appearances.’

the force of the ‘argument from observation’ derives from the fact that the observation statements involved are not put to question – not put to doubt – are regarded as certain

‘There is no use appealing to observation if one does not know how to describe what one sees, or if one can only offer one’s description with hesitation only, as if one had just learned the language in which it is formulated.’ –

yes – in a complex propositional context there is no use proposing an ‘observation’ statement – if one does not know how to describe it – to propose in relation to it

as to being hesitant – well that is neither here nor there

there is though the deeper logical issue if understanding that your proposal is open to question – open to doubt – that it is uncertain

‘Producing an observation statement, then consists of two very different psychological events: (1) a clear and unambiguous sensation and (2) a clear and unambiguous connection between this sensation and parts of language. This is the way in which sensation is made to speak.’ –

as to a ‘clear an unambiguous’ sensation / proposition – yes you can put on some front –

but in so doing you defy propositional logic –

the logic of question – doubt – and uncertainty

‘This is the way in which sensation is made to speak. Do the sensations in the above language speak the language of real motion?’

this is the way the sensation / proposal is interpreted –

is it interpreted in terms of the Copernican proposal of ‘real motion’?

well it can be

‘They speak the language of real motion in the manner of 17^th century everyday thought. At least, this is what Galileo tells us. He tells us that the everyday thinking of the time assumes the ‘operative’ character of all motion, or, to use well-known philosophical terms, it assumes a naïve realism with respect to motion: except for occasional and unavoidable illusions, apparent motion is identical with real (absolute) motion. Of course, this distinction is not explicitly drawn. One does not first distinguish the apparent motion from the real motion and then connect the two by a correspondence rule. One rather describes, perceives, acts toward motion as if it were the real thing. Nor does one proceed in this matter under all circumstances. It is admitted that objects may move that are not seen to move; and it is also admitted that certain motions are illusory (cf. the example of the moon mentioned earlier in this chapter). Apparent motion and real motion are not always identified. However there are paradigmatic cases in which it is psychologically very difficult, if not plainly impossible, to admit deception. It is from these paradigmatic cases, and not from the exceptions, that naïve realism derives its strength. These are also the situations in which we first learn our kinematic vocabulary. From our very early childhood we learn to react to them with concepts, which have naïve realism built right into them, and which inextricability connect movement and the appearance of movement. The motion of the stone in the tower argument, or the alleged motion of the earth, is such a paradigmatic case. How could one possibly be unaware of the swift motion of a large bulk of matter such as the earth is supposed to be! How could one possibly be unaware of the fact that the falling stone traces a vastly extended trajectory through space! From the point of view of 17^th century thought and language, the argument is therefore, impeccable and quite forceful. However, notice how theories (‘operative character’ all motion; essential correctness of sense reports) which are not formulated explicitly, enter the debate in the guise of observational terms. We realise again that observation terms are Trojan horses which must be watched most carefully. How is one supposed to proceed in such a tricky situation?’

‘it assumes a naïve realism with respect to motion: except for occasional and unavoidable illusions, apparent motion is identical with real (absolute) motion. Of course, this distinction is not explicitly drawn’

what this amounts to is – that the proposal of naive realism – once subjected to question – doubt – is shown to be uncertain

and if in the face of ‘occasional and unavoidable illusion’ – it is proceeded with –

we can only say it is proceeded with – with uncertainty – and that it is decided that even in the face of this uncertainty – it will prove useful

‘One does not first distinguish the apparent motion from the real motion and then connect the two by a correspondence rule. One rather describes, perceives, acts toward motion as if it were the real thing. Nor does one proceed in this matter under all circumstances. It is admitted that objects may move that are not seen to move; and it is also admitted that certain motions are illusory (cf. the example of the moon mentioned earlier in this chapter’.

what one does is critically evaluate the proposal of ‘real motion’ –

where it is put that objects move that are not seen to move – and that certain motions are illusory –

this proposal of real motion – will be regarded as open to question – open to doubt – and regarded as – uncertain

‘Apparent motion and real motion are not always identified. However there are paradigmatic cases in which it is psychologically very difficult, if not plainly impossible, to admit deception’

apparent motion and real motion are not easily identified – because the proposal of motion – is uncertain

a so called paradigmatic case – is really just a proposal that is not subjected to question – to doubt –

or if it is – it is decided that it is worth sticking with

the history of science is a history of changing paradigms

paradigms – represent the given – the accepted view – within a propositional context

it is not an issue of whether or not there is deception –

the issue is whether or not there is question – doubt – critical evaluation –

deception – like ‘the real deal’ – gets a free pass if there is no critical evaluation

‘It is from these paradigmatic cases, and not from the exceptions, that naïve realism derives its strength’

I suspect that the proposal of naïve realism ‘derives its strength’ – from its usefulness – in ordinary or commonly used propositional contexts

where it is not useful – i.e. in certain theoretical propositional contexts – it looks weak – and inadequate

‘These are also the situations in which we first learn our kinematic vocabulary. From our very early childhood we learn to react to them with concepts, which have naïve realism built right into them, and which inextricability connect movement and the appearance of movement.’

this is just to reinforce the utility argument

‘However, notice how theories (‘operative character’ all motion; essential correctness of sense reports) which are not formulated explicitly, enter the debate in the guise of observational terms. We realise again that observation terms are Trojan horses which must be watched most carefully.’

yes – you can run with the Trojan horse analogy here – but again this is really old epistemology

the real point is not what is contained in or hidden in observational terms –

it is rather just that these terms are – logically speaking – open to question – to doubt –

it is to say that in spite of a proposed utility – that they are – uncertain

‘How is one supposed to proceed in such a tricky situation?’

the fact of it is that there is no way that one is ‘supposed’ to proceed –

one proceeds as one does –

if you proceeds with the understanding that the propositions you use – are open to question – open to doubt – are uncertain – then you proceed logically

if on the other hand you proceed without question or doubt – if you think your propositions are certain – then you proceed – illogically

‘The argument from falling stones seems to refute the Copernican view. This may be due to an inherent disadvantage of Copernicanism; but it may also be due to the presence of natural interpretations which are in need of improvement. The first task, then, is to discover and isolate these unexamined obstacles to progress’

the old Trojan horse rears its head again

this is the whole basis of analysis – discovering – the hidden –

there is nothing hidden –

all that we have is what is proposed –

and what is proposed – is apparent –

all that so called ‘analysis’ can throw up is – new proposals

‘the unexamined obstacles to progress’

these unexamined obstacles –

will just be what they are proposed to be

and yes – I am sure any proposal here will be of interest –

but that is all it will be – a proposal –

open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

as to ‘progress’ –

progress is in the eye of the beholder –

really all you can speak of – with a logically clear conscience

is different proposals – and different propositional paths

‘It was Bacon’s belief that natural interpretations could be discovered by a method of analysis that peels them off, one after another, until the sensory core of every observation is laid bare. This method has serious drawbacks. First, natural interpretations of the kind considered by Bacon are not just added to a previously existing field of sensations. They are instrumental in constituting the field, as Bacon says himself. Eliminate all natural interpretations, and you also eliminate the ability to think and perceive. Second, disregarding this fundamental function of natural interpretations, it should be clear that a person who faces a perceptual field without a single natural interpretation at his disposal would be completely disoriented, he could not even start the business of science. The fact that we do start, even after some Baconian analysis, therefore shows that the analysis has stopped prematurely. It has stopped at precisely those natural interpretations of which we are not aware and without which we cannot proceed. It follows that the intention to start from scratch, after a complete removal of all natural interpretations, is self-defeating.’

‘It was Bacon’s belief that natural interpretations could be discovered by a method of analysis that peels them off, one after another, until the sensory core of every observation is laid bare

the ‘sensory core’ – is a proposal

natural interpretations are proposed –

natural interpretations of a sensory core proposal – place the primary proposal – the sensory core proposal – within a propositional framework

also the natural interpretations of the sensory core proposal – propose function and use of the sensory core proposal

here we are talking about proposal in relation to a proposal

there is no ‘peeling off’ – as if this sensory core exists independently of interpretation – of proposal –

any natural interpretation proposed – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

natural interpretations are not ‘peeled off’ – they are critically evaluated

there is no ‘core’ of every observation – there are only proposals in relation to the observation proposal

‘First, natural interpretations of the kind considered by Bacon are not just added to a previously existing field of sensations. They are instrumental in constituting the field, as Bacon says himself. Eliminate all natural interpretations, and you also eliminate the ability to think and perceive. Second, disregarding this fundamental function of natural interpretations, it should be clear that a person who faces a perceptual field without a single natural interpretation at his disposal would be completely disoriented, he could not even start the business of science.’

yes – the ‘field’ – the propositional field is constituted – by proposal

the propositional field is logically speaking – never stable –

the propositional field is open to question – to doubt –

the propositional field is uncertain

eliminate all proposals – and what you face is the unknown –

and yes eliminate all proposals and you are disorientated – and unable to proceed

we propose in order to think and perceive and act

our thought and our perception is propositional

‘The fact that we do start, even after some Baconian analysis, therefore shows that the analysis has stopped prematurely. It has stopped at precisely those natural interpretations of which we are not aware and without which we cannot proceed. It follows that the intention to start from scratch, after a complete removal of all natural interpretations, is self-defeating.’

we are aware of what is proposed –

there is no hidden reality – no undiscovered core

there is no starting from scratch – there is no scratch

we begin in – inherit – a propositional reality – a reality that is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain.

we put forward new and different proposals in response to this reality –

this critical process – logically speaking is never-ending – and is the engine of our creativity

‘Furthermore, it is not possible even to partly unravel the cluster of natural interpretations. At first sight the task would seem to be simple enough. One takes observation statements, one after the other, and analyses their content. However, concepts that are hidden in observation statements are not likely to reveal themselves in the more abstract parts of language. If they do, it will still be difficult to nail them down; concepts just like percepts, are ambiguous and dependent on background. Moreover, the content of a concept is determined also by the way in which it is related to perception. Yet, how can this way be discovered without circularity? Perceptions must be identified, and the identifying mechanism will contain some of the very same elements which govern the use of the concept to be investigated. We never penetrate this concept completely, for we always use part of it to find its constituents. There is only one way to get out of this circle, and it consists in using an external measure of comparison, including new ways of relating concepts and percepts. Removed from the domain of natural discourse and from all those principles, habits, and attitudes which constitute its form of life, such an external measure will look strange indeed. This, however, is not an argument against its use. On the contrary, such an impression of strangeness reveals that natural interpretations are at work, and it is the first step towards their discovery. Let us explain this situation with the help of the tower example.’

there is no cluster of natural interpretations – unless – you propose a cluster

the content of observation statements – is proposed

concepts are proposed

that which is proposed – is not hidden

there is no hidden content – in an observation statement – in a proposal

the observation statement has no content – but the content proposed

if background is a consideration – it is a consideration – because it is proposed

perceptions and conceptions – are propositional categories –

how a conceptual proposition is related to a perceptual proposition – is the issue of how one proposal is related to another

any answer to this question – is a proposal

a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

‘We never penetrate this concept completely, for we always use part of it to find its constituents’

the concept is a proposal – and we propose in relation to it – and any proposal put – is logically speaking – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

there is no problem here

the notion of ‘complete penetration’ – is essentialist rubbish

this ‘external measure’ – is just another proposal to work with –

and this ‘external measure’ proposal – as with any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

if it is regarded as useful it will have a role to play –

if not it will be dropped

introducing such a proposal is not a revolutionary move –

it is just another propositional action thrown into the mix

‘The example is intended to show that the Copernican view is not in accordance with ‘facts’. Seen from the point of view of these ‘facts’, the idea of the motion of the earth is outlandish, absurd and obviously false, to mention only some of the expressions which were frequently used at the time, and which are still heard whenever professional squares confront a new and counter-factual theory. This makes us suspect that the Copernican view is an external measuring rod of precisely the kind described above.’

the Copernican theory is a different view – a different view of the ‘facts’ –

and therefore a different view from the facts

the ‘facts’ are proposals – interpreted in terms of other proposals – theories

and the ‘facts’ – as with the theories – are open to question – open to doubt – and they are – before or after interpretation – uncertain

and just by the way all proposals – all views – are external – to each other

as for ‘measuring-rod’ – nice touch

a pretence of mathematics here – of calculation –

when in reality all we have – if we have any engagement between different views – is argument

‘We can turn the argument around and use it as detecting devise that helps us to discover the natural interpretations which exclude the motion of the earth. Turning the argument around, we first assert the motion of the earth and then inquire what changes will remove the contradiction. Such an inquiry may take considerable time, and there is a good sense in which it is not finished today. The contradiction may stay with us for decades or even centuries. Still it must be upheld until we have finished our examination, or else the examination, the attempt to discover the antediluvian components of our knowledge, cannot even start. This, we have seen, is one of the reasons one can give for retaining, and, perhaps, even for inventing, theories which are inconsistent with the facts. Ideological ingredients of our knowledge and, more especially, of our observations, are discovered with the help of theories which are refuted by them. They are discovered counter-inductively.’

‘Turning the argument around, we first assert the motion of the earth and then inquire what changes will remove the contradiction.’

the argument – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain –

so yes – you can ask the question – what changes will remove the contradiction?

this is one example of the kind of questioning that can be employed in a critical examination of the argument – of the proposal

‘Such an inquiry may take considerable time, and there is a good sense in which it is not finished today’

true enough – logically speaking a propositional inquiry – is never at an end

‘The contradiction may stay with us for decades or even centuries. Still it must be upheld until we have finished our examination, or else the examination, the attempt to discover the antediluvian components of our knowledge, cannot even start.’

there will be no finish – no mission accomplished – in a logical sense –

at best there will be – more questions – more doubts – greater uncertainty

any decision to put an end to questioning – is pragmatic – and is itself – open to question

discovering the antediluvian components of our knowledge –

if such ‘discoveries’ – lead to question – doubt and uncertainty – regarding the propositions in play – ok

however it strikes me that such a venture will most likely be a waste of time – energy and resources

and likely to divert the critical focus from the propositional issues being dealt with

what we are dealing with is proposals put – in the here and now – not some mythical history of them

‘This, we have seen, is one of the reasons one can give for retaining, and, perhaps, even for inventing, theories which are inconsistent with the facts. Ideological ingredients of our knowledge and, more especially, of our observations, are discovered with the help of theories which are refuted by them. They are discovered counter-inductively.’

any fact is a proposal – open to question – open to doubt – uncertain

subjecting facts to different theories – wherever they spring from – is a good way of putting the facts to question –

at the same time we need to put to question – any theories advanced –

ideological ingredients of our knowledge and observations?

ideological ingredients –

it is useful to understand the epistemological – ontological – metaphysical perspectives one operates with –

and to realise that these perspectives – are open to question – open to doubt – are uncertain

does counterinduction discover these different perspectives?

I don’t think so

the discovery of different perspectives – will be the result of a critical investigation –

that is – of question – doubt – and the exploration of propositional uncertainty

in such an investigation all theories involved – counterinductive or not – will be put to question – put to doubt –

and out of such a critical process –

new perspectives – new theories – new proposals can emerge

‘Let me repeat what has been asserted so far. Theories are tested and possibly refuted, by facts. Facts contain ideological components, older views which have vanished from sight or were perhaps never formulated in an explicit manner. Such components are highly suspicious. Firstly, because of their age and obscure origin: we do not know why or how they were first introduced; secondly, because their very nature protects them, and always has protected them, from critical examination. In the event of a contradiction between a new and interesting theory and a collection of firmly established facts, the best procedure, therefore, is not to abandon the theory but to use it to discover the hidden principles responsible for the contradiction. Counter-induction is an essential part of such a process of discovery. (Excellent historical example: the arguments against motion and atomicity of Parmenides and Zeno. Diogenes of Sinope, the Cynic, took the simple course that would be taken by many contemporary scientist and all contemporary philosophers: he refuted the arguments by rising and walking up and down. The opposite course, recommended here, has led to much more interesting results, as is witnessed by the history of the case. One should not be too hard on Diogenes, however, for it is also reported that he beat up a pupil who was content with his refutation, exclaiming that he had given reasons which the pupil should not accept without additional reasons of his own.)’

‘Theories are tested and possibly refuted, by facts. Facts contain ideological components, older views which have vanished from sight or were perhaps never formulated in an explicit manner.’

facts are proposals

if a fact contains ideological components – it because ideological proponents are proposed

older views that have vanished from sight?

this is irrelevant

if an older view is proposed – and formulated in an explicit manner – it will be a candidate for relevance

‘Such components are highly suspicious. Firstly, because of their age and obscure origin: we do not know why or how they were first introduced; secondly, because their very nature protects them, and always has protected them, from critical examination.’

their age and obscure origin – are logically irrelevant

no proposal – ancient or current – is protected from criticism – if questions are asked – doubts raised – and uncertainties explored

the view itself is a proposal –

how it is dealt with – i.e. – either critically or non-critically – is up to those dealing with it

they can behave logically – or not

‘In the event of a contradiction between a new and interesting theory and a collection of firmly established facts, the best procedure, therefore, is not to abandon the theory but to use it to discover the hidden principles responsible for the contradiction.’

setting things up this way gives you the opportunity to re-evaluate the so called ‘firmly established facts’ –

to put them to question – to doubt – and to explore their uncertainty

this you could do anyway without the prop of the alternative theory –

and in any case – the new theory – is not sacrosanct – it too is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain -

prime facie – relative to the issue of critical evaluation – the alternative theory proposal – doesn’t really change anything

I am suspicious of any claim of methodological superiority –

we have the logical method of question – doubt – and the exploration of uncertainty

this method can be recommended – but only recommended –

how the scientist deals with the materials he has at his disposals – the theories and facts he works with – is in a real sense is up to him –

and that I think ought to be respected

‘Counter-induction is an essential part of such a process of discovery.’ –

as I have said – I think Feyerabend’s counterinduction – can play a role in science –

it can play a role – if scientists in fact find counter-induction to be useful in their work

‘is it an essential part of such a process of discovery?’

well first off there is no ‘essential’ part to any process of discovery –

discovery – as with the proposals – that are discovered – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

as for Diogenes –

a great advertisement for counter-induction

we shouldn’t be too hard him?

he beat up a student who agreed with him

Diogenes was an ignorant thug

‘Havering discovered a particular natural interpretation, how can we examine it and test it? Obviously we cannot proceed in the usual way, i.e. derive predictions and compare them with ‘the results of observation’. These results are no longer available. The idea that the senses, employed under normal circumstances, produce correct reports of real events, for example reports of the real motion of physical bodies, has been removed from all observational statements. (Remember that this notion was found to be an essential component of the anti-Copernican argument). But without it our sensory reactions cease to be relevant for tests. This conclusion has been generalized by some older rationalists, who decided to build their science on reason only and ascribed to observation a quite insignificant auxiliary function. Galileo does not adopt this procedure.’

the point is that – however you build your science – be it on reason or observation

the logical reality is that your theories – your proposals – are open to question – open to doubt – and are uncertain

‘If one natural interpretation causes trouble for an attractive view, and if its elimination removes the view from the domain of observation, then the only acceptable procedure is to use other interpretations and to see what happens. The interpretation that Galileo uses restores the senses to their position as instruments of exploration, but only with respect to the reality of relative motion. Motion ‘among things which share it in common’ is ‘non-operative’, that is, ‘it remains insensible, imperceptible, and without any effect whatever’. Galileo’s first step, in his joint examination of the Copernican doctrine and of a familiar but hidden natural interpretation, consists therefore in replacing the latter by a different interpretation. In other words he introduces a new observation language.’

Feyerabend is still persisting with the ‘hidden’ –

if an interpretation is proposed – if it is familiar – it is not hidden

if it is not proposed – it is not hidden – if it is not proposed – it is not there

a new observation language –

yes – a new observation language – in the sense that we have a different theory – a different account of what is observed

‘This is of course an entirely legitimate move. In general the observation language which enters an argument has been in use for a long time and is quite familiar. Considering the structures of common idioms on the one hand, and of the Aristotelian philosophy on the other, neither this use nor this familiarity can be regarded as a test of the underlying principles. These principles, these natural interpretations, occur in every description. Extraordinary cases which might create difficulties are defused with the help of ‘adjuster words’, such as ‘like’ or ‘analogous’, which divert them so that the basic ontology remains unchallenged. A test is, however, urgently needed. It is essentially needed in those cases where the principles seem to threaten a new theory. It is then quite reasonable

to introduce alternative observation languages and so compare them both with the original idiom and with the theory under examination. Proceeding this way we must make sure that the comparison is fair. That is we must not criticize an idiom that is supposed to function as an observation language because it is not yet well known and is, therefore, less strongly connected with our sensory reactions and less plausible than another, more ‘common’ medium. Superficial criticisms of this kind, which have been elevated into an entire new ‘philosophy’ abound in discussions of the mind-body problem. Philosophers who want to introduce and test new views thus find themselves faced not with arguments, which they could most likely answer, but with an impenetrable stone wall of well-entrenched reactions. This is not at all different from the attitude of people ignorant of foreign languages, who feel that a certain colour is much better described by ‘red’ than by ‘rosso’. As opposed to such attempts at conversion by appeal to familiarity (I know what pains are, and I also know, from introspection, that they have nothing whatever to do with material processes!’), we must emphasise that a comparative judgment of observation languages, e.g. materialistic observation languages, phenomenalistic observation languages, objective-idealistic observation languages, theological observation languages, etc., can start only when all of them are spoken equally fluently.’

‘It is then quite reasonable to introduce alternative observation languages and so compare them both with the original idiom and with the theory under examination.’

as to comparison –

let’s be clear – if you are dealing with different – conflicting observation languages – there is no common ground to begin with

to suggest that the common ground is the ‘original idiom’ and the theory under examination – is a hoax

if the common ground was the original idiom and theory – there would be no argument – no ‘alternative’ observation language

the real point here is that there is no test – to suggest that there is – is pretentious

yes – there are propositional alternatives advanced –

and there is argument –

and once we get past the pretence of being ‘fair’ –

the persuasive battle takes off –

and the battle is to establish a propositional ground

now there is no way to predict in advance – which observation language – which theory – which world view – will win the day in any propositional conflict

you have to see what happens

‘As opposed to such attempts at conversion by appeal to familiarity (I know what pains are, and I also know, from introspection, that they have nothing whatever to do with material processes!’), we must emphasise that a comparative judgment of observation languages, e.g. materialistic observation languages, phenomenalistic observation languages, objective-idealistic observation languages, theological observation languages, etc., can start only when all of them are spoken equally fluently.’

yes – I am afraid conversion or at least some form of persuasion – wins the day –

for even ‘when all of them are spoken equally fluently’ – there will still be the question of which to proceed with –

speaking different languages fluently doesn’t determine which language to use – in which circumstance

we have options here – and that is a good thing –

one language may function better than another in a particular propositional context –

it is worth investigating different observational languages and their uses

however decisions must be made – and in practice that comes down to persuasion – to rhetoric –

and whatever decision is made – whatever rhetoric wins the day –

that decision – that rhetoric – is open to question – open to doubt – is logically speaking –

uncertain

‘The new natural interpretations constitute a new and highly abstract observation language. They are introduced and concealed so that one fails to notice that the change has taken place (method of anamnesis). They contain the idea of the relativity of all motion and the law of circular inertia.’

‘Galileo replaces one natural interpretation by a very different and as yet (1630) at least partly unnatural interpretation. How does he proceed? How does he manage to introduce absurd and counterinductive assertions, such as the assertion that the earth moves, and yet get them a just and attentive hearing? One anticipates that arguments will not suffice – an interesting and highly important limitation of rationalism – and Galileo’s utterances are indeed arguments in appearance only. For Galileo uses propaganda. He uses psychological tricks in addition to whatever intellectual reasons he has to offer. These tricks are very successful: they lead him to victory. But they obscure the new attitude to experience that is in the making, and postpone for centuries the possibility of a reasonable philosophy. They obscure the fact that the experience on which Galileo wants to base the Copernican view is nothing but the result of his own fertile imagination, that it has been invented. They obscure this fact by insinuating that the new results which emerge are known and conceded by all, and need only to be called to our attention to appear as the most obvious expression of the truth.

Galileo ‘reminds’ us that there are situations in which the non-operative character of shared motion is just as evident and firmly believed as the operative character of all motion is in other circumstances. (The latter idea is, therefore, not the only natural interpretation of motion). The situations are: events in a boat, in a smoothly moving carriage, and in other systems that contain an observer and permit him to carry out some simple operations’

let us hear from Galileo himself –

‘Sagredo: There has just occurred to me a certain fantasy which passed through my imagination one day while I was sailing to Aleppo, where I was going as a consul for our country….If the point of a pen had been on the ship during the whole voyage from Venice to Alexandretta and had the property of leaving visible marks of its whole trip, what trace – what mark – what line would it have left?

Simplicio: It would have left a line extending from Venice to there; not perfectly straight – or rather, not lying in the perfect arc of a circle – but more or less fluctuating as the vessel would now and again have rocked. But this bending in some places a yard or two to the right or left, up or down, in length of many hundreds of miles, would have made little alteration to the whole extent of the line. These would scarcely be sensible, and, without an error or any movement, it could be part of a perfect arc.

Sagredo: So if the fluctuation of the waves were taken away and the motion of the vessel were calm and tranquil, the true and precise motion of the pen would have been the arc of a perfect circle. Now if I had that same pen continually in my hand and had moved it only a little sometimes this way or that, what alterations should I have brought into the main extent of this line?

Simplicio: Less than that which would be given to a straight line a thousand yards long which deviated from the absolute straightness here and there by a flea’s eye.

Sagredo: Then if an artist had been drawing with that pen on a sheet of paper when he left the port and had continued doing so all the way to Alexandretta, he would have been able to derive from the pen’s motion a whole narrative of many figures, completely traced and sketched in thousands of directions, with landscapes, buildings, animals, and other things. Yet the actual real essential movement marked by the pen point would have been only a line; long, indeed but very simple. But as to the artist’s own actions, these would have been conducted exactly the same had the ship been standing still. The reason that of the pen’s long motion no trace would remain except the marks drawn upon the paper is that the gross motion from Venice to Alexandretta was common to the paper, the pen, and everything else in the ship. But the small motions back and forth, to the right and left, communicated by the artist’s fingers to the pen but not to the paper, and belonging to the former alone, could thereby leave a trace on the paper which remained stationary to those motions.’

Galileo is arguing here that perspective is the key to understanding motion

‘But this bending in some places a yard or two to the right or the left, up or down, in length of many hundreds of miles, would have made little alteration in the whole extent of the line’

the key phrase here is ‘the whole extent of the line’ – and the point is that though we might naturally focus on a part of the line – ‘this bending in some places’ – we can also adopt a broader perspective – the perspective of the whole line

it is this perspective – the larger perspective which gives us the ‘real motion’ of the boat

and if you take the fluctuations out of the analysis ‘if the fluctuations are taken away’ – the alterations to the line ‘would be less than a flea’s eye’

that is you can then ‘see’ the real motion as the arc of a perfect circle

this is strictly speaking an argument against immediate experience – or giving any weight to the perspective of immediate experience in terms of understanding ‘real’ motion

the argument goes on to show that the appearance of being stationary cannot be maintained relative to the perspective of real motion –

an artist drawing in the boat draws pictures of what he sees – ‘Yet the actual real essential movement marked by the pen point would have only been a line; long indeed but very simple – and the reason for this is the ‘gross motion (common motion) of the paper, the pen, and everything else in the ship’

however the immediate actions of the artist’s fingers to the pen – but not the paper – leaves a trace that ‘remained stationary’ – to those motions

what is clear from this argument is that immediate experience is a perspective – just as the so called ‘real’ motion is a perspective

this is not to say that Galileo holds that these perspectives should be given equal weight

Galileo makes clear in this argument that he regards the perspective of immediate experience as limited –

he clearly prefers the perspective of real motion – and his implicit argument for this preference is that it does not suffer the limitation of immediate experience

and the inference of course is that it will have greater application and functionality

now to the second example –

‘Salviati:…..imagine yourself in a boat with your eyes fixed on a point of the sail yard. Do you think that because the boat is moving along briskly, you will have to move your eyes in order to keep your vision always on the point of the sail yard and follow its motion?

Simplicio: I am sure that I should not need to make any such change at all: not just to my vision, but if I had aimed a musket I should never have to move a hairs breath to keep it aimed, no matter how the boat moved.

Salviati: And this comes about because the motion which the ship confers upon the sail yard, it also confers upon you and upon your eyes, so that you need not move them a bit in order to gaze at the top of the sail yard, which consequently appears motionless to you. (And the rays of vision go from the eye to the sail yard, just as if a cord where tied between two ends of the boat. Now a hundred cords are tied at different fixed points, each of which keeps its place whether the ship moves or remains still).’

the argument here is that the appearance of the sail yard as stationary is no more than a function of the motion of the boat from the perspective of an observer in the boat

as Feyerabend says it is clear that these situations lead to a non-operative concept of motion

(Galileo defines relative motion as motion ‘among things which share it in common’

and that this motion is non-operative in that it ‘remains insensible, imperceptible, and without any effect whatever’)

the first of the above two paradigms of non-operative motion is followed by this statement –

‘It is likewise true that the earth being moved, the motion of the stone in descending is actually a long stretch of many hundreds of yards, or even many thousand; and had it been able to mark its course in motionless air or some other surface, it would have left a very long slanting line. But that part of all this motion which is common to the rock, the tower, and ourselves remains insensible and as if it did not exist. There remains observable only that part in which neither the tower nor we are participants; in a word that with which the stone, in falling measures the tower.

And the second paradigm precedes the exhortation to ‘transfer this argument to the whirling of the earth and to the rock placed on top of the tower, whose motion you cannot discern because, in common with the rock, you posses from the earth that motion which is required for following the tower; you do not need to move your eyes. Next, if you add to the rock a downward motion which is peculiar to it and not shared by you, and which is mixed with this circular motion, the circular portion of the motion which is common to the stone and the eye continues to be imperceptible. The straight motion alone is sensible, for to follow that you must move your eyes downwards.’

Feyerabend says –

‘Yielding to this persuasion, we now automatically start confounding the conditions of the two cases and became relativists. This is the essence of Galileo’s trickery! As a result, the clash between Copernicus and ‘the conditions affecting ourselves and those in the air above us’ dissolves into thin air, and we finally realize ‘that all terrestrial events from which it is ordinarily held that the earth stands still and the sun and the fixed stars are moving would necessarily appear just the same to us if the earth moved and the other stood still.’

Feyerabend argues that Galileo ‘confounds the conditions of the two cases’ – and that this is the essence of his trickery

is this so?

Galileo puts forward a proposal – for relativism and non-operative shared motion

and this proposal – and the argument for it – does reconcile the tower argument with the Copernican theory of motion – thus reconciling operative and non-operative motion

Galileo argues by implication that the theory of absolute motion is limited in that it cannot account for non-operative motion

whereas a relativistic theory does accommodate operative and non-operative motion

the conditions of the two cases are not confounded – they are placed on the equal epistemological footing of relativism

the relativist theory has greater range and applicability –

and it is this greater range and applicability that makes it more useful to science than the Aristotelian idea of absolute motion

Galileo in his argument for the Copernican theory of motion has done some first class philosophical thinking and argument –

and further he has illustrated his argument for non-operative motion and relativism with examples that people can readily understand

it would suit Feyerabend to be able to show that Galileo was some kind of fraud

this would fit beautifully with Feyerabend’s so called irrationalism

the fact of it is though that on any fair reading of Galileo – all you have is elegantly constructed rational argument –

the only one trying to be tricky here is Feyerabend – and the trick doesn’t work –

what we have from Feyerabend is no real argument – just rhetorical assertion –

and in the best traditions of rhetoric – the attempt to discredit – a decent logical argument

Feyerabend puts forward two paradigms:

‘Let us now look at the situation from a more abstract point of view. We start with two conceptual sub-systems of ‘ordinary’ thought…One of them regards motion as an absolute process which always has effects, effects on our sense included… the arguments of Copernicus’s opponents which are quoted by Galileo himself and, according to him, are ‘very plausible’, show that there was a widespread tendency to think in its terms, and that this tendency was a serious obstacle to the discussion of alternative ideas.’

The second system is built around the relativity of motion, and is also well entrenched in its own domain of application. Galileo aims at replacing the first system by the second in all cases, terrestrial as well as celestial. Naïve realism with respect to motion is to be completely eliminated…

Now we have seen that this naïve realism is on occasions an essential part of our observational vocabulary. On these occasions…the observation language contains the idea of the efficacy of all motion. Or, to express it in the material mode of speech, our experience in these situations is an experience of objects which move absolutely. Taking this into consideration, it is apparent that Galileo’s proposal amounts to a partial revision of our observation language or of our experience. An experience which partly contradicts the idea of the motion of the earth is turned into an experience that confirms it, at least as far as ‘terrestrial things’ are concerned. This is what actually happens. But Galileo wants to persuade us that no change has taken place, that the second conceptual system is already universally known, even though it is not universally used. Salviati, his representative in the dialogue, his opponent Simplicio and Sagredo the intelligent layman, all connect Galileo’s method of argumentation with Plato’s theory of anamnesis – a clever tactical move, typically Galilean one is inclined to say. Yet we must not allow ourselves to be deceived about the revolutionary development that is actually taking place.’

‘Now we have seen that this naïve realism is on occasions an essential part of our observational vocabulary. On these occasions…the observation language contains the idea of the efficacy of all motion. Or, to express it in the material mode of speech, our experience in these situations is an experience of objects which move absolutely.’

our observational vocabulary can be interpreted in terms of the proposal of naïve realism

and we can have the same vocabulary – without the understanding that objects move absolutely –

that is we can have the same vocabulary – with a relativistic understanding

and in a sense – this is just what Galileo proposes and argues for

‘Taking this into consideration, it is apparent that Galileo’s proposal amounts to a partial revision of our observation language or of our experience. An experience which partly contradicts the idea of the motion of the earth is turned into an experience that confirms it, at least as far as ‘terrestrial things’ are concerned.’

‘a partial revision of our observation language or our experience’

this is a confusing statement

I would put that our experience is not revised – and that our observation language need not be revised

what is different – is not the experience per se – or even how it is expressed – but rather the understanding –

the understanding of the experience – the understanding of the observation language

in time of course a different understanding can lead to different expressions – changes in the observation language – but this is really incidental –

the real issue is always how the ‘experience’ is interpreted – how it is proposed – how it is understood

and the same is true with the observation language – the issue is what interpretation it is given

the experience itself – neither confirms a theory or contradicts it

what you have in play here is different theories of the experience – different proposals –

that is where the argument is

and what Galileo does is argue that the relativistic theory – the relativistic proposal –

can be shown to apply to all motion –

and in so arguing he puts that the proposal of absolute motion is indeed – naïve

and I think you would find that Galileo would see his proposal – as open to question – open to doubt – and therefore – uncertain

but also a proposal that represents the best of his thinking –

and a proposal that he would say should be taken seriously

‘The resistance against the assumption that shared motion is non-operative was equated with the resistance which forgotten ideas exhibit towards the attempt to make them known. Let us accept this interpretation of resistance. But let us not forget its existence. We must then admit that it restricts the use of the relativistic ideas, confining them to part of our everyday experience. Outside this part, i.e. in interplanetary space, they are ‘forgotten’ and therefore not active. But outside this there is not complete chaos. Other concepts are used, among them whose very same absolutistic concepts which derive from the first paradigm. We not only use them, but we must admit that they are entirely adequate. No difficulties arise as long as one remains within the limits of the first paradigm. “Experience’, i.e. the totality of all facts from all domains, cannot force us to carry out the change which Galileo wants to introduce. The motive for change must come from a different source.’

‘Other concepts are used, among them whose very same absolutist concepts which derive from the first paradigm. We not only use them, but we must admit that they are entirely adequate.’

if a concept is useful in a propositional context – then it will be used

‘No difficulties arise as long as one remains within the limits of the first paradigm.’

this can be argued – but the point really is that what we are dealing with is two different proposals – different paradigms – different theories of experience – different theories of motion

“Experience’, i.e. the totality of all facts from all domains, cannot force us to carry out the change which Galileo wants to introduce. The motive for change must come from a different source.’

Feyerabend is right here – at least in my terms he is right –

‘experience’ as such is an unknown –

that is to say experience – in the absence of proposal – any proposal – is unknown

we propose to make known

there is no known experience – independent of proposal – so no use pretending that there is – or pretending that you can appeal to it

the best you can do is argue for your theory – your interpretation – your proposal for experience – your understanding of experience

while at the same time regarding it as open to question – open to doubt – and as uncertain

‘The motive for change must come from a different source.’ –

‘the motive for change’?

my answer to this is to say that the proposal – in fact any proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

motives and change – are responses to and expressions of propositional uncertainty

Feyerabend continues –

‘It comes, first, from the desire to see ‘the whole [correspond] to its parts with wonderful simplicity’, as Copernicus had already expressed himself. It comes from the ‘typically metaphysical urge’ for unity of understanding and conceptual presentation. And the motive for a change is connected, secondly, with the intention to make room for the motion of the earth, which Galileo accepts and is not prepared to give up. The idea of the motion of the earth is closer to the first paradigm than to the second, or at least it was at the time of Galileo. This gave strength to the Aristotelian arguments and made them plausible. To eliminate this plausibility, it was necessary to subsume the first paradigm under the second, and to extend the relative notions to all phenomena. The idea of anamnesis functions here as psychological crutch, as a lever which smooths the process of submission by concealing its existence. As a result we are now ready to apply the notions not only to boats, coaches, birds, but to the solid and well-established earth’ as a whole. And we have the impression that this readiness was in us all the time, although it took some effort to make it conscious. This impression is most certainly erroneous: it is the result of Galileo’s propagandistic machinations. We would do better to describe the situation in a different way, as a change of our conceptual system. Or, because we are dealing with concepts which belong to natural interpretations, and which are therefore connected with sensations in a very direct way, we should describe it as a change of experience that allows us to accommodate the Copernican doctrine. The change corresponds perfectly to the pattern described in Chapter 2 below: an inadequate view, the Copernican theory, is supported by another inadequate view, the idea of the non-operative character of shared motion, and both theories gain strength and give support to each other in the process. It is this change which underlies the transition from the Aristotelian point of view to the epistemology of modern science.’

‘The idea of the motion of the earth is closer to the first paradigm than to the second, or at least it was at the time of Galileo. This gave strength to the Aristotelian arguments and made them plausible. To eliminate this plausibility, it was necessary to subsume the first paradigm under the second, and to extend the relative notions to all phenomena.’

look – which ever view you take – the argument will be that the opposing point of view can be accounted for in your perspective

‘The idea of anamnesis functions here as psychological crutch, as a lever which smooths the process of submission by concealing its existence. As a result we are now ready to apply the notions not only to boats, coaches, birds, but to the solid and well-established earth’ as a whole. And we have the impression that this readiness was in us all the time, although it took some effort to make it conscious. This impression is most certainly erroneous: it is the result of Galileo’s propagandistic machinations’

Galileo presents his argument in a way that is likely to be understood by the common man

propaganda – is opinion – without argument – masquerading as knowledge

now seriously – is Feyerabend going to say that Galileo’s elegant – thoughtful and logical argument – is opinion without argument masquerading as knowledge?

well – apparently so

and it is just here that you have to ask – well who’s the propagandist?

‘We would do better to describe the situation in a different way, as a change of our conceptual system. Or, because we are dealing with concepts which belong to natural interpretations, and which are therefore connected with sensations in a very direct way, we should describe it as a change of experience that allows us to accommodate the Copernican doctrine.’

as Feyerabend illustrates here – the ‘situation’ – can be described in different ways

different descriptions will suit different propositional contexts –

different descriptions will suit different audiences

the logical point is that where there is a change of perspective –

any proposal put to account for the change is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

‘For experience now ceases to be the unchangeable fundament which it is both in common sense and in Aristotelian philosophy. The attempt to support Copernicus makes experience ‘fluid’ in the very same manner in which it makes the heavens fluid, ‘so that each star moves around in it by itself’. An empiricist who starts from experience, and builds on it without ever looking back, now loses the very ground on which he stands. Neither the earth, ‘the solid, well-established earth’, nor the facts on which he usually relies on can be trusted any longer. It is clear that a philosophy that uses such a fluid and changing experience needs new methodological principles which do not insist on an asymmetric judgement of theories by experience. Classical Physics intuitively adopts such principles; at least the great and independent thinkers, such as Newton, Faraday, Boltzmann proceed in this way. But its official doctrine still clings to the idea of a stable and unchanging basis. The clash between this doctrine and the actual procedure is concealed by a tendentious presentation of the results of research that hides their revolutionary origin and suggests that they arose from a stable and unchanging source. These methods of concealment start with Galileo’s attempt to introduce new ideas under the cover of anamnesis and they culminate in Newton. They must be exposed if we want to arrive at a better account of the progressive elements in science.’

‘An empiricist who starts from experience, and builds on it without ever looking back, now loses the very ground on which he stands. Neither the earth, ‘the solid, well-established earth’, nor the facts on which he usually lies can be trusted any longer.’

the ground of our knowledge of the world – if we are to still run with such an idea –

is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

any proposal we put is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

we can describe where we start – as ‘starting from experience’ –

however to start here – is no different – logically speaking – than any other proposed stating place –

it will be open to question –

which is to say that the proposal ‘experience’ – or whatever your proposal is – is open to question – open to doubt – is uncertain

a proposal – is put – not ‘trusted’ – and ‘facts’ are proposals – open to question

we begin – logically speaking – in propositional uncertainty

as to an ‘official doctrine’ – I guess that depends on whether you think there are ‘officials’ in science – and if so – who they are

science is a critical study of proposals – of propositions –

who puts a proposal – is irrelevant

and yes – science as with any propositional activity has a rhetorical dimension –

however the rhetoric of science is about its presentation – not its substance –

we need not make rhetoric our focus – unless it gets out of hand

Feyerabend goes on about Galileo’s so called ‘methods of concealment’ –

as I see it Galileo presents his argument is a way that makes difficult philosophical and scientific issues – readily understandable to a scientifically illiterate populace –

his ingenious and successful presentation of his argument – may well explain why it gained support

‘exposing’ his presentation – is neither here nor there – and hardly worth a mention

what is important is the argument – the philosophical argument – the proposal –

that he advances in response to the Copernican problem –

a brilliant proposal – a brilliant argument – and one that is open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

I think Galileo would agree with that

‘My discussion of the anti-Copernican argument is not yet complete. So far, I have tried to discover what assumption will make a stone that moves alongside a moving tower appear to fall ‘straight down’, instead of being seen to move in an arc. The assumption which I shall call the relativity principle, that our senses notice only relative motion and are completely insensitive to a motion which objects have in common, was seen to do the trick. What remains to be explained is why the stone stays with the tower and is not left behind. In order to save the Copernican view, one must explain not only why a motion that preserves the relation among visible objects remains unnoticed, but also, why a common motion of various objects does not effect their relation. That is, one must

explain why such a motion is not a causal agent. Turning the question around … it is clear that the anti-Copernican argument …rests on two natural interpretations: viz., the epistemological assumption that absolute motion is always noticed, and the dynamical principle that objects (such as the falling stone) that are not interfered with assume their natural motion. The present problem is to supplement the relativity principle with a new law of inertia in such a fashion that the motion of the earth can still be asserted. One sees at once that the following law, the principle of circular inertia as I shall call it, provides the required solution: an object that moves with a given angular velocity on a frictionless sphere around the centre of the earth will continue moving with the same angular velocity forever. Combining the appearance of the falling stone with the relativity principle, the principle of circular inertia and with some simple assumptions concerning the composition of velocities, we obtain an argument which no longer endangers Copernicus’ view, but can be used to give it partial support.

yes – a good argument from Feyerabend – a good proposal in support of the Copernican view –

clearly though – a proposal open to question – open to doubt – and uncertain

‘The relativity principle was defended in two ways. The first was by showing how it helps Copernicus: this defence is truly ad hoc. The second was in pointing to its function in common sense, and by surreptitiously generalizing that function (see above). No independent argument was given for its validity. Galileo’s support for the principle of circular motion is of exactly the same kind. He introduces the principle, again not by reference to experiment or to independent observation, but by reference to what everyone is supposed to know.’

Galileo put forward a proposal – and argues for a change of perspective

what Galileo simply does is say – if you understand my argument and accept my argument – you will see the inherent sense of its conclusion

and you will see and understand the physical world differently

no great conspiracy or deception there

and yes Galileo does not claim that his proposal is based on ‘independent argument for its validity’

perhaps he did not think there is such a thing

‘Simplicio: So you have not made a hundred tests, or even one? And yet you so freely declare it to be certain? …

Salviati: Without experiment I am sure the effect will happen as I tell you, because it must happen that way; and I might also add that you yourself also know that it cannot happen otherwise, no matter how you might pretend not to know it …but I am so handy at picking people’s brains that I shall make you confess this in spite of yourself.’

this is not Galileo’s finest moment – what we have here is rhetoric – pretentious rhetoric

‘Step by step, Simplicio is forced to admit that a body that moves, without friction, on a sphere concentric with the centre of the earth will carry out a ‘boundless’, a ‘perpetual’ motion, that what Simplicio accepts is based neither on experiment nor a corroborated theory. It is a daring suggestion that involves a tremendous leap of the imagination. A little more analysis then shows that this suggestion is connected with experiments, such as the experiments of the Discorsi, by ad hoc hypotheses. (The amount of friction to be eliminated follows not from independent investigations – such investigations commence only much later in the 18^th century – but from the result to be achieved, viz. the circular law of inertia.) Viewing natural phenomena in this way leads to a re-evaluation of all experience, as we have seen. We can now add that it leads to the invention of a new kind of experience that is not only more sophisticated but far more speculative than is the experience of Aristotle or of common sense. Speaking paradoxically, but not incorrectly, one may say that Galileo invents an experience that has metaphysical ingredients. It is by means of such an experience that the transition from a geocentric cosmology to the point of view of Copernicus and Kepler is achieved.’

‘what Simplicio accepts is based neither on experiment nor a corroborated theory. It is a daring suggestion that involves a tremendous leap of the imagination.’

what is put to Simplicio – is a proposal –

and yes it is daring – and a leap of the imagination –

this is all very well – the logical point is that this proposal – is open to question – open to doubt – and daring and imaginative as it is – it is as a proposal – uncertain

‘Viewing natural phenomena in this way leads to a re-evaluation of all experience, as we have seen. We can now add that it leads to the invention of a new kind of experience that is not only more sophisticated but far more speculative than is the experience of Aristotle or of common sense. Speaking paradoxically, but not incorrectly, one may say that Galileo invents an experience that has metaphysical ingredient.’.

yes – viewing natural phenomena in this way – leads to a different understanding of experience

it is not the invention of a ‘new kind of experience’ –

it is a new interpretation of experience – a new theory of experience –

it is a new proposing of experience

and yes it can be seen as a more sophisticated theory than that of Aristotle – or of common sense

and if it is held open to question – open to doubt – and regarded as uncertain –

it will be springboard for speculation – speculation that is logical

Galileo doesn’t invent an experience – he puts up a proposal for how we can interpret experience

as to the ‘metaphysical ingredient’ –

what theory of reality – is without a metaphysical ingredient?

or to put it more precisely –

what proposal – cannot be analysed in metaphysical terms?

‘Initial difficulties caused by the change are defused by ad hoc hypotheses which thus turn out occasionally to have a positive function; they give new theories a breathing space, and they indicate the direction of future research.’

‘This is the place to mention certain ideas developed by Lakatos which throw light on the problem of the growth of knowledge, and which to some extent, undermine his own quest for law and order in science.

It is customary to assume that good scientists refuse to employ ad hoc hypotheses and are right to do so. New ideas, so it is thought, go far beyond the available evidence and must go beyond it in order to be of value. Ad Hoc hypotheses are bound to creep in eventually, but they should be resisted and kept at bay. This is the customary attitude as it is expressed, for example, in the writings of K. R. Popper.

As opposed to this, Lakatos has pointed out that ‘adhocness’ is neither despicable, nor absent from the body of science. New ideas he emphasizes, are essentially entirely ad hoc, they cannot be otherwise. And they are reformed only in a piecemeal fashion, by gradually stretching them, so that they apply to situations lying beyond their starting point. Schematically:

Popper: New theories have, and must have, excess content which is, but should not be, gradually infected by ad hoc adaptations.

Lakatos: New theories are, and cannot be anything but, ad hoc. Excess content is and should be created in a piecemeal fashion, by gradually extending them to new facts and domains.’

Popper’s notion of excess content –

a new theory is to have ‘excess content’ – relative to the older theory – if it is to be preferable to the older theory

if the idea is that a new theory is only preferable to an older theory – if it adds ‘excess content’ to that older theory –

then all you have is ad hoc additions to the original theory

on this view there is no place for a genuinely different theory – with different content

science as an investigation of different theories comes to a stop

and as for Popper’s prohibition on ad hoc theories –

his notion of excess content depends on ad hoc theories

Popper’s view of the growth of knowledge – of scientific knowledge – is rendered incoherent because of his view of ad hoc theories

the deeper problem is that Popper fails to see that the issue of scientific method – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

we need to be open to the many and varied descriptions of how science works –

and we need to look for new ways of describing science

it is not a matter of simply insisting that there is only one way for scientists to proceed –

to take such a view is to adopt and authoritarian attitude – which in the end comes down to nothing but pretence and rhetoric

for Lakatos – all new content – excess content – is ad hoc

now the question here is – are you dealing with new and different theories – or not?

if you are just talking about additions to the current theory – then you can say that such are ad hoc

but in that case – you have no new theory – just an older theory added to

if a genuinely new theory is proposed – what will mark it out – is that it is different

it will present a different picture of reality – it will come from a different perspective – its content will be different

Lakatos I think is a philosophical bureaucrat – he has no notion of genuine theoretical difference –

anything that comes into the in-tray gets absorbed into the balance sheet –

there is nothing that can’t be fitted into the expanding ledger

hard to say – but this just may be a good picture of a great deal of scientific practise

but it doesn’t account for genuinely new theories – genuinely different content

with their focus on ad hocness both Popper and Lakatos are in the same boat – they cannot account for new theories

if a new theory is not taken up as a prospect – for whatever reason – it stays on the outer

if a new theory is brought in from the cold – it plays a role –

just what that role is – will be determined by those involved

it may be regarded as adding to the current debate – or it may be seen as turning things in a new direction

if the later – is that ad hoc – or a real change in propositional perspective?

however it is regarded – however it is described – the propositional action is open to question – open to doubt – and is as a matter of fact – uncertain

we can get too hung up on this idea of the ad hoc –

I’m inclined to think it is a non-issue

the basic problem with Lakatos’ view is that it renders the notion of ad hoc meaningless

ad hoc to what – if every hypothesis is ad hoc?

the best you can say of Lakatos’ contribution here is that he proposes that scientific theories or hypotheses can be or are related to each other

‘being related to each other’ – is not a strong enough criterion to distinguish anything from anything

the result is that Lakatos’ view is of no consequence for science

Feyerabend says he sides with Lakatos over Popper and wants to show that the early history of Galileo’s mechanics ‘tells exactly the same story’

he looks at some statements on the nature of motion from Galileo’s early works Du Motu and Dialogue on Motion and concludes that Galileo is in agreement with Aristotle’s general theory of motion – where a mover is postulated for every motion

‘Galileo seems to accept this part of the theory, both when letting rotating spheres slow down and when accepting the ‘force of the intelligences’. He also accepts the impetus theory which attributes any motion to an internal moving force similar to the force of sound that resides in a bell long after it has been struck, and is supposed to ‘gradually diminish.

Looking at these few examples, we see that Galileo ascribes a special position to motions which are neither natural or forced. Such motions may last for a considerable time, even though they are not supported by the surrounding medium. But they do not last forever,

and they need an internal driving force in order to persist even for a finite time.

Now if one wants to overcome the dynamical arguments against the motion of the earth (and we are here thinking about its rotation rather than its motion around the sun) then the two underlined principles must both be revised. It must be assumed that the ‘neutral motions’ which Galileo discusses in his early writings, may last forever, or at least for periods comparable to the age of historical records. And they must be regarded as ‘natural’ in the entirely new and revolutionary sense that neither an outer nor an inner motor is needed to keep them going. The first assumption is necessary to account for the daily rising and setting of stars. The second assumption is necessary if we want to regard motion as a relative phenomenon, depending on the choice of a suitable co-ordinate system. Copernicus, in his brief remarks on the problem, makes the first assumption, and perhaps the second. Galileo takes a long time arriving at a comparable theory. He formulates permanence along a horizontal line as a hypothesis in his Discorsi, and he seems to make both assumptions in the Dialogue.’

Feyerabend says –

‘My guess is that a clear idea of permanent motion with(out) impetus developed in Galileo only together with his gradual acceptance of the Copernican view. Galileo changed his view about the ‘neutral’ motions – he made them permanent and ‘natural’ – in order to make them compatible with the rotation of the earth and in order to evade the difficulties of the tower argument. His new ideas concerning motions are, therefore, at least partly ad hoc. Impetus in the old sense disappeared partly for methodological reasons (interest in the how, not in the why – this development itself deserves careful study), partly because of the vaguely perceived inconsistency with the idea of the relativity of all motion. The wish to save Copernicus plays a role in either case.’

Feyerabend says that Galileo in dropping the Aristotelian ideas and replacing them with the idea of permanent motion without impetus – was adopting an ad hoc strategy – a strategy designed to support the Copernican view

dropping the Aristotelian ideas and replacing them with the idea of permanent motion –

can be seen as an addition to the Copernican view –

this is a fair enough interpretation –

however this issue is really just and only a matter of perspective

you could also argue that the key theory that Galileo was concerned to advance was the theory of permanent motion

and that the Copernican view – was an addition to this theory – an addition designed to give the permanent motion theory substance and credibility

my overall point here is that we can look at the development and function of theories – and hypotheses – from different perspectives –

there is no one way of viewing the matter – just as there is no one way of proceeding in science

Feyerabend proceeds –

‘Now if we are right in assuming that Galileo framed an ad hoc hypothesis at this point, then we can also praise him for his methodological acumen. It is obvious that the moving earth demands a new dynamic. One test of the old dynamics consists in the attempt to establish the motion of the earth. Trying to establish the motion of the earth is the same as trying to find a refuting instance for the old dynamics. The motion of the earth, however, is inconsistent with the tower experiment if this experiment is interpreted in accordance with the old dynamics. Interpreting the tower argument in accordance with the old dynamics, therefore, means trying to save the old dynamics in an ad hoc fashion. If one does not want to do this one must find a different interpretation for the phenomena of free fall. What interpretation should be chosen? One wants an interpretation that turns the motion of the earth into a refuting instance of the old dynamics, without lending ad hoc support to the motion of the earth itself. The first step towards such an interpretation is to establish contact, however vague, with the ‘phenomena’ i.e. with the falling stone, and to establish it in such a manner that the motion of the earth is not obviously contradicted. The most primitive element of this step is to frame an ad hoc hypothesis with respect to the rotation of the earth. The next step would be to elaborate the hypothesis, so that additional predictions become possible. Copernicus and Galileo take the first and primitive step. Their procedure looks contemptible only if one forgets that the aim is to test older views rather than to prove new ones, and if one also forgets that developing a good theory is a complex process that has to start modestly and that it takes time.’

‘The most primitive element of this step is to frame an ad hoc hypothesis with respect to the rotation of the earth’

yes – in terms of the Galilean / Copernican problematic –

relative to the theory of the motion of the earth – an hypothesis with respect to the rotation of the earth – is an addition to that theory –

in that the idea is that it reconciles free fall – with the theory of the motion of the earth and challenges the tower argument of the old dynamic

you would have to say this additional hypothesis strengthens the theory of the motion of the earth – as an alternative to the old dynamic

however the ‘addition’ – is only an addition – if view historically –

in terms of the overall theory – it could well be seen as integral

there is nothing against an historical view of theory development – however it is only one view – and a plodding one at that –

‘piecemeal’ is Lakatos’ term here

‘Their procedure looks contemptible only if one forgets that the aim is to test older views rather than to prove new ones, and if one also forgets that developing a good theory is a complex process that has to start modestly and that it takes time.’

science just is this argument – an argument of different perspectives – different theories –

and in terms of the logic of any scientific argument – it is irrelevant which is the old view and which is the new –

that is to say the history of any scientific argument – is from a logical point of view – irrelevant –

it is history – here – that is ad hoc –

and of no value to the problematic per se

now with regard to how Feyerabend uses the notion ad hoc –

Lakatos’ view is that every theory and every addition or subtraction to or from a theory is to be regarded as ad hoc

Feyerabend also runs with this version of ad hoc when he says –

‘The historical material I have been discussing ….lends unambiguous support to the position of Lakatos. The early history of Galileo’s mechanics tells exactly the same story.’

no description – no historical theory – if it is held rationally – is without question – is without doubt – is certain

the matter is not ‘unambiguous’ –

I would have thought that just this would be Feyerabend’s point –

after all – he represents himself as the ‘anything goes’ man

and if ‘anything goes’ – then one particular view – is not the end of the story –

you would expect at the very least the presentation of a range of different views

this argument over ad hoc hypotheses really goes back to Popper – who make a big deal of it – when in fact it is a non-issue

what’s in and what’s out of a theory – what strengthens and what weakens it – or what is irrelevant to it –

these are matters that are never finally settled –

nevertheless in practise – decisions get made –

and any decision here – is open to question – open to doubt – and is uncertain

in conclusion I find Feyerabend’s support of Lakatos’ view quite puzzling

which brings me to the claim that Lakatos is a fellow anarchist –

that is a stretch – that is very hard to explain

and by the way fellow anarchist to who?

‘In addition to natural interpretations, Galileo also changes sensations that seem to endanger Copernicus. He admits that there are such sensations, he praises Copernicus for having disregarded them, he claims to have removed them with the help of his telescope. However he offers no theoretical reasons why the telescope should be expected to give a true picture of the sky.’

Feyerabend says –

‘For while it might be admitted that Copernicus simply acted on faith, it may also be said that Galileo found himself in an entirely different position. Galileo, after all, invented a new dynamics. And he invented the telescope. The new dynamics, one might point out, removes the inconsistency between the motion of the earth and the ‘conditions affecting ourselves and those in the air above us’. And the telescope removes the ‘even more glaring’ clash between the changes in the apparent brightness of Mars and Venus as predicted on the basis of the Copernican scheme and as seen with the naked eye. This incidentally is Galileo’s own view. He admits that ‘were it not for the existence of a superior and better sense than natural and common sense to join forces with reason’ he would have been ‘much more recalcitrant towards the Copernican system’. The ‘superior and better sense’ is of course, the telescope, and one is inclined to remark that the apparent counterinductive procedure was as a matter of fact induction (or conjecture plus refutation plus new conjecture) but one based on a better experience, containing not only better natural interpretations but also a better sensory core than was available to Galileo’s Aristotelian predecessors. This matter must now be examined in more detail.’

‘The telescope is a superior and better sense’ that gives new and more reliable evidence for judging astronomical matters. How is this hypothesis examined, and what arguments are presented in its favour?’

in the Sidereus Nuncius Galileo writes that he ‘succeeded (in building the telescope) through a deep study of the theory of refraction’

Feyerabend says this suggests that Galileo had theoretical reasons for preferring the results of telescopic observations – to observations with the naked eye

but according to Feyerabend the particular reason Galileo gives – his insight into the theory of refraction – is not correct and not sufficient

Feyerabend here points out that Galileo in a letter to Guiliano Medici in 1610 more than half a year after the publication of the Sidereus Nuncius – asks for a copy of Kepler’s Optics of 1604 saying he had not been able to obtain it in Italy

and that Jean Tarde who in 1614 asked Galileo about the construction of telescopes of pre-assigned magnification – says that Galileo regarded the matter as difficult and that he found Kepler’s Optics so obscure ‘that perhaps its own author had not understood it’

also in a letter to Liceti two years before his death Galileo says the nature of light is still in darkness

Feyerabend concludes Galileo’s knowledge of optics was inferior to that of Kepler’s

first off Galileo does not claim to have a superior knowledge of optics to that of Kepler

he says Kepler’s book is virtually unreadable –

you cannot assume from this claim that Galileo concludes anything at all about Kepler’s knowledge

further it doesn’t tell us anything about Galileo’s knowledge

the fact that he may have regarded the nature of light as still in darkness – again does not tell us anything in particular about Galileo’s mastery or not of the subject

it is fair enough to assume that in making such a statement Galileo knew something of what he was talking about

in my opinion it suggests he has looked at the various theories and found them all wanting – or something along these lines

also ‘a deep study of the theory of refraction’ – means just that – a deep study

one can make a deep study of subject and still be unclear or unsure of its principles

we don’t know if this was the case with Galileo

but it is clear that deep study does not necessarily result in one being confident about one’s knowledge

so what can we make of his claim that he succeeded in building the telescope through a deep study of the theory of refraction?

I am inclined to accept Galileo at his word

a deep – albeit inconclusive study – may well result in the production of an instrument

let’s say that in Galileo’s mind the construction of the telescope was the a result of his study of refraction

and we can ask – what other ‘explanation’ did he have – could he have had?

let us assume for argument’s sake that Galileo is mistaken here – that even though he explains the making of the telescope in terms of his study – in fact there were other factors involved which he did not recognize such as i.e. luck or inspiration

we can say here Galileo’s view of what he accomplished is only one view –

other accounts are possible

in this case we really don’t have enough information as to what did or did not go on

perhaps if you got right down to it Galileo might have to admit he did not know how he made the telescope with any certainty

this is not to question the instrument or its making – just the epistemology surrounding it

in any case Feyerabend clearly thinks that if you can show Galileo was deficient in his knowledge of the theory of refraction – then he did not really have any theoretical reasons for preferring the observations of the telescope over those of the naked eye

my point would be – even if Galileo was not confident in his knowledge of the theory of refraction –

this in itself is not relevant for why one would regard the telescope’s observations as preferable to those of the naked eye

a theory of refraction will explain how the telescope works – it will also explain how the eye works

the theory of refraction will not give you reason for preferring one over the other

it is actually irrelevant to this question

Galileo says of the telescope that it removes the ‘even more glaring’ clash between the changes in the apparent brightness of Mars and Venus as predicted on the basis of the Copernican scheme and as seen with the naked eye

so the clash between the Copernican theory and the naked eye is removed by the use of telescope

it seems clear to me that the theoretical reason Galileo gives for preferring the telescope as an instrument over the naked eye (as an instrument) is just that its results can be seen to support of the Copernican view

and here we have a genuine theoretical reason

Feyerabend’s argument about theoretical preference here depends on a confusion between different kinds of theory – a theory of refraction – on the one hand – and a cosmological theory on the other hand

the theory of refraction will not settle the issue of the preference of instruments – the naked eye or the telescope –

it seems that for Galileo – the issue is settled by the support that the telescope’s results give to the Copernican cosmology

whether you agree with him or not here – you have to admit – it is a genuine reason in support of one theory against another

Feyerabend goes on to quote Professor E Hoppe –

‘Galileo’s assertion that having heard of the Dutch telescope he reconstructed the apparatus by mathematical calculation must of course be understood with a grain of salt; for in his writings we do not find any calculations and the report by letter, which he gives of his first effort says that no better lenses had been available; six days later we find him on the way to Venice with a better piece to hand it as a gift to the Doge Leonardi Donati. This does not look like calculation; it rather looks like trial and error. The Calculation may well have been of a different kind, and here he succeeded, for on 25 August 1609 his salary was increased by a factor of three.’

the only real argument here is that there were no calculations found in his writings

this does not mean no calculations were made

and even if you accept the so called alternative – it is hard to see how a process of trial and error – in the making of a telescope – would not involve calculation

Feyerabend goes on to say –

‘‘it was experience and not mathematics that led Galileo to a serene faith in the reliability of his device’. [Geymonat] This second hypothesis on the origin of the telescope is also supported by Galileo’s testimony, in which he writes that he had tested the telescope ‘a hundred times on a hundred thousand stars and other objects.’’ [Letter to Cariosco 1616]

the reality is that ‘experience’ is the problematic – what is to count as genuine experience?

the observations of the naked eye or the observations obtained via the telescope?

experience actually will not arbitrate the matter – what decides the issue here?

clearly Galileo’s preference for the Copernican system

the argument of the telescope is really that it makes the naked eye argument irrelevant

the observations of the naked eye can now be seen as a limited case of telescopic vision

that is to say the naked eye has not been refuted – rather it has been incorporated into a larger vision

our interest becomes then not what is seen with the naked eye – but rather what can be seen when the naked eye is extended

the argument of the telescope is that it enables us to have greater vision

this is primarily an instrumentalist argument

it is the instrument – not its theory – that enables us to see experience in a new light

in the appendix 2 of this chapter Feyerabend says –

‘It is different with the psychological problems raised by the telescopic observations. These problems were seen by Pecham and others (such as Roger Bacon) and they still remain (moon illusion). At the time of Galileo they were tremendous, and they account for the strange reports (some of which were discussed in my text). These problems are comparable to the problems of somebody who, having never seen a lens before, looks for the first time into a very bad microscope. Not knowing what to expect (after all, one doesn’t meet man size fleas on the sidewalk), he is unable to separate the properties of the ‘object’ from the ‘illusions’ created by the instrument (distortions; coloured fringes; discolouring; etc.) and he cannot make sense of the objects themselves. On the surface of the earth – with buildings, ships, etc. – the telescope of course will work well; these are familiar things and our knowledge of them eliminates most distortions just as the first observers soon noticed, and said. Thus it is true that the telescope causes illusions both in the sky and in the terrestrial cases (p. 20), but only the heavenly illusions were a real problem, for the reasons just stated.’

outside of an observational context – any observation – of the naked eye or of another instrument such as the telescope will be without known reference

which is to say the observation will not be identifiable – it will not be describable – it is an unknown

what is to count as real and what is to count as illusion is always a matter of context –

i.e. relative to the use of a particular instrument in a particular context – distortions etc. will be regarded as real –

that is they are real effects of such a use of the instrument in that context

on the other hand relative to a broader epistemological context that involves complex scientific theory and complex philosophical theory – these effects can be categorized as non-central and hence illusory

it all depends finally – not on what is there – but rather what you are looking for

that is it depends on the conceptions – the proposals – you bring to the observation

with the original use of the telescope in the celestial context – the issue is of course – just the establishment of the context –

factors involved in this process will be e.g. previous observational preconceptions – the state of the critical discussion – and the goals of the current endeavour etc.

may I suggest that at the beginning – looking through the telescope into the heavens – the only clear vision was the unknown

Feyerabend began this chapter with –

‘However, he offers no theoretical reasons why the telescope should be expected to give a true picture of the sky’.

Feyerabend does not show that Galileo held the view that the ‘telescope should be expected to give a true picture of the sky’

we can safely assume Galileo believed that the telescope provides a different picture of the sky

we just don’t know if this picture was for Galileo – the ‘true’ picture

it is at least conceivable that Galileo did not think a ‘true picture’ – in the sense of an end to the matter – was achievable

which is to say he may just have had an open mind on the nature of the heavens

we do know that he favoured the Copernican view and that he thought the observations from the telescope supported that view

having said this it nevertheless strikes me that Galileo regarded the instrumental advantage of the telescope to be obvious to anyone with their eyes open

in the end however – what we have from Galileo here – is a proposal – nothing more –

a proposal that is open to question – open to doubt – and is in every respect – uncertain

‘Nor does the initial experience with the telescope provide such reasons. The first telescopic observations of the sky are indistinct, indeterminate, contradictory and in conflict with what everyone can see with his unaided eyes. And the only theory that would have helped to separate telescopic illusions from veridical phenomena was refuted by simple tests’

Feyerabend argues –

the problem of telescopic vision is different for celestial and terrestrial vision –

it was thought to be different at Galileo’s time because of the idea that celestial and terrestrial objects are formed from different materials and obey different laws

this means that the result of an interaction of light with terrestrial objects cannot be extended to the sky

added to this is the idea that the senses are acquainted with the close appearance of terrestrial objects and are able to perceive them distinctly – even if the telescopic image is distorted

the stars are not known by close acquaintance

therefore we cannot use our memory for distinguishing the effect of the telescope from the object itself

also all the familiar clues which aid terrestrial vision are absent when dealing with the sky – and new phenomena abound

only a new theory of vision containing both hypotheses could bridge the gap between terrestrial (unaided vision) and celestial (telescopic) experience

Feyerabend’s first task is to –

‘comment on the contradictions and difficulties which arise when one tries to take the celestial results of the telescope at their face value, as indicating, stable, objective properties of things seen.’

he refers to the fact that many of Galileo’s contemporaries regarded what was seen in the telescope as unsatisfactory or illusory

he mentions here Aristotle’s explanation that the senses applied in abnormal conditions are likely to give abnormal results –

he also points out that in the 16th century they were unaware of strong positive illusions

the extent of which was not realized until the work of Ronchi – who showed that the greatest variations have to do with the placement of the telescopic image – and correspondingly – in the observed magnification

some observers placed the image inside the telescope – making it change its position with the lateral position of the eye – as it would be with an after image – or a reflex inside the telescope

this was regarded as an excellent proof of illusion

others placed the image in a way that led to no magnification – when a magnification of over thirty had been promised

even a doubling of images can be explained by a lack of proper focusing

in my view here we are primarily talking about instrumental limitations – and problems that come from the lack of a secure theory and protocol of usage

Galileo reports unevennesses at the inner boundary of the lighted part of the moon while the outer boundary appears round and circular

the moon appeared to be full of mountains at the inside but smooth at the periphery –

despite the fact that the periphery changed as a result of the moon’s librations

the moon and some planets such as Jupiter were enlarged while the apparent diameter of the fixed stars decreased – the planets were brought nearer while the stars were pushed away

Galileo says –

‘The stars, fixed as well as erratic, when seen with the telescope, by no means appear to be increased in magnitude in the same proportion as other objects, and the moon itself, gain increase of size; but in the case of the stars such increase appears much less, so that

you consider that a telescope (which for the sake of illustration) is powerful enough to magnify other objects a hundred times, will scarcely render the stars magnified four or five times’

Feyerabend says the strangest features of the early history of the telescope can be seen when we have a look at Galileo’s pictures of the moon

‘It needs only a brief look at Galileo’s drawings, and at photographs of similar phases, to convince the reader that ‘none of the features recorded….can be safely identified

with any known markings of the lunar landscape.’ [Kopal] Looking at such evidence it is easy to think that ‘Galileo was not a great astronomical observer; or else the excitement of so many telescopic discoveries made by him at the time had temporarily blurred his skill or critical sense’ [R. Wolf]

Feyerabend has his doubts about this view in light of the ‘quite extraordinary skill which Galileo exhibits on other occasions’ – here referring to Galileo’s discovery and identification of the moon’s of Jupiter

he argues there are other hypotheses which lead to new suggestions which show just how complex the situation was at the time of Galileo

Feyerabend goes on to consider two such hypotheses –

hypothesis I

‘Galileo recorded faithfully what we he saw and in this way left us evidence of the shortcomings of the first telescopes as well as the peculiarities of contemporary telescopic vision’

Feyerabend thinks that what would be needed to establish this view would be an empirical collection of all the early telescopic results – including all the pictorial representations that have survived

but this he notes is a yet to be written history

hypothesis II

‘hypothesis II, just like Hypothesis I, approaches telescopic reports from the point of view of the theory of perception; but it adds that the practise of telescopic observation and acquaintance with the new telescopic reports changed not only what was seen through the telescope, but also what was seen with the naked eye.’

Feyerabend’s view is that this hypothesis has many difficulties – and perhaps should be given up

however he thinks that looking at this hypothesis is important for our evaluation of the contemporary attitude to Galileo’s reports

first up Feyerabend summarizes the situation Galileo was in –

Galileo was only barely acquainted with contemporary optical theory

his telescope gave good results on the earth

in the celestial realm the telescope produced spurious and contradictory results that seemed to be refuted by the unaided eye

a new theory of telescopic vision was required to separate appearance and reality

such a theory was developed by Kepler in 1604 and 1611

‘According to Kepler, the place of the image of a punctiform object is found by first tracing the path of the rays emerging from the object according to the laws of (reflection and) refraction until they reach the eye, and then by using the principle (still taught today) that ‘the image will be seen in the point determined by the background intersection of the rays of vision of both eyes’ [Werke] or in the case of monocular vision, from the two sides of the pupil. This rule which proceeds from the assumption that ‘the image is the work of the act of vision’, is partly empirical and partly geometrical. It bases the position of the image on a ‘metrical triangle’ or a ‘telemetric triangle’ as Ronchi calls it, that is constructed out of the rays which finally arrive at the eye and is used by the eye and the mind to place the image at the proper distance. Whatever the optical system, whatever the total path of the rays from the object to the observer, the mind of the observer utilizes its very last part only and bases its visual judgement, the perception, on it.’

Feyerabend says this is an advance on previous thought – but entirely false

take a magnifying glass – determine its focus – and look at an object close to it

the telemetric triangle now reaches beyond the object to infinity

no such phenomenon is ever observed

we see the image slightly enlarged in a distance that is most of the time identical with the actual distance between the object and the lens

the visual distance of the image remains constant – however much we may vary the distance between lens and object – and even when the image is distorted

I am rather surprised at this argument from Feyerabend

Kepler’s telemetric triangle is a calculation – it is not a phenomenon

so arguing that it is not observed – is no argument against it

what you have from Kepler is a theoretical model for vision – a decision – in short on how to define vision

and this model – as with any such model – is open to question – open to doubt –

is uncertain

Feyerabend concludes with –

‘This then was the actual situation in 1610 when Galileo published his telescopic findings. How did Galileo react to it? The answer has already been given: he raised the telescope to the state of superior and better sense’

I take the view that Galileo’s success here was an intuitive success

his argument was an argument for common sense – and an argument for the common man

common sense tells us and the denizens of the 16th century that vision is variable –

that it is relative –

you do not need to enlist a telescope to realize this – just step back from or move closer to what you are observing – to see the difference – to be aware of the relativity

the argument of the telescope is really just the common sense relative vision argument –

in the instrument of a telescope

I am of course here quarantining the 16th century mind and for that matter the modern mind to the context of vision – minus the extraneous considerations of cosmological theory

Galileo’s problem was never the question of what can be seen or understood by those with their eyes and minds open –

his problem was that of dealing with those in the political philosophical and religious domains who had (and still have) a invested interest in propagating theoretical and empirical blindness

Galileo was deeply involved in theoretical uncertainty and he was deeply involved in observational uncertainty

what we have in the work of Galileo is an exploration of those propositional uncertainties

and it is this exploration of uncertainty that leads to the growth of knowledge –

uncertain knowledge

Feyerabend's Against Method

Saturday, April 28, 2018

Feyerabend's Against method 1 - 10